Category Archives: Utah

January 27, 2014

Union Membership: By the Numbers – 2013

By Jeffrey T. Johnson (retired)

The results are in.  For 2013, the percentage of union members in the private sector ticked up slightly, to 6.7%.  The percentage for 2012 was 6.6%.  The total number of union members working in the private sector rose from 7.0 million in 2012 to 7.3 million in 2013.

Numbers for the public sector dipped slightly from 2012, with 35.9 percent of public sector employees reported to be union members in 2012 and 35.3 percent in 2013. The total number of public sector union members remained relatively flat, with 7.2 million union members in 2013, down just over 100,000 members from 2012.

In analyzing the data provided by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the trend in both percentage and total number of union members has been a steady downward one.  For example, in 2005, 7.8% of private sector employees were union members.  In 2005, 15.7 million workers (private and public) were union members; in 2013, only 14.5 million.

The BLS report breaks down the union membership data by many categories, including by state, gender, age, industry, and occupation.  It also provides comparative earnings information.  Here are some highlights:

  • Men had a higher union membership rate (11.9%) than women (10.5%).
  • The age category with the highest percentage of union members was age 55-64 (14.3%).
  • The occupations with the highest percentage of private sector union members were protective service occupations (35.3%), utilities (25.6%), and transportation and warehousing (19.6%)
  • New York continues to have the highest union membership rate (24.4%), while North Carolina had the lowest rate (3.0%).

Statistics for 2013 union membership in the primary states served by Holland & Hart’s offices were as follows:

  • Nevada – 14.6% unionized, total of 169,000 members
  • Montana – 13.0% unionized, total of 52,000 members
  • Colorado – 7.6% unionized, total of 171,000 members
  • New Mexico – 6.2% unionized, total of 751,000 members
  • Wyoming – 5.7% unionized, total of 15,000 members
  • Idaho – 4.7% unionized, total of 29,000 members
  • Utah – 3.9% unionized, total of 49,000 members

Note:  Above figures are private and public sectors combined

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October 14, 2013

“Pretaliatory” Firing Recognized as Wrongful Discharge Claim in Utah

By Elizabeth T. Dunning 

Does an employee have to actually file a workers’ compensation claim to be protected from retaliatory termination?  No, says the Utah Court of Appeals.  In the recent Stone v. M&M Welding and Constr. Inc. decision, the Court ruled that an employee who was fired after expressing his intention to file a workers’ compensation claim could pursue a retaliatory discharge claim even though he failed to actually file his worker’s comp claim until eight months after he was fired.  

Employee Discusses Desire to File Workers’ Compensation Claim 

Terry Lee Stone was injured at a party hosted by M&M Welding and Construction in November of 2009.  Within days of the injury, Stone informed the company president that he wanted to file a workers’ compensation claim.  The president dissuaded Stone from doing so, instead holding his position open for two months until he could return to work.  Upon his return, however, Stone’s hours were reduced.  In March and April of 2010, Stone again informed the company that he intended to file a workers’ compensation claim, but failed to do so. 

In early May, a customer demanded that Stone be fired, believing that he exaggerated in reporting a spill of contaminated water at the customer’s site. A few days later, Stone contacted M&M to obtain insurance information for his workers’ compensation claim.  M&M fired him the following day.  Stone sued, alleging that M&M terminated him in retaliation for expressing his intent to file a workers’ compensation claim.  M&M argued that because Stone did not file his workers’ compensation claim until eight months after he was fired, his termination could not be in retaliation of the filing.  The trial court agreed, awarding summary judgment to M&M. 

Utah Court of Appeals Rules that Notifying Employer of Intent to File Workers’ Compensation Claim is Enough 

On appeal, the Court pointed to the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc. which recognized that “retaliatory discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim violates the public policy of this state; thus, an employee who has been fired or constructively discharged in retaliation for claiming workers’ compensation benefits has a wrongful discharge cause of action.”  In Stone, the Court of Appeals extended the basis for a wrongful discharge claim by concluding that conduct short of actually filing a workers’ compensation claim was protected conduct.  The Court wrote that preparing a claim, notifying the employer of the intent to file a claim or discussing his claim with coworkers could be sufficient to support a claim of retaliatory discharge.  In Stone’s case, he had repeatedly expressed to the company president and others that he intended to file a workers’ compensation claim so that conduct was sufficient to proceed with his retaliatory discharge lawsuit.

 

Policy Behind Recognizing “Pretaliatory” Discharge 

The Court recognized that a rule that protected employees only after they actually filed a workers’ compensation claim “would create a perverse incentive for an employer to discharge an injured employee as soon as the employer learns of the employee’s intention to file a claim.”  The Court found such a rule would contradict the important public policy embodied in the state’s workers’ compensation act. 

The Court’s ruling also squares with the conduct that can underlie a retaliation claim under other employment laws.  For example, retaliation claims under Title VII can be based on conduct where the employee either opposes workplace discrimination or participates in a discrimination claim, investigation or proceeding.  “Opposing” discrimination can include the threat of filing a discrimination charge as well as complaining about or reporting discrimination at work.   The Stone decision recognizing a retaliation wrongful discharge claim based on an employee’s expressed intent to file a workers’ compensation claim is analogous to the “opposition” retaliation claims recognized in such other employment laws. 

Employer Take-Aways 

Employers should be careful when making adverse employment decisions related to an employee who has either filed a workers’ compensation claim or is preparing to do so. Decisions should be unrelated to the claim or threat of claim and should be based on a reason that can be clearly articulated and is supported by thorough documentation.  Anything less may lead the affected employee to conclude that the adverse action was in retaliation for the workers’ compensation claim and make it difficult to defend a retaliation lawsuit.


Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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October 4, 2013

EEOC’s Religious Accommodation Claim Fails Despite Retailer’s Assumption that a Female Job Applicant Wore a Headscarf for Religious Reasons

By John M. Husband 

US-CourtOfAppeals-10thCircuit-SealDoes an employer have to engage in an interactive discussion about reasonably accommodating the wearing of a headscarf (i.e., hijab) in contravention of its dress code simply because a job applicant wears a headscarf to the job interview?  No, according to a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Court ruled that to establish a religious accommodation claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must establish that he/she informed the employer that he/she adheres to a particular practice for religious reasons and that the plaintiff needs an accommodation for that practice, due to a conflict between the practice and the employer’s neutral work rule.  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 11-5110 (10th Cir. October 1, 2013). 

In the Abercrombie case, an assistant manager named Heather Cooke interviewed Samantha Elauf, a seventeen-year old applicant for an in-store sales position. Ms. Elauf wore a headscarf to the interview.  Though they did not discuss religion, Ms. Cooke assumed that Ms. Elauf was Muslim and that her Muslim religion was the reason she wore a headscarf.  During the interview, Ms. Cooke described some of the dress requirements expected of Abercrombie employees but neither she nor Ms. Elauf specifically referred to or discussed the wearing of a headscarf.   After the interview, Ms. Cooke believed Ms. Elauf was a good candidate for the job but was unsure whether it would be a problem for her to wear a headscarf since Abercrombie has a strict “Look Policy” that forbids wearing of “caps” and black clothing.  Ms. Cooke consulted with her district manager who rejected Ms. Elauf for hire because she wore a headscarf which was inconsistent with the Look Policy.  

EEOC Files Lawsuit Alleging Retailer Failed to Accommodate Applicant’s Religious Practice 

In 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit in federal court in Oklahoma alleging that Abercrombie violated Title VII by refusing to hire Ms. Elauf because she wore a headscarf and failing to accommodate her religious beliefs because it failed to make an exception to its Look Policy.  The Oklahoma court ruled in favor of the EEOC on summary judgment, reasoning that Abercrombie had enough information to make it aware that there was a conflict between the applicant’s religious practice and its Look Policy that would require an accommodation.  It emphasized that Abercrombie had made numerous exceptions to its Look Policy over the past decade or so, including eight or nine headscarf exceptions.  The parties went to trial on the issue of damages where a jury awarded the EEOC $20,000 in compensatory damages. 

Religious Accommodation Claim Requires Plaintiff to Inform Employer of Conflict between Religious Practice and Employer Policy 

On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Abercrombie argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because there was no dispute that Ms. Elauf never informed the company that her practice of wearing a headscarf was based on her religious beliefs and that she would need an accommodation for the practice based on the conflict between it and the Look Policy.  A divided Tenth Circuit agreed.  Two of the three judges on the panel ruled that the plaintiff in a religious accommodation case must establish that he or she informedthe employer of his/her religious belief that contradicts with an employment requirement and the plaintiff must request an accommodation.  Because Ms. Elauf never informed Abercrombie that she wore a headscarf for religious reasons and never requested an exception from the dress code, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the EEOC and vacated the jury award with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Abercrombie.  The majority stated that it is only after an employer is put on notice of the need for a religious accommodation that it must actively engage in a dialogue with applicants or employees concerning their conflicting religious practices and possible accommodations.  

Dissenting Opinion and Conflicting Circuit Court Decisions Set Up Possible Appeal to Supreme Court 

The dissenting judge strongly disagreed with his two colleagues on the panel, believing that Abercrombie should not be permitted to avoid discussing reasonable accommodations for Ms. Elauf’s religious practice when it knew that she wore a headscarf, assumed she was Muslim and wore the headscarf for religious reasons and knew that its Look Policy prohibited its sales models from wearing headwear.  The dissent noted that Ms. Elauf could not inform Abercrombie of a conflict between her religious practice and its dress code because she did not know the details of the Look Policy or that headwear, including a headscarf, was prohibited.  The dissenting judge would have sent the entire matter to a jury to decide if Abercrombie was liable for religious discrimination. 

The dissenting opinion points out that other circuit courts of appeal have held that a job applicant or employee can establish a religious failure-to-accommodate claim if he/she can show that the employer knew of a conflict between the plaintiff’s religious beliefs and a job requirement, regardless of how the employer acquired knowledge of that conflict.  Unlike the Tenth Circuit, these other circuits do not require that the plaintiff actually inform the employer of the conflict. The stage is set for the EEOC to ask the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the disagreement between the courts to ultimately decide whether a plaintiff must actually inform the employer of the conflict between his/her religious practice and a job requirement before the duty to discuss reasonable accommodations kicks in.   

Employer Lessons 

This opinion is favorable for employers in the states within the Tenth Circuit’s jurisdiction, namely Colorado, Oklahoma, Kansas, Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico.  That said, employers should always be cautious about making adverse employment decisions when it has knowledge or information that relates to an applicant/employee’s religious beliefs or practices.


Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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July 29, 2013

The Battle Over Background Checks Continues — State AGs Accuse EEOC of “Gross Federal Overreach”

By Mark Wiletsky 

Is it discriminatory if an employer does not hire anyone with a particular criminal conviction, regardless of that person’s race, gender, religion, or other protected characteristic?  According to the EEOC’s April 2012 Enforcement Guidance, it might be.  But in a July 24, 2013 letter sent to EEOC Commissioner Jacqueline Berrien and the four EEOC Board Members, nine state Attorneys’ General (AGs) disagree.  The AGs chastise the EEOC for filing recent lawsuits against BMW Manufacturing Co., LLC and Dolgencorp (Dollar General), in which the EEOC alleges that these employers violated Title VII’s disparate impact prohibition by using a bright-line screening policy that rejected all individuals with past convictions in certain categories of crimes, such as murder, assault, reckless driving and possession of drug paraphernalia.   

The letter then criticizes the EEOC’s April 2012 Enforcement Guidance on Arrest and Conviction Records, stating that the EEOC’s policy guidance incorrectly applies the law and constitutes an unlawful expansion of Title VII.  The AGs argue that if Congress wishes to protect former criminals from employment discrimination, it can amend the law, but it is not the EEOC’s role to expand the protections of Title VII under the guise of preventing racial discrimination. 

The Republican state AGs from Colorado, Montana, Utah, Kansas, Nebraska, West Virginia, Alabama, South Carolina and Georgia joined in this missive to say “enough is enough” on the EEOC’s background check lawsuits.  Citing the burden on businesses to undertake more individualized assessments of an applicant’s criminal history, the AGs urge the EEOC to rescind its April 2012 Enforcement Guidance and dismiss the lawsuits against Dollar General and BMW.  Not likely, but it may get the attention of federal lawmakers who may try to rein in the EEOC’s position on this issue.


Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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July 22, 2013

Myriad of Social Media Privacy Laws Create Havoc for Multi-State Employers

By Elizabeth Dunning 

ComputerDoes your company request that your employees and applicants provide user names and passwords to their personal social media accounts?  Do you require applicants to log onto their online accounts in your presence so that you can view their content?  Perhaps you ask employees to “friend” their supervisors.  If you haven’t followed new developments in state employment laws, you may not realize that such activities are unlawful in some states.  In just two years, eleven states have passed social media privacy laws that prevent employers from accessing employees’ and applicants’ personal online accounts.  Each state law differs in certain respects, making it difficult for multi-state employers to adopt a uniform and consistent social media policy.  To help sort things out, we highlight here the primary differences in the state social media privacy laws. 

States with Workplace Social Media or Internet Privacy Laws 

The eleven states that have enacted social media or internet privacy laws affecting employers to-date are:  Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Washington.  All but one of these states protect the access information for both current and prospective employees, with New Mexico only protecting the log-in information of applicants. 

Differences in State Social Media Laws 

Generally, all of these states prohibit an employer from requesting or requiring an employee or applicant to disclose his or her user name, password or other means of accessing his or her personal social media accounts. Many of these states also make it unlawful to discipline, discharge, discriminate against or penalize an employee, or fail to hire an applicant who refuses to disclose his or her access information to personal social media accounts.  However, that’s where the uniformity in the laws generally ends.  The following chart highlights numerous key differences between the state laws. 

Legal Provision

States Recognizing Provision

Prohibits employers from requesting that employee add employer representative or another employee to his or her list of contacts (e.g., “friend”)

Arkansas, Colorado, Oregon and Washington

Prohibits employers from requesting employee to access his or her personal social media account in the presence of the employer (“shoulder surfing”)

California, Michigan, Oregon and Washington

Prohibits employers from requesting employee to change the privacy settings on his or her personal social media accounts

Arkansas, Colorado and Washington

Specifically permits employers to view and access social media accounts that are publicly available

Arkansas, Illinois, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon and Utah

Exception when access required to comply with laws or regulations of self-regulatory organizations

Arkansas, Nevada, Oregon and Washington

Exception for investigations of employee violation of law or employee misconduct

Arkansas, California, Michigan, Oregon, Utah and Washington (Colorado and Maryland limit this exception to investigation of securities or financial law compliance)

Exception for investigation of unauthorized downloading of employer’s proprietary, confidential or financial data

Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, Utah and Washington

Inadvertent acquisition of personal log-in information while monitoring employer systems not a violation but employer not permitted to use the log-in information to access personal social media accounts

Arkansas, Oregon and Washington

As you can see, the differences in the laws exceed the similarities, making it difficult for an employer operating in more than one covered state to comply with all applicable provisions.  Even the definition of covered social media accounts varies by state, creating even more inconsistencies. 

Would a Federal Law Help? 

With eleven laws in place and almost 20 additional states considering social media privacy bills, the issue seems ripe for a federal bill that would bring some uniformity to the protections offered to employees and applicants.  In February 2013, the Social Networking Online Protection Act, which offers such workplace protections, was introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives.  Unfortunately, it has languished in committee and is not expected to pass.  In addition, a federal law on the issue will likely only simplify the web of state laws if it specifically preempts state law.  Without federal preemption, we might face two sources of law on the issue, federal and state, which might muddy the waters even more.  In any event, it does not appear that a federal law will be enacted before additional states enact their own laws, leaving employers to struggle with the variances in state law. 

Best Practices for Complying with Social Media Privacy Laws 

With the vast amount of information available on social media and the increased use of social networking platforms for business purposes, it is likely that most employers will at some point need to access or review content on an employee’s or applicant’s social media account.  Perhaps it will be for an investigation of an employee who downloaded proprietary information or perhaps it will be to confirm derogatory statements about the company made by an employee.  Whatever the reason, the first step is to recognize that these laws exist and you will need to review which, if any, apply to your company and/or the employee involved.  Remember that you are generally free to access publicly available social media content.  However, if one of these state laws applies, consult with legal counsel before accessing (or requesting access to) any personal social media accounts to determine what restrictions and exceptions are applicable to your particular circumstances. 

Establish a social media policy specifying that employees are not permitted to disclose or post proprietary or confidential company information on their personal social media accounts.  Make a clear delineation between company/business-related social media accounts where you control who speaks on behalf of your organization, and personal accounts where employees do not represent the views of the company. Be careful that your social media policy does not run afoul of the National Labor Relations Act by interfering with employees’ right to discuss their wages and working conditions in a concerted manner.  Communicate your policy to your employees through normal channels, such as your employee handbook, online policy/intranet, etc. 

Train your supervisors, managers and human resources staff on these laws.  Sometimes supervisors or HR folks think it is acceptable to ask an employee to “friend” them online, or to ask for their log-in information to view pictures or other benign posts.  Despite good intentions, company representatives could get you into legal trouble so advise them of these laws and your restrictions on requesting access to personal social media accounts.


Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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April 25, 2013

Tips for Complying with Utah’s Internet Employment Privacy Act

By Elizabeth Dunning

Effective May 14, 2013, Utah employers may not request employees or applicants to disclose information related to their personal Internet accounts.  The Internet Employment Privacy Act(IEPA), recently signed into law by Utah Governor Gary R. Herbert, prohibits employers from asking an employee or applicant to reveal a username or password that allows access to the individual’s personal Internet account.  In addition, employers may not penalize or discriminate against an employee or applicant for failing to disclose a username or password.  A similar restriction applies to higher educational institutions through passage of the Internet Postsecondary Institution Privacy Act. 

With enactment of the IEPA, Utah becomes the fifth state to pass legislation that limits an employer’s access to social media accounts, joining California, Illinois, Maryland and Michigan.  New Mexico passed a similar law shortly after Utah and New Jersey’s law passed the legislature and is awaiting the governor’s signature.  A bill introduced in February in the U.S. House of Representatives called the Social Networking Online Protection Act (H.R. 537) is stuck in committee. 

Public Online Accounts Are Fair Game under the IEPA 

The IEPA does not restrict or prohibit employers from viewing or using online information about employees and applicants that the employer can obtain without the employee’s username or password.  Any online information that is available to the public may be accessed and viewed by employers without violating the IEPA.  Consequently, individuals who set privacy settings on their online accounts to allow “public” access effectively opt themselves out of any protections offered by this new law. 

Utah Restriction Applies to Accounts Used Exclusively for Personal Communication 

In prohibiting employers from requiring disclosure of online usernames and passwords, the IEPA draws a distinction between personal Internet accounts and those used for business related communications.  The law only restricts employer access to personal online accounts that are used by an employee or applicant exclusively for personal communications unrelated to any business purpose of the employer.  It does not, however, restrict access to accounts created, maintained, used or accessed by an employee or applicant for business related communications or for a business purpose of the employer.  

In practice, the line between personal and business related accounts may be blurred as many employees use their personal online presence to network and communicate for business reasons.  Consider the sales person who uses his or her LinkedIn account to communicate with potential buyers within a particular industry, or the CPA who posts tax reminders on his or her Facebook page.  Are those accounts accessible under the IEPA since they are not used “exclusively” for personal communications?  A plain reading of the law suggests that may be the case, thereby watering down the potential protections offered by the IEPA to applicants and employees.   

Steps for Complying with the IEPA 

Utah employers should review their HR forms, policies and practices to ensure that they do not ask applicants and/or employees to provide a username or password to their personal Internet accounts.   Train supervisors and managers not to ask for this information as well.  In fact, take the opportunity to remind supervisors and managers not to “friend” subordinates on personal online platforms, such as Facebook.  In addition, reinforce that employees and applicants may not be penalized or treated adversely for failing to provide a username or password for personal online accounts.   

Remember, too, that even though the IEPA does not prohibit accessing an employee’s or applicant’s public social media accounts, viewing such information creates other risks.  Employers may view information regarding the individual’s religion, race, national origin, disability, age, or other protected group status that could give rise to a discrimination claim.  Furthermore, online information is unreliable and ever-changing, meaning that employers should not rely on what they see online when making employment decisions.  To stay out of trouble, consult with legal counsel before viewing or using social media in the employment context.

For more information about permissible actions and potential damages under the Utah Internet Employment Privacy Act, please see our Client Alert.