Tag Archives: discrimination

February 23, 2016

EEOC Providing Employer Position Statements To Charging Parties

No reciprocity exists in the new nationwide procedure announced by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) late last week. The EEOC now will provide employer position statements and any non-confidential attachments to a charging party during an investigation upon request. It then will permit the charging party to submit a response within 20 days. However, the EEOC will not afford employers the right to receive a copy of the charging party’s response.

As you may know, after an employee or other aggrieved individual files a charge with the EEOC, the agency begins an investigation of the allegations. As part of the investigation, the EEOC will request that the employer (the respondent) submit a position statement, responding to the allegations and providing supporting documentation of its employment decisions that allegedly affected the charging party.

Some EEOC regional offices already release employer position statements to the charging party and allow the charging party to file a response. For employers in those EEOC districts, there is little change in procedure. According to the EEOC, however, this new nationwide procedure is intended to provide a consistent approach in all of its offices.

Take note – these procedures apply to position statements you already may be drafting, or have recently submitted, as they apply to all EEOC requests for position statements made to respondents on or after January 1, 2016.

EEOC Providing Only The First Formal Document From Each Side

In justifying its policy to provide the employer’s position statement to the charging party, but not providing the charging party’s response to the employer, the EEOC states that it is releasing the first formal document received from each party. The respondent receives the Charge and the charging party may receive the respondent’s position statement. The EEOC does not intend to release other documents during the investigation process.

Does this amount to a one-sided discovery request? In other words, by requesting copies of what the respondent submitted to the EEOC, does the charging party get the unreciprocated right to learn the identification of witnesses, decision-makers, applicable company policies, internal documentation of the employment decision, and other important information? The EEOC states this new process is intended to help accelerate the investigation and allow it to better tailor its requests for additional information. But, employer respondents will likely see the procedure as requiring it to lay its cards on the table while permitting the charging party to keep its cards largely hidden.

Use Care With Confidential Information

Respondents who rely on confidential information in their position statements should use care in segregating that information in separate attachments that are labeled “Confidential” or some similar designation. Examples of “confidential” information include birth dates, confidential commercial or financial information, trade secrets, non-relevant personally identifiable information of witnesses, comparators or third parties, references to charges filed against the respondent by other charging parties, and sensitive medical information of others (not the charging party). The EEOC states, however, that it will not accept blanket or unsupported assertions of confidentiality, so be prepared to justify why particular information must be protected.

Be careful, too, when submitting position statements and attachments through the EEOC’s online portal. Once you click “Save Upload” to submit your position statement and any attachments, you will not be able to retract them.

Will The New Procedure Change Outcomes?

It’s important to ask whether the early release of the respondent’s position statement (with supporting documents) to the charging party during the EEOC’s investigation will change the outcome of charges. As with any case, it largely depends on the facts. If you have bad facts or poor documentation on your side, the charge may result in a probable cause finding. Or, the charging party may hold out for more during settlement talks or mediation. However, if you have good policies in place, enforce them uniformly, and document your decisions properly, the release of your defense may help resolve the matter earlier in the process, short of litigation.

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May 6, 2014

Separation Agreements Targeted By EEOC Again

By Mark Wiletsky

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently filed a lawsuit seeking to stop a Colorado employer from using its form separation and release agreement and to allow employees who have signed the form agreement to file charges of discrimination and participate in EEOC and state agency fair employment investigations. In its federal court complaint, the EEOC alleges that CollegeAmerica Denver violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by conditioning employees’ receipt of severance benefits on signing a separation and release agreement which, according to the EEOC, chills and interferes with the employees’ rights to file charges and/or cooperate with the EEOC and state fair employment practice agencies.

As we wrote on this blog earlier, the EEOC has been scrutinizing employers’ separation agreements. This is the second such lawsuit challenging language in the separation agreements that does not permit the filing of discrimination or retaliation charges with the EEOC or other government agencies. As in the EEOC’s earlier complaint against a national pharmacy, the recent complaint against CollegeAmerica Denver targets numerous provisions in the separation agreement, including the release of claims, a non-disparagement clause and provisions in which the employee represents that he/she has not filed any claims, has disclosed to the company all matters of non-compliance and will continue to cooperate with and assist the company with any investigation or litigation.

Many of the targeted provisions are standard clauses in form separation agreements. Although it remains to be seen whether the courts will agree with the EEOC’s claims, it is always a good idea for organizations to review their agreements and ensure they do not raise any red flags for the EEOC while still protecting the company from future payouts for employment-related claims. We will continue to provide updates as new developments arise.

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April 16, 2014

EEOC Loses Kaplan Credit Check Appeal

By Brad Cave

In 2010, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Kaplan Higher Education Corporation, claiming that Kaplan’s use of credit reports had a disparate impact on black applicants. The trial court threw out the EEOC’s suit because it used an invalid method for determining the race of Kaplan’s applicants. The EEOC appealed, and lost again. In a stinging opinion, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Kaplan and rejected the methodology promoted by the EEOC’s expert witness. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion dooms the agency’s background check disparate impact lawsuit against Kaplan and slaps the EEOC for suing a private employer “for using the same type of background check that the EEOC itself uses.” The ruling also illustrates the EEOC’s failure to show that an employer’s use of neutral background checks results in a disparate impact on African-American applicants. EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., No. 13-3408 (6th Cir. April 9, 2014).

Credit Checks Aimed At Preventing Employee Abuses

Kaplan is a for-profit test preparation and higher education provider. Because some Kaplan students receive financial aid, some Kaplan employees have access to students’ financial information, including information that is subject to the U.S. Department of Education confidentiality regulations. Years ago, Kaplan discovered that some of its financial-aid officers had stolen aid payments and some executives had engaged in self-dealing by hiring relatives as vendors for the company. To help stop these abuses, Kaplan began conducting credit checks on applicants for senior-executive positions as well as accounting, financial aid and other positions where employees have access to company or student financial information. Neither Kaplan nor its credit check vendor provided or linked the applicant’s race with the applicant’s credit report.

EEOC Alleges Kaplan’s Credit Checks Screen Out More African-Americans

Consistent with its efforts to target employers who use background check policies to screen applicants, the EEOC sued Kaplan alleging that Kaplan’s use of credit checks resulted in more African-Americans being rejected than whites, creating a disparate impact in violation of Title VII. To support its claim, the EEOC hired industrial and organizational psychologist Kevin Murphy to analyze Kaplan’s credit check data and offer an expert opinion based on the statistics. However, because the credit check information did not include the applicant’s race, Murphy and his team needed another method to determine race. They created a process that the EEOC called “race rating” in which a team of five “race raters” reviewed drivers’ license photos for a portion of the applicants to visually identify their race. Despite having credit information for 4,670 applicants, Murphy based his “expert” analysis on only 1,090 applicants, of whom 803 had been racially classified using Murphy’s “race rating” process.

“Homemade Methodology” Rejected by Court

The Sixth Circuit wholeheartedly rejected Murphy’s “race rating” process, stating that “[t]he EEOC brought this case on the basis of a homemade methodology, crafted by a witness with no particular expertise to craft it, administered by persons with no particular expertise to administer it, tested by no one, and accepted only by the witness himself.” The Court upheld the exclusion of Murphy’s testimony not only due to his faulty methodology, but also because the group of 1,090 applicants in Murphy’s statistical analysis was not representative of the applicant pool as a whole. Of Kaplan’s entire pool of 4,670 applicants, only 13.3% of the applicants were rejected on the basis of credit checks, but Murphy’s smaller pool of applicants had a fail rate of 23.8%. The Court found that Murphy’s unrepresentative sample might not equate to the respective fail rates of black versus white applicants and therefore, was an unreliable method for the EEOC to show disparate impact.

EEOC’s Own Background Check Policy Contradicts Its Attack on Private Employers For Use of Credit Checks

Although not central to the exclusion of the EEOC’s expert, the Court put the EEOC’s own background check policy front and center. Through the discovery process, Kaplan had successfully obtained information on the EEOC’s background check policies and pointed to the agency’s personnel handbook which states “[o]verdue just debts increase temptation to commit illegal or unethical acts as a means of gaining funds to meet financial obligations.” To address those potential concerns, the EEOC runs credit checks for 84 of the 97 positions within the agency. The Court highlighted the disconnect between the EEOC attacking Kaplan for a credit check policy that the agency used itself.

Future EEOC Challenges to Employer Use of Credit Checks

The Kaplan decision is the latest in a string of EEOC losses in class actions alleging disparate impact based on an employer’s use of a neutral background check process. The EEOC seems unable to provide evidence to support a finding that African-Americans, Hispanics or other groups are being rejected for employment at higher rates than whites based on background checks. In addition, the EEOC’s own use of credit checks in hiring will be used against it in any future similar lawsuits. Although it remains to be seen whether the EEOC will back off of its systemic enforcement efforts related to the use of background checks, the trend for employers is positive.

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March 13, 2014

Harassment Training for Supervisors is Key in Minimizing Risk

By Mark Wiletsky

Most employers today have policies prohibiting harassment. But if your supervisors and employees are not trained on those policies, and if harassment is allowed to occur, your organization could face significant liability.

Female Bailiff Alleges Egregious Sexual Harassment By Her Supervisor

Camille Kramer was employed as a jailor and later as a bailiff by the Wasatch County Sheriff’s Department. While working at the jail, male co-workers allegedly made offensive comments about Kramer’s breasts, she was subjected to sexually explicit materials on work computers and had to listen to graphic sexual conversations. Kramer complained to Sheriff Kenneth Van Wagoner, the head of the Sheriff’s Department. Sheriff Van Wagoner said he’d “take care of it” and proceeded to call a staff meeting at which he used Kramer as a volunteer to act out the exact harassing scenarios that she had reported to him. Van Wagoner told the group: “[t]hat’s harassment. Don’t do it.” When the harassment got worse after the meeting, Kramer complained again to the Sheriff, who told her she might want to avoid that area.

Kramer transferred to the courthouse to work as a bailiff. Sergeant Rick Benson, also a bailiff, supervised both Kramer and one other bailiff. According to Kramer, Benson subjected Kramer to a campaign of sexual harassment and sexual assault that ranged from demanding foot rubs to groping and rape. Kramer did not report Benson’s conduct to the Sheriff because Benson threatened her job if she said anything and she believed nothing would be done about it anyway.

Later, Kramer told female co-workers about the rape and assault. She also told them that she was having a consensual affair with another man and was pregnant from that relationship. Sheriff Van Wagoner found out about Benson’s sexual assault of Kramer and her pregnancy from one of Kramer’s co-workers. He assigned a detective who was not trained in human resources or in conducting sexual harassment investigations to look into the misconduct. The detective focused his investigation exclusively on finding out who fathered Kramer’s baby, not on Benson’s conduct. When it was learned that Kramer was involved with a married county firefighter, the detective urged Kramer to resign and Kramer was disciplined with her certification suspended for six months for “actions unbecoming an officer.” Although the Sheriff decided to terminate Benson, Benson resigned before that could happen.

Benson directly supervised Kramer’s work as a bailiff. He wrote her performance evaluations, which could cause her to be promoted, demoted or fired. He could create a corrective action plan for her which might include transfer, reassignment or separation, if he deemed her performance was substandard. At all times, however, the Sheriff was the final decision-maker and the only person who had the actual authority to take tangible employment actions against Kramer.

Kramer sued the County and the Sheriff for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII, among other claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, holding that because Benson did not have the actual authority to unilaterally fire Kramer, the County could not be vicariously liable for Benson’s conduct. It also ruled that supervisor status could not be based on Benson having apparent authority over Kramer because no reasonable juror could find that Kramer reasonably believed that Benson had the power to fire her. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the County and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 12-4058 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2014).

Delegation of Power and Apparent Authority

The Tenth Circuit pointed to wording in the Supreme Court’s recent case, Vance v. Ball State, 570 U.S. ___ (2013), to determine whether the County could be vicariously liable for Benson’s conduct. Vance held that a “supervisor” for purposes of determining employer liability for workplace harassment under Title VII includes only those individuals who have the authority to take tangible employment actions against the victim. Although that seemed like a bright-line test, the Tenth Circuit stated that if Benson had or appeared to have the power to take or substantially influence tangible employment actions or used the threat of taking such actions to subject Kramer to a hostile work environment, then the County could be vicariously liable for Benson’s severe or pervasive sexual harassment. Because the Court found sufficient evidence in the record that raised genuine issues of fact as to whether the Sheriff effectively delegated to Benson the power to cause tangible employment actions by relying on Benson’s recommendations and performance evaluations when making decisions regarding firing, promotion, demotion and reassignment, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the County. The Court stated that even if the Sheriff took some independent analysis when considering input from Benson on employment decisions, Benson could qualify as a supervisor if his recommendations were among the proximate causes of the Sheriff’s decision-making. The Court also found that there was evidence to suggest that Kramer reasonably believed that Benson had the power to take tangible employment actions against her meaning Benson qualified as a supervisor under apparent authority principles.

No Tangible Employment Actions

If Benson is a supervisor under the definition established in Vance, the County would be strictly liable for Benson’s harassment if it resulted in a tangible employment action. Kramer asserted that four actions constituted tangible employment actions. First, she argued that Benson’s rape was a tangible employment action. The Court disagreed, stating that while the rape was inarguably a severe form of sexual harassment, Benson did not commit the rape in an official company action. Next, Kramer asserted that Benson prepared a negative performance evaluation of her and argued that was a tangible employment action. However, Benson improved the evaluation after speaking with Kramer and before submitting it to the Sheriff, so even though the threatened poor evaluation contributed to a hostile work environment, it did not constitute a tangible employment action. The Court similarly rejected the final two alleged employment actions, a denial of leave time and assigning Kramer to an unfavorable duty that denied her the training needed for a promotion. The Court found that the loss of one day’s leave time was not a “significant” change in Kramer’s benefits and the assignment to an unfavorable duty did not have a deleterious economic consequence for Kramer or reduce her opportunity for advancement. Finding that Kramer did not suffer a tangible employment action, the Court remanded for consideration of whether the County established the Faragher/Ellerth defense.

Teachable Moments from the Tenth Circuit

The Court’s thorough discussion of Benson’s conduct and what the Sheriff did/did not do when he learned of potential misconduct reveals many teachable moments for employers. First and foremost, make sure to train your supervisors and employees on prohibited forms of harassment, and how important it is to promptly and appropriately address issues when they arise. For example, when an employee reports harassing behavior, as Kramer did when she first worked at the jail, take it seriously. Do not simply tell workers to “stop it” or tell the person who complained to “avoid the area” or stay away from the perpetrators. Make sure that the person conducting the investigation is trained in workplace harassment investigations. Do not focus the investigation solely on the potential wrongdoing of the complaining party, as the detective did when trying to determine the father of Kramer’s baby. Talk to all parties implicated in the misconduct, including any witnesses who may have knowledge of the hostile work environment. If the investigation reveals harassing behavior, take immediate steps to correct it and prevent it from happening again. Follow up with the person who reported it to make certain your corrective actions are effective and that no further incidents have occurred. And finally, do not retaliate against the complaining employee. Learning from these missteps will go along way in minimizing your risk of harassment liability.

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December 9, 2013

Holiday Party Checklist—Plan Ahead to Minimize Employer Risks

By Mark Wiletsky

Delicious food, fine wines, music, camaraderie, laughter – all ingredients for a great holiday get-together. What could go wrong? Too much, unfortunately. Employees may drink too much, act inappropriately, offend co-workers or guests, hurt themselves or others, or even start a brawl. Depending on the circumstances, your company may find itself potentially liable for the inappropriate or unlawful actions of your employees at company-sponsored parties. You can help minimize the risks associated with holiday parties by following these five tips.

Avoid or Limit Alcohol

Employers face potential liability when providing alcohol at a company holiday event when someone gets hurt due to drunk driving, falling down, etc., or when inappropriate behavior crosses the line from embarrassing to unlawful, such as sexual harassment or violence during an argument. You can limit your company’s exposure for such conduct by either banning alcohol entirely (we know that may not be well-received in some situations), or limiting each person’s consumption through the use of drink tickets or a 2-drink limit. If you choose to allow alcohol at your events, don’t allow free access to the alcohol (e.g., open bar, self-serve beer or unlimited wine bottles). Instead have a professional, licensed bartender serve the alcohol as they are trained not to over-serve patrons. Be sure to offer plenty of food and non-alcoholic beverages. Arrange for taxis or hotel stays if someone over-indulges. Schedule the event during the week so folks are less inclined to get carried away. Set an end time for the party and shut down the bar at least a half hour before the event closes. Do not authorize or condone “after parties.” Finally, designate some supervisors or managers to refrain from drinking alcohol to make sure things don’t get out of hand.

Keep Harassing Behavior in Check

Make sure that your sexual harassment policy is up-to-date and that it applies to company parties, even if held off company premises. Send out a reminder to employees in advance of the party that all company policies, including those prohibiting harassment and other inappropriate conduct, apply to the party. Consider making the event a family party where employees may bring their spouse, significant other, or children as the presence of family members and children often deters inappropriate behavior which could give rise to a harassment complaint. Make sure that supervisors and managers watch out for potentially harassing conduct and are trained to intervene as necessary.

Respect Religious Differences and Keep the Party Neutral

Although many holidays toward the end of the year are religious in nature, be sensitive to your employees’ varying religious beliefs and avoid any conduct that could be construed as favoring one religious group over another. Refrain from calling your party a “Christmas Party” and stick with the neutral “Holiday Party” instead. Do not make attendance at the company-sponsored events such as parties, volunteer activities, food drives or other holiday outings mandatory. Make sure the timing of the company party does not exclude any employees for religious reasons. For example, because the Jewish Sabbath starts on Friday night, a party on a Friday evening may exclude Jewish employees. Avoid decorating with religious symbols, such as nativity scenes, menorahs or angels. There are plenty of neutral decorations, such as snowflakes, holly and reindeer, that can be used instead.

Be Wary of Gift Exchanges

Gift exchanges between employees may seem innocuous enough, but consider the potential issues a gift exchange may cause. Employees may not be able to afford to participate, even within a recommended cost guideline. Other employees may give sexy or “funny” gifts that end up offending others. The best practice is to avoid a company or department sponsored gift exchange altogether. If you decide to allow one among your employees, make sure it is entirely voluntary and no one is pressured or made to feel uncomfortable for not participating. Set cost guidelines and remind participants that gifts must be appropriate for the workplace.

Remember Wage and Hour Laws

If you assign any non-exempt employees to plan, prepare for and staff the party, their hours are likely work hours for which they must be paid. For example, if your office receptionist is required to be at the door of your holiday party to greet guests and hand out name tags, that individual is likely working and you need to include those hours in his or her weekly work hours when determining regular and overtime wages. You do not need to pay employees who are attending the party if their attendance is voluntary and they are not expected to provide services that benefit your organization.

Follow this checklist and you’ll avoid last minute holiday headaches and keep your organization out of trouble.

Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

October 9, 2013

Idaho Supreme Court Changes Tack and Applies McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Analysis at Summary Judgment Stage

By A. Dean Bennett

Since 2008, employers defending employment claims in Idaho have faced a higher burden of proof, thanks to the Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue decision of the Idaho Supreme Court. In that case, the Court decided that the well-known McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis used in employment cases did not apply at the summary judgment stage, making it more difficult for employers to get a favorable outcome without going to trial. Recently, however, the Idaho Supreme Court changed its position, deciding that the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis did apply at the summary judgment stage, resolving a five-year debacle in which Idaho employers faced different burdens of proof depending on whether employment claims were litigated in state or federal court. See Hatheway v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Idaho, No. 39507 (Idaho Sept. 6, 2013).

Federal Framework Applied to Age Discrimination Claim Under the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA)

The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis has been widely used to resolve a variety of federal employment law claims since 1973. The analysis allows a plaintiff to put forth indirect evidence of discrimination to establish a prima facie case. The burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s actions. If the employer provides such reason, the burden of production then swings back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is in fact pretext for unlawful discrimination. At all times, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion, meaning the plaintiff must convince the judge or jury that his or her position is correct.

Many state courts have adopted the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis when adjudicating employment claims brought under analogous state laws. In Curlee, the Idaho Supreme Court appeared to adopt the McDonnell Douglas analysis, but went on to rule that the analysis explicitly governed the burden of persuasion at tria, and did not apply at the summary judgment stage.

The Hatheway decision appears to change that. Without specifically mentioning or overruling its Curlee decision, the Court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis at the summary judgment stage of Hatheway’s IHRA discrimination claims against the University of Idaho. The Court reiterated that federal law guides the interpretation of the IHRA and applied the same degree of proof and standards to an IHRA age discrimination claim as is used to analyze discrimination claims under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

Why Employers Should Care

If this all sounds like legal mumbo-jumbo, let’s put it in practical, real-life terms. Employers want to get employment claims dismissed at the earliest possible stage for numerous reasons, including avoiding expensive litigation, disruption to their operations and unfavorable publicity. Following the 2008 Curlee decision, Idaho employers had to prove more of their case early on, making it difficult to get a favorable judgment prior to trial. This prolonged meritless cases and cost employers more in legal fees and litigation-related expenses. Now, with the application of the traditional burden shifting analysis at the summary judgment stage, employers facing employment claims in Idaho state courts will have a better chance of getting employment claims dismissed earlier in the legal process with fewer cases proceeding to trial.

August 12, 2013

EEOC Slapped with Order to Pay $4.6 Million for Pursuing Unreasonable and Groundless Discrimination Claims

By Mark Wiletsky

When a former employee sues for discrimination or retaliation, the employer generally is unable to recover its fees or costs for defending the lawsuit, even if the employer prevails. That was not the case, however, in a recent class action brought by the agency tasked with enforcing federal anti-discrimination laws, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). A federal court recently slammed the EEOC with over $4.6 million in attorneys’ fees, costs and out-of-pocket expenses after finding that the EEOC’s pattern or practice class action claim and 153 of the individual discrimination claims were unreasonable or groundless. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. 07cv95 (N.D. Iowa, August 1, 2013).

EEOC Sued Employer Alleging Sexual Harassment

In September 2007, the EEOC filed a lawsuit against trucking company, CRST Van Expedited, Inc. (CRST) alleging that the company’s lead drivers and team drivers subjected female employees to sexual harassment and created a sexually hostile environment in violation of Title VII. The EEOC filed its action on behalf of employee Monika Starke and a class of similarly situated female employees.

After almost a year of discovery in the case, the EEOC was pressed to identify the total number of harmed individuals making up the purported class. In October 2008, the EEOC identified 270 allegedly aggrieved female employees. When the EEOC failed to make all of the individuals available for deposition by a court-ordered deadline, the District Court barred the EEOC from pursuing claims on behalf of those 99 individuals who were not deposed.

CRST filed multiple motions for summary judgment to get the remaining claims dismissed before trial. First, CRST succeeded in getting the EEOC’s pattern or practice claim dismissed, which meant that the EEOC was left to pursue harassment claims only on behalf of individual employees. CRST then hammered away at all of the individual claims and succeeded in getting them all dismissed for a multitude of reasons, ranging from lack of evidence that some individuals had suffered severe or pervasive harassment to some individuals not reporting any harassment to the company. Significantly, the Court dismissed 67 of the individual claims because the EEOC had failed to exhaust administrative prerequisites by failing to investigate or attempt conciliation of the claims. Having dismissed all claims against CRST, the District Court found that CRST was the prevailing party and was entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees and costs, which exceeded $4.5 million.

EEOC Appeals and Keeps Two Claims Alive

The EEOC appealed the dismissal of 107 of the claims to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims on behalf of two female employees and consequently found that CRST was no longer the prevailing party entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was sent back to the District Court for continuation of those two claims.

District Court Awards Millions in Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Expenses

After the case was sent back to the District Court, the EEOC voluntarily dismissed one of the two remaining claims because it had failed to exhaust the administrative prerequisites as to her claim. CRST agreed to settle the remaining claim for $50,000 and the parties asked the Court to dismiss the case in its entirety as a result of the settlement. CRST then asked to recover its attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses for the claims on which it prevailed.

In order to recover its attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses, CRST needed to show that it was the prevailing party for purposes of Title VII and that the EEOC’s claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. The Court ruled that CRST was the prevailing party on the EEOC’s pattern or practice claim and on 153 of the EEOC’s individual claims. CRST was not the prevailing party, however, for the claim it settled, for the three claims withdrawn by the EEOC and for 98 claims that the Court dismissed as a discovery sanction against the EEOC. The Court then ruled that the EEOC’s failure to exhaust Title VII administrative prerequisites of investigation and conciliation for 67 of the individual claims was unreasonable. It further ruled that the EEOC’s pattern or practice claim was unreasonable as it was based only on anecdotal evidence. In total, the Court found that 153 of the individual claims as well as the pattern or practice claim were unreasonable or groundless.

After discounting the total amount of CRST’s attorneys’ fees, costs and out-of-pocket expenses to reflect those claims for which CRST was not the prevailing party, the Court ordered the EEOC to pay CRST $4,694,442. This award represented $4,189,296 in CRST’s attorneys’ fees, $91,758 in costs and $413,387 in out-of-pocket expenses for expert witness fees, travel expenses, delivery fees, and similar expenses.

While the EEOC performs an important function and pursues meritorious cases, the case against CRST shows that employers can and should fight back when the EEOC brings a frivolous case. Significantly, this is not the first time a court has awarded fees against the EEOC or rejected its claims. Last year, the Tenth Circuit (which covers Colorado) slapped the EEOC with attorneys’ fees and costs in EEOC v. TriCore Reference Laboratories, No. 11-CV-2096 (10th Cir. 2012), affirmed summary judgment against the EEOC in EEOC v. The Picture People, Inc., No. 11-CV-1306 (10th Cir. 2012), and the court affirmed a district court’s decision that the EEOC’s administrative subpoena was overbroad in EEOC v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad. We also recently discussed a letter sent by nine state Attorney Generals, in which they criticized the EEOC’s lawsuits and position concerning employers’ ability to use background checks to screen employees with a criminal record. Hopefully, these losses, fee awards, and criticisms will cause the EEOC to more thoroughly evaluate which cases have merit before subjecting employers to the high cost and aggravation of defending meritless claims.

June 10, 2013

Fired for Dating a Client, Employee Fails to Prove Violation of Colorado’s Lawful Activities Statute

By Mark Wiletsky

Dating a client is probably never a good idea. In some professions, it is a violation of ethical responsibilities. In other cases, it may be bad for business when the relationship goes sour. In the case of a family advocate for a social services organization, it created the appearance of a conflict of interest. That conflict of interest saved a small Colorado employer from being liable for a violation of Colorado’s Lawful Activities statute when it terminated the family advocate for dating a client. Ruiz v. Hope for Children, Inc., 2013 COA 91.

Romantic Relationship as Lawful Activity Conducted Outside of Work

Charlotte Ruiz worked as the only family advocate at a small non-profit social services organization in Pueblo called Hope for Children. Seledonio Rodriguez became a client of Hope for Children when he attended a court-ordered fathering class there. Ruiz didn’t meet Rodriguez until he completed his first class and needed assistance to sign up for a second class. Shortly after completing his second class, Rodriguez ran into Ruiz at the Colorado State Fair and sometime thereafter, they began dating. When Hope for Children’s executive director learned about the romantic relationship, she told Ruiz she could not continue to work for the organization if she wanted to continue to date Rodriguez. Ruiz refused to give up the relationship, so she was fired.

Ruiz sued Hope for Children alleging that she was terminated in violation of Colorado’s Lawful Activities Statute, which prohibits terminating an employee for engaging in a lawful activity outside of work. After a two-day bench trial, the judge concluded that Ruiz was indeed terminated for engaging in a lawful activity outside of work. However, the judge also found that the relationship raised a conflict of interest, or at least, the appearance of a conflict of interest which kept the termination from violating the statute.

Conflict of Interest Defense to Lawful Activities Statute

Colorado’s Lawful Activities statute provides defenses that allow an employer to restrict employees’ off-duty, off-premises lawful activities, namely when the restriction: (1) relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or group of employees; or (2) is necessary to avoid a conflict of interests with any responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of such a conflict of interest. Before this opinion, no Colorado appellate opinions interpreted these statutory defenses. In the Ruiz case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the conflict of interest defense was not limited to financial conflicts or an actual interference with the employee’s ability to perform a job-related duty. Instead, the Court stated that the determination of a conflict of interest, or appearance of one, must be made in light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case looking at both the context and industry involved.

In Ruiz’s case, the Court agreed that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions that Ruiz’s romantic relationship with a client created an appearance of a conflict of interest with her job duties. The relevant facts in this case included that: (a) Ruiz might be called to testify in court about Rodriguez’s completion of his court-ordered fathering class; (b) Hope for Children does not “close” its files and frequently worked with families over the course of many years, meaning Rodriguez would always be considered a client; (c) most of the organization’s budget was from a state agency grant and referrals from the agency would be negatively affected by permitting employees to date clients; (d) a romantic relationship between an employee and a client would negatively impact the credibility of the social services organization, as testified to by a former director of another social services agency and board member; and (e) the organization’s funding might be revoked if it allowed its employees to date clients. Based on the appearance of a conflict of interest created by Ruiz’s relationship with Rodriguez, the Court agreed that Hope for Children’s termination of Ruiz fell within the statutory defense language contained within the Lawful Activities statute and therefore, did not violate the statute.

What do we learn from this case? First, be cautious before terminating an employee for otherwise lawful, off-duty activities, at least in Colorado and other states that protect such conduct. Second, a romantic relationship can be a lawful, off-duty activity under the Lawful Activities statute. Therefore, if you terminate an employee for a romantic relationship, be sure you are on solid footing to establish a defense to a wrongful termination claim.

May 7, 2013

Small Colorado Employers Face Higher Damages for Discrimination Claims

By Mark Wiletsky and Steve Gutierrez

Small businesses beware: your employees now have more incentive to sue you. As of January 1, 2015, employees can recover compensatory and punitive damages for employment discrimination claims against businesses that employ between one to fourteen people under Colorado’s Job Protection and Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 2013, signed into law by Governor John Hickenlooper on Monday, May 6, 2013. But don’t despair. By taking some proactive steps now, businesses can minimize their exposure to potential claims.

Increased Exposure for Small Employers

Colorado’s new anti-discrimination law changes the landscape for small employers by allowing compensatory and punitive damages against Colorado’s small businesses (with 1-14 employees), along with attorneys’ fees and costs to the employee if he or she prevails, back pay, front pay, interest, and other potential relief. Thankfully, the new Colorado law contains some safeguards against outrageous damage awards that would likely put small employers out of business. For businesses with 1-4 employees, compensatory and punitive damages are capped at $10,000. For businesses with 5-15 employees, such damages are capped at $25,000. Businesses with greater than 15 employees are subject to the existing damages caps found in the federal anti-discrimination laws.

The availability of these damages to employees of businesses with fewer than 15 employees will likely result in more discrimination cases filed in Colorado against small businesses, significantly raising the potential exposure for small business owners. That is especially true given that such claims may be filed in state court, which is often viewed by attorneys representing employees as a more favorable forum for such claims.

Age Discrimination No Longer Cut Off at Age 70

The Job Protection and Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 2013 also eliminates the age 70 cutoff for age discrimination claims brought under Colorado law. This brings the state law into line with the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act which does not have an upper age limit. Consequently, employees age 40 and older are protected from employment discrimination under both state and federal law.

Good Faith Efforts May Avoid Punitive Damages

Under the new Colorado law, employers will not be subject to punitive damages if they can demonstrate good-faith efforts to prevent discriminatory and unfair employment practices in the workplace. In addition, no punitive damages are available in a lawsuit involving a claim of failure to make a reasonable accommodation for a disability if the employer can demonstrate good-faith efforts to identify and make a reasonable accommodation that would provide the disabled employee with an equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on the employer’s operation. Small businesses should begin those good-faith efforts now so that policies and procedures to prevent and respond to discrimination are in place when the law goes into effect.

Steps Small Businesses Should Take to Minimize Risk

Unfortunately for small businesses, the mere threat of a lawsuit, however meritless, may stretch tight resources to the breaking point. That is why it is so important to take proactive measures now, which will help minimize the risk of such lawsuits. Among other things, small businesses should:

1) Adopt and distribute policies that prohibit discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in the workplace. Require new and existing employees to acknowledge their receipt of these policies, preferably on an annual basis.

2) Train supervisors, managers and employees. Everyone in the workplace should be trained on your anti-discrimination policies and procedures with specialized training provided to supervisors and managers who must recognize harassment and discrimination and know what to do when they observe it or receive a complaint. In small workplaces, dealing with complaints of discrimination or retaliation can be difficult. Still, if you address it promptly and appropriately, you will be in a better position to avoid or defend against a claim.

3) Document performance issues. We often see meritless lawsuits filed because legitimate performance concerns were not shared with the employee or appropriately documented. If an employee has performance issues, be sure to get it in writing. Focus on the problem, give concrete examples, and warn the employee that a failure to achieve immediate and sustained improvement may result in termination.

4) Arbitration agreements. Consider whether it would be appropriate to have employees sign an arbitration agreement. Such agreements take discrimination claims out of the civil court system, and generally allow for a more streamlined resolution. However, arbitration is not necessarily cheaper than a court proceeding; in fact, in some cases it might cost more. Be sure to consider all the benefits and burdens of arbitration before relying on such agreements. And if you prefer arbitration, make sure your agreement complies with all applicable legal requirements.

Essentially, small employers need the same policies and procedures to deal with discrimination as larger employers do, even though many smaller employers simply do not have the same resources. Take the next 18 months before the law becomes effective to educate yourself, your supervisors and your employees on discrimination issues and take the steps that will help minimize your risk to the damages that will be available soon to aggrieved employees.

June 7, 2012

Last-Chance Agreements — Employer beware!

The EEOC, in its recent press release (http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-29-12.cfm) of May 29, 2012, announces a rare victory on summary judgment in what could be a bad trend for employers. In the underlying case of EEOC v. Cognis Corporation, a foreign multinational corporation, the federal judge ruled that the company retaliated against an employee for refusing to waive his rights to file a discrimination charge, both for past conduct and prospective conduct.

The employee, as a condition of continued employment, was asked to sign a last-chance agreement that prohibited him from filing a discrimination charge. According to the EEOC, Cognis conditioned the employment on the execution of the last chance agreement and when the employee refused to be bound by that agreement he was fired. As the Court noted in its opinion, it is not often that an employee is granted summary judgment on a Title VII retaliation claim.

The outcome here is problematic for two reasons. First, in most cases there is often a fact issue over the stated motivation for the adverse action taken by the employer because the motivation for the underlying decision is almost always in dispute; thus, there is a necessary question of fact that would defeat a summary judgment. Second, the Court’s willingness to discount the fact that had the employee not executed the last-chance agreement in the first instance he would have been terminated for a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason – poor performance – is worrisome. In rejecting Cognis’s argument on this point, the Court reasoned that even if it credited Cognis’s argument; it was the employee’s revocation of the last-chance agreement that constituted an adverse action, an act that might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. (See Opinion). This reasoning, of course, doesn’t adequately address the fact that the worker essentially was given consideration to remain employed under the last-change agreement.

What is clear from the Court holding in Cognis is the fact that the last-chance agreement is said to have threatened termination for undertaking future protected activity, which the Court says satisfies one element of the prima facie case of retaliation – a preemptive retaliatory act. Now, all that remains for the Court is a determination of damages. If the Cognis last-chance agreement had not included this prospective provision, I wonder how the case would have turned.

This holding is sure to motivate the EEOC to seek out similar cases of this kind. The EEOC concludes its release by indicating that “[f]iling EEOC charges is a fundamental right of American employees, and this agency always stands ready to protect that right.” EEOC’s Chicago District Director John Rowe further states, “This court’s opinion should cause employers to remember that seeking to dissuade employees from exercising that right is not only bad policy, it’s a violation of federal law which can give rise to very substantial liability.”

Despite the Court’s finding and the threats by the EEOC, this author maintains that narrowly crafted last-chance agreements are often useful to employers, both to ensure employees understand that future satisfactory performance is demanded and to give the employee fair opportunity to improve his/her conduct.

For more information contact Steven M. Gutierrez.