Tag Archives: Title VII

June 13, 2014

Forced “Onionhead” Practices At Work Result in EEOC Religious Discrimination Lawsuit

“I love you, man.” Appropriate for beer commercials but perhaps not for the workplace. A New York employer who allegedly required employees to participate in prayer circles, thank God for their job and say “I love you” to managers and co-workers faces a religious discrimination lawsuit filed recently by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC seeks compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of three employees who were fired, allegedly for opposing the required “Onionhead” practices, and a class of similarly harmed individuals. EEOC v. United Health Programs of America, No. 14-cv-3673 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 11, 2014).

Company Required “Harnessing Happiness” or “Onionhead” Practices

According to the EEOC complaint, three former employees of United Health Programs of America filed charges alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII because the company required employees to engage in practices under a belief system called “Harnessing Happiness” or “Onionhead.” According to the Harnessing Happiness website, Onionhead is an “incredibly pure, wise and adorable character” who “wants everyone to know how they feel and then know what to do with those feelings.” The three women claim that the company required them to participate in various Onionhead-related activities on a daily and weekly basis, including praying, reading spiritual texts, burning candles, keeping lights at work very dim, thanking God for their employment and saying “I love you” to colleagues and managers. They assert that every day, employees were asked to select Onionhead-related cards to keep next to their computers and to wear Onionhead-related pins. In addition, one of the company’s upper managers and the aunt of the company owner, “Denali,” was the leader of the Onionhead practices and allegedly would require employees to attend one-on-one sessions with her in order to read and discuss books about “divine plans,” “moral codes” and “enlightenment.”

Fired – Allegedly for Opposing Onionhead Practices

Each of the three Charging Parties, Elizabeth Ontaneda, Francine Pennisi and Faith Pabon, were allegedly fired for objecting to the Onionhead practices. Pennisi, an Account Manager and IT Project Manager, spoke up at a managers’ meeting in July 2010, stating that she was Catholic and did not want to participate in the Onionhead activities. Ontaneda, a Senior Accounting Manager for Customer Service, also spoke up at the meeting, saying she felt the same way. A few weeks later, both women were relocated to work in an open area on the customer service floor, rather than in their offices, and their duties were changed to require answering phones. Denali placed a large statue of Buddha in Pennisi’s empty office. Denali also spoke of “demons” in connection with Ontaneda’s and Pennisi’s resistance to Onionhead practices. The day after losing their offices, the women called in sick and were terminated by the company owner by phone and voicemail.

Pabon, a Customer Care Consultant, attended a spa weekend in Connecticut with Denali and about 20 other customer service employees. Pabon alleges that Denali stated that the purpose of the trip was spiritual enlightenment and that they were to be together at all times, holding hands, praying and chanting. Pabon refused to participate in some of the group activities and on Monday following the spa weekend, Denali fired Pabon for “insubordination.”

Hostile Work Environment, Failure to Accommodate and Retaliation

The EEOC asserts numerous religious discrimination claims against the company, including creating a hostile work environment based on religion, failure to accommodate the employees’ own religious beliefs or lack thereof, terminating employees based on religion and retaliating against employees for opposing the required Onionhead practices in the workplace. The EEOC also alleges that some employees were constructively discharged when they felt compelled to leave the company to avoid participating in the required Onionhead activities.

Reports suggest that the company denies any merit to the lawsuit and that they expect it to be dismissed. We don’t yet know the basis of their defense and must remember that at present, the allegations are unproven. It will be an interesting case to follow. We will keep you posted as it proceeds through the court

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April 16, 2014

EEOC Loses Kaplan Credit Check Appeal

By Brad Cave

In 2010, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Kaplan Higher Education Corporation, claiming that Kaplan’s use of credit reports had a disparate impact on black applicants. The trial court threw out the EEOC’s suit because it used an invalid method for determining the race of Kaplan’s applicants. The EEOC appealed, and lost again. In a stinging opinion, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Kaplan and rejected the methodology promoted by the EEOC’s expert witness. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion dooms the agency’s background check disparate impact lawsuit against Kaplan and slaps the EEOC for suing a private employer “for using the same type of background check that the EEOC itself uses.” The ruling also illustrates the EEOC’s failure to show that an employer’s use of neutral background checks results in a disparate impact on African-American applicants. EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., No. 13-3408 (6th Cir. April 9, 2014).

Credit Checks Aimed At Preventing Employee Abuses

Kaplan is a for-profit test preparation and higher education provider. Because some Kaplan students receive financial aid, some Kaplan employees have access to students’ financial information, including information that is subject to the U.S. Department of Education confidentiality regulations. Years ago, Kaplan discovered that some of its financial-aid officers had stolen aid payments and some executives had engaged in self-dealing by hiring relatives as vendors for the company. To help stop these abuses, Kaplan began conducting credit checks on applicants for senior-executive positions as well as accounting, financial aid and other positions where employees have access to company or student financial information. Neither Kaplan nor its credit check vendor provided or linked the applicant’s race with the applicant’s credit report.

EEOC Alleges Kaplan’s Credit Checks Screen Out More African-Americans

Consistent with its efforts to target employers who use background check policies to screen applicants, the EEOC sued Kaplan alleging that Kaplan’s use of credit checks resulted in more African-Americans being rejected than whites, creating a disparate impact in violation of Title VII. To support its claim, the EEOC hired industrial and organizational psychologist Kevin Murphy to analyze Kaplan’s credit check data and offer an expert opinion based on the statistics. However, because the credit check information did not include the applicant’s race, Murphy and his team needed another method to determine race. They created a process that the EEOC called “race rating” in which a team of five “race raters” reviewed drivers’ license photos for a portion of the applicants to visually identify their race. Despite having credit information for 4,670 applicants, Murphy based his “expert” analysis on only 1,090 applicants, of whom 803 had been racially classified using Murphy’s “race rating” process.

“Homemade Methodology” Rejected by Court

The Sixth Circuit wholeheartedly rejected Murphy’s “race rating” process, stating that “[t]he EEOC brought this case on the basis of a homemade methodology, crafted by a witness with no particular expertise to craft it, administered by persons with no particular expertise to administer it, tested by no one, and accepted only by the witness himself.” The Court upheld the exclusion of Murphy’s testimony not only due to his faulty methodology, but also because the group of 1,090 applicants in Murphy’s statistical analysis was not representative of the applicant pool as a whole. Of Kaplan’s entire pool of 4,670 applicants, only 13.3% of the applicants were rejected on the basis of credit checks, but Murphy’s smaller pool of applicants had a fail rate of 23.8%. The Court found that Murphy’s unrepresentative sample might not equate to the respective fail rates of black versus white applicants and therefore, was an unreliable method for the EEOC to show disparate impact.

EEOC’s Own Background Check Policy Contradicts Its Attack on Private Employers For Use of Credit Checks

Although not central to the exclusion of the EEOC’s expert, the Court put the EEOC’s own background check policy front and center. Through the discovery process, Kaplan had successfully obtained information on the EEOC’s background check policies and pointed to the agency’s personnel handbook which states “[o]verdue just debts increase temptation to commit illegal or unethical acts as a means of gaining funds to meet financial obligations.” To address those potential concerns, the EEOC runs credit checks for 84 of the 97 positions within the agency. The Court highlighted the disconnect between the EEOC attacking Kaplan for a credit check policy that the agency used itself.

Future EEOC Challenges to Employer Use of Credit Checks

The Kaplan decision is the latest in a string of EEOC losses in class actions alleging disparate impact based on an employer’s use of a neutral background check process. The EEOC seems unable to provide evidence to support a finding that African-Americans, Hispanics or other groups are being rejected for employment at higher rates than whites based on background checks. In addition, the EEOC’s own use of credit checks in hiring will be used against it in any future similar lawsuits. Although it remains to be seen whether the EEOC will back off of its systemic enforcement efforts related to the use of background checks, the trend for employers is positive.

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March 13, 2014

Harassment Training for Supervisors is Key in Minimizing Risk

By Mark Wiletsky

Most employers today have policies prohibiting harassment. But if your supervisors and employees are not trained on those policies, and if harassment is allowed to occur, your organization could face significant liability.

Female Bailiff Alleges Egregious Sexual Harassment By Her Supervisor

Camille Kramer was employed as a jailor and later as a bailiff by the Wasatch County Sheriff’s Department. While working at the jail, male co-workers allegedly made offensive comments about Kramer’s breasts, she was subjected to sexually explicit materials on work computers and had to listen to graphic sexual conversations. Kramer complained to Sheriff Kenneth Van Wagoner, the head of the Sheriff’s Department. Sheriff Van Wagoner said he’d “take care of it” and proceeded to call a staff meeting at which he used Kramer as a volunteer to act out the exact harassing scenarios that she had reported to him. Van Wagoner told the group: “[t]hat’s harassment. Don’t do it.” When the harassment got worse after the meeting, Kramer complained again to the Sheriff, who told her she might want to avoid that area.

Kramer transferred to the courthouse to work as a bailiff. Sergeant Rick Benson, also a bailiff, supervised both Kramer and one other bailiff. According to Kramer, Benson subjected Kramer to a campaign of sexual harassment and sexual assault that ranged from demanding foot rubs to groping and rape. Kramer did not report Benson’s conduct to the Sheriff because Benson threatened her job if she said anything and she believed nothing would be done about it anyway.

Later, Kramer told female co-workers about the rape and assault. She also told them that she was having a consensual affair with another man and was pregnant from that relationship. Sheriff Van Wagoner found out about Benson’s sexual assault of Kramer and her pregnancy from one of Kramer’s co-workers. He assigned a detective who was not trained in human resources or in conducting sexual harassment investigations to look into the misconduct. The detective focused his investigation exclusively on finding out who fathered Kramer’s baby, not on Benson’s conduct. When it was learned that Kramer was involved with a married county firefighter, the detective urged Kramer to resign and Kramer was disciplined with her certification suspended for six months for “actions unbecoming an officer.” Although the Sheriff decided to terminate Benson, Benson resigned before that could happen.

Benson directly supervised Kramer’s work as a bailiff. He wrote her performance evaluations, which could cause her to be promoted, demoted or fired. He could create a corrective action plan for her which might include transfer, reassignment or separation, if he deemed her performance was substandard. At all times, however, the Sheriff was the final decision-maker and the only person who had the actual authority to take tangible employment actions against Kramer.

Kramer sued the County and the Sheriff for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII, among other claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, holding that because Benson did not have the actual authority to unilaterally fire Kramer, the County could not be vicariously liable for Benson’s conduct. It also ruled that supervisor status could not be based on Benson having apparent authority over Kramer because no reasonable juror could find that Kramer reasonably believed that Benson had the power to fire her. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the County and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 12-4058 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2014).

Delegation of Power and Apparent Authority

The Tenth Circuit pointed to wording in the Supreme Court’s recent case, Vance v. Ball State, 570 U.S. ___ (2013), to determine whether the County could be vicariously liable for Benson’s conduct. Vance held that a “supervisor” for purposes of determining employer liability for workplace harassment under Title VII includes only those individuals who have the authority to take tangible employment actions against the victim. Although that seemed like a bright-line test, the Tenth Circuit stated that if Benson had or appeared to have the power to take or substantially influence tangible employment actions or used the threat of taking such actions to subject Kramer to a hostile work environment, then the County could be vicariously liable for Benson’s severe or pervasive sexual harassment. Because the Court found sufficient evidence in the record that raised genuine issues of fact as to whether the Sheriff effectively delegated to Benson the power to cause tangible employment actions by relying on Benson’s recommendations and performance evaluations when making decisions regarding firing, promotion, demotion and reassignment, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the County. The Court stated that even if the Sheriff took some independent analysis when considering input from Benson on employment decisions, Benson could qualify as a supervisor if his recommendations were among the proximate causes of the Sheriff’s decision-making. The Court also found that there was evidence to suggest that Kramer reasonably believed that Benson had the power to take tangible employment actions against her meaning Benson qualified as a supervisor under apparent authority principles.

No Tangible Employment Actions

If Benson is a supervisor under the definition established in Vance, the County would be strictly liable for Benson’s harassment if it resulted in a tangible employment action. Kramer asserted that four actions constituted tangible employment actions. First, she argued that Benson’s rape was a tangible employment action. The Court disagreed, stating that while the rape was inarguably a severe form of sexual harassment, Benson did not commit the rape in an official company action. Next, Kramer asserted that Benson prepared a negative performance evaluation of her and argued that was a tangible employment action. However, Benson improved the evaluation after speaking with Kramer and before submitting it to the Sheriff, so even though the threatened poor evaluation contributed to a hostile work environment, it did not constitute a tangible employment action. The Court similarly rejected the final two alleged employment actions, a denial of leave time and assigning Kramer to an unfavorable duty that denied her the training needed for a promotion. The Court found that the loss of one day’s leave time was not a “significant” change in Kramer’s benefits and the assignment to an unfavorable duty did not have a deleterious economic consequence for Kramer or reduce her opportunity for advancement. Finding that Kramer did not suffer a tangible employment action, the Court remanded for consideration of whether the County established the Faragher/Ellerth defense.

Teachable Moments from the Tenth Circuit

The Court’s thorough discussion of Benson’s conduct and what the Sheriff did/did not do when he learned of potential misconduct reveals many teachable moments for employers. First and foremost, make sure to train your supervisors and employees on prohibited forms of harassment, and how important it is to promptly and appropriately address issues when they arise. For example, when an employee reports harassing behavior, as Kramer did when she first worked at the jail, take it seriously. Do not simply tell workers to “stop it” or tell the person who complained to “avoid the area” or stay away from the perpetrators. Make sure that the person conducting the investigation is trained in workplace harassment investigations. Do not focus the investigation solely on the potential wrongdoing of the complaining party, as the detective did when trying to determine the father of Kramer’s baby. Talk to all parties implicated in the misconduct, including any witnesses who may have knowledge of the hostile work environment. If the investigation reveals harassing behavior, take immediate steps to correct it and prevent it from happening again. Follow up with the person who reported it to make certain your corrective actions are effective and that no further incidents have occurred. And finally, do not retaliate against the complaining employee. Learning from these missteps will go along way in minimizing your risk of harassment liability.

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October 4, 2013

EEOC’s Religious Accommodation Claim Fails Despite Retailer’s Assumption that a Female Job Applicant Wore a Headscarf for Religious Reasons

By John M. Husband

Does an employer have to engage in an interactive discussion about reasonably accommodating the wearing of a headscarf (i.e., hijab) in contravention of its dress code simply because a job applicant wears a headscarf to the job interview? No, according to a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that to establish a religious accommodation claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must establish that he/she informed the employer that he/she adheres to a particular practice for religious reasons and that the plaintiff needs an accommodation for that practice, due to a conflict between the practice and the employer’s neutral work rule. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 11-5110 (10th Cir. October 1, 2013).

In the Abercrombie case, an assistant manager named Heather Cooke interviewed Samantha Elauf, a seventeen-year old applicant for an in-store sales position. Ms. Elauf wore a headscarf to the interview. Though they did not discuss religion, Ms. Cooke assumed that Ms. Elauf was Muslim and that her Muslim religion was the reason she wore a headscarf. During the interview, Ms. Cooke described some of the dress requirements expected of Abercrombie employees but neither she nor Ms. Elauf specifically referred to or discussed the wearing of a headscarf. After the interview, Ms. Cooke believed Ms. Elauf was a good candidate for the job but was unsure whether it would be a problem for her to wear a headscarf since Abercrombie has a strict “Look Policy” that forbids wearing of “caps” and black clothing. Ms. Cooke consulted with her district manager who rejected Ms. Elauf for hire because she wore a headscarf which was inconsistent with the Look Policy.

EEOC Files Lawsuit Alleging Retailer Failed to Accommodate Applicant’s Religious Practice

In 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit in federal court in Oklahoma alleging that Abercrombie violated Title VII by refusing to hire Ms. Elauf because she wore a headscarf and failing to accommodate her religious beliefs because it failed to make an exception to its Look Policy. The Oklahoma court ruled in favor of the EEOC on summary judgment, reasoning that Abercrombie had enough information to make it aware that there was a conflict between the applicant’s religious practice and its Look Policy that would require an accommodation. It emphasized that Abercrombie had made numerous exceptions to its Look Policy over the past decade or so, including eight or nine headscarf exceptions. The parties went to trial on the issue of damages where a jury awarded the EEOC $20,000 in compensatory damages.

Religious Accommodation Claim Requires Plaintiff to Inform Employer of Conflict between Religious Practice and Employer Policy

On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Abercrombie argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because there was no dispute that Ms. Elauf never informed the company that her practice of wearing a headscarf was based on her religious beliefs and that she would need an accommodation for the practice based on the conflict between it and the Look Policy. A divided Tenth Circuit agreed. Two of the three judges on the panel ruled that the plaintiff in a religious accommodation case must establish that he or she informedthe employer of his/her religious belief that contradicts with an employment requirement and the plaintiff must request an accommodation. Because Ms. Elauf never informed Abercrombie that she wore a headscarf for religious reasons and never requested an exception from the dress code, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the EEOC and vacated the jury award with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Abercrombie. The majority stated that it is only after an employer is put on notice of the need for a religious accommodation that it must actively engage in a dialogue with applicants or employees concerning their conflicting religious practices and possible accommodations.

Dissenting Opinion and Conflicting Circuit Court Decisions Set Up Possible Appeal to Supreme Court

The dissenting judge strongly disagreed with his two colleagues on the panel, believing that Abercrombie should not be permitted to avoid discussing reasonable accommodations for Ms. Elauf’s religious practice when it knew that she wore a headscarf, assumed she was Muslim and wore the headscarf for religious reasons and knew that its Look Policy prohibited its sales models from wearing headwear. The dissent noted that Ms. Elauf could not inform Abercrombie of a conflict between her religious practice and its dress code because she did not know the details of the Look Policy or that headwear, including a headscarf, was prohibited. The dissenting judge would have sent the entire matter to a jury to decide if Abercrombie was liable for religious discrimination.

The dissenting opinion points out that other circuit courts of appeal have held that a job applicant or employee can establish a religious failure-to-accommodate claim if he/she can show that the employer knew of a conflict between the plaintiff’s religious beliefs and a job requirement, regardless of how the employer acquired knowledge of that conflict. Unlike the Tenth Circuit, these other circuits do not require that the plaintiff actually inform the employer of the conflict. The stage is set for the EEOC to ask the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the disagreement between the courts to ultimately decide whether a plaintiff must actually inform the employer of the conflict between his/her religious practice and a job requirement before the duty to discuss reasonable accommodations kicks in.

Employer Lessons

This opinion is favorable for employers in the states within the Tenth Circuit’s jurisdiction, namely Colorado, Oklahoma, Kansas, Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico. That said, employers should always be cautious about making adverse employment decisions when it has knowledge or information that relates to an applicant/employee’s religious beliefs or practices.

Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

July 29, 2013

The Battle Over Background Checks Continues — State AGs Accuse EEOC of “Gross Federal Overreach”

By Mark Wiletsky

Is it discriminatory if an employer does not hire anyone with a particular criminal conviction, regardless of that person’s race, gender, religion, or other protected characteristic? According to the EEOC’s April 2012 Enforcement Guidance, it might be. But in a July 24, 2013 letter sent to EEOC Commissioner Jacqueline Berrien and the four EEOC Board Members, nine state Attorneys’ General (AGs) disagree. The AGs chastise the EEOC for filing recent lawsuits against BMW Manufacturing Co., LLC and Dolgencorp (Dollar General), in which the EEOC alleges that these employers violated Title VII’s disparate impact prohibition by using a bright-line screening policy that rejected all individuals with past convictions in certain categories of crimes, such as murder, assault, reckless driving and possession of drug paraphernalia.

The letter then criticizes the EEOC’s April 2012 Enforcement Guidance on Arrest and Conviction Records, stating that the EEOC’s policy guidance incorrectly applies the law and constitutes an unlawful expansion of Title VII. The AGs argue that if Congress wishes to protect former criminals from employment discrimination, it can amend the law, but it is not the EEOC’s role to expand the protections of Title VII under the guise of preventing racial discrimination.

The Republican state AGs from Colorado, Montana, Utah, Kansas, Nebraska, West Virginia, Alabama, South Carolina and Georgia joined in this missive to say “enough is enough” on the EEOC’s background check lawsuits. Citing the burden on businesses to undertake more individualized assessments of an applicant’s criminal history, the AGs urge the EEOC to rescind its April 2012 Enforcement Guidance and dismiss the lawsuits against Dollar General and BMW. Not likely, but it may get the attention of federal lawmakers who may try to rein in the EEOC’s position on this issue.

May 3, 2011

EEOC files suit against retailer alleging retaliation

The EEOC announced last Thursday that it was filing suit against a large retailer under Title VII. The EEOC complained that retailer retaliated against an employee when she heeded mandatory evacuation warnings. According to the EEOC, the retailer terminated the employee for "excessive absenteeism." The case will now proceed in federal court. Whether or not the EEOC can prevail in its suit remains to be seen.

The lesson for employers is that the EEOC is paying close attention to claims of retaliation by employees and is filing suit when it believes that employers have retaliated against employees for engaging in protected activity. Employers should tread carefully in this area, as the costs of defending a suit can be significant, as can the negative publicity that can result from an EEOC enforcement action. In recent days, the EEOC has announced settlements of retaliation claims totaling thousands of dollars. In addition, some of the settlements have involved mandatory training for all company personnel and other policy changes. Employers are well advised to train their management team on these issues to ensure that all key personnel understand the importance of disconnecting complaints about protected activity from employment decisions about that individual.