Category Archives: Current Affairs

June 21, 2013

Arbitration Agreement Waiving Class Claims Upheld – What it Means for Employers

Arbitration is a matter of contract between the parties and courts are not permitted to invalidate an agreed-upon provision that prohibits claims from being arbitrated on a class action basis, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in its June 20, 2013 opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. Employers can benefit from this ruling by crafting arbitration agreements that limit an employee’s right to pursue employment claims on behalf of a class of employees.

Cost to Pursue Individual Arbitration Not a Factor

At issue in the American Express case was an arbitration agreement between American Express and merchants who accept its charge cards that required the parties to arbitrate all disputes. The agreement further stated that “there shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.”

When numerous merchants filed a class action lawsuit against American Express alleging violations of federal antitrust laws due to American Express’ alleged high card fees, American Express moved to dismiss the lawsuit and instead force each merchant to arbitrate its claim individually, as required by the arbitration agreement. The District Court agreed with American Express and dismissed the class action lawsuit. The merchants appealed the dismissal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the cost to prove the antitrust claims by each individual merchant would far exceed the amount they could recover as an individual plaintiff. The merchants submitted a declaration from an economist who estimated that the cost of expert analysis on the antitrust claims would be “at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million.” The maximum amount of damages that each individual plaintiff could expect to recover was $38,549 as treble damages. The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal, ruling that because the cost for each merchant to arbitrate their claim individually was prohibitive, the class-action waiver in the arbitration agreement was unenforceable and arbitration could not proceed. American Express sought review by the Supreme Court.

In a 5-3 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not allow courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class actions on the ground that the plaintiffs’ cost to arbitrate a federal statutory claim individually exceeds the potential recovery. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the merchants’ argument that cost vs. recovery should factor into the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. He wrote that “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.” The Court drew a distinction between contract provisions that prohibit an individual from asserting their statutory rights at all (e.g., a waiver of certain claims) and prohibiting class claims. Relying on earlier precedent, the Court reiterated that it may invalidate arbitration agreements that operate as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies, but will not invalidate an agreement because it is not worth the expense involved in a party proving a statutory remedy. The Court also refused to create preliminary hurdles before a plaintiff could be held to contractually-agreed arbitration, such as requiring a court to evaluate the cost to prove claims as well as the damages that could be recovered if the plaintiff is successful. Justice Scalia wrote that “such a judicially created superstructure” would “undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in general and bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure.”

Dissent: Majority’s Response to Merchants Was “Too Darn Bad”

Justice Elena Kagen, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Steven Breyer (Justice Sotomayor did not take part in the decision), wrote a stinging dissent in which she characterized the case as small business owners who were forced to accept a form contract by a monopolizing credit card company that violated antitrust laws. The dissent states that if the arbitration clause is enforceable, American Express has insulated itself from antitrust liability because it used its monopoly power to insist on a contract that “effectively deprives its victims of all legal recourse.” Justice Kagen wrote: the “nutshell version of today’s opinion, admirably flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too darn bad.” The three dissenting justices believe that the FAA was never meant to produce the outcome arrived at by the majority, and that the majority decision blocks the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulates wrongdoers from liability. The dissent instead would rely on the “effective vindication” rule, namely that an arbitration clause will not be enforced if it prevents the effective vindication of federal statutory rights, however it achieves that result, to invalidate the bar on class arbitration in the American Express agreement.

Employment Arbitration Agreements

Recent Supreme Court decisions upholding arbitration agreements, such as the American Express opinion, may bolster efforts to use arbitration agreements in the employment context. Although there are pros and cons to utilizing arbitration agreements with employees, a significant advantage is the ability to prohibit class actions by requiring employees to arbitrate their employment disputes on an individual basis. In addition, arbitration can be less costly than litigating in court, and more confidential as most arbitration filings are not public records. Perhaps most significantly, arbitration allows employment cases to be heard by arbitrators, not juries, thereby reducing the risk of runaway verdicts. Employers should consult with employment counsel to determine if arbitration agreements are warranted with their workforce and if so, what provisions will best protect the company’s interests.

Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

June 19, 2013

Wyoming Employers – Time to Pay More Attention to those Unemployment Claims

By Brad Cave

July 1 creates some new incentives for Wyoming employers to participate in the unemployment claims system. Currently, UI benefits are paid to the employee beginning immediately when a deputy clerk of the Wyoming Department of Workforce Services determines that the employee is entitled to benefits. If the employer appeals that determination, and a hearing officer reverses the deputy’s decision, the employer’s account is not charged for the benefits paid under the deputy’s erroneous decision. The same is true if the employer obtains reversal of a decision granting benefits through an appeal to the Unemployment Insurance Commission or the district court.

Effective July 1, this general rule has an exception that all employers should keep in mind. Bowing to federal pressure, the Wyoming Legislature amended the Wyoming Employment Security Law (ironic name for the unemployment benefit statute, isn’t it) to require employers to respond to requests for information from the Department. See, http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2013/Enroll/SF0073.pdf Employers will no longer escape the monetary consequences of erroneous payments if the Department determines that, (1) an erroneous payment of benefits was made because the employer was at fault for failing to respond adequately or on time to a written request for information; and, (2) the employer has established a pattern of failing to respond adequately or on time to such requests. The employer’s responses must be received within fifteen (15) days after the Department sends the request, whether by regular mail or email. What constitutes a pattern of failing to respond remains to be seen – the Legislature said only that the phrase means a “repeated documented failure” to respond to written requests for information, “taking into consideration the number of instances of failure in relation to the total volume of requests by the Department” to the employer.

Action items for Wyoming employers:

1. Maintain documentation of your responses to the Department on unemployment claims. We don’t believe that certified mail is necessary for most employers, but we do suggest keeping copies of all the documentation you return in response to a request. Also, the amendment requires the Department to acknowledge receipt of the requested information within fifteen (15) days if the employer requests such acknowledgement.

2. Some employers use a third-party agent or centralized offices in remote states to respond to unemployment claims. Be sure to notify those who process your UI claims, as the amendment clearly holds the employer responsible for delays or inadequate information from an employer’s agent. Likewise, if you have drug your feet getting back to your UI agent with the necessary information, now is the time to improve your response time so the agent does not blame you for a “pattern of failing to respond.”

3. As always, be very careful about what you (or your agent) say or submit in response to a request for information. A determination for or against an employee regarding unemployment benefits is not “binding, conclusive or admissible” in any subsequent litigation between the employer and employee. But the employer can be bound by what it says were the reasons for termination and the documents it submits to support the termination. Any discrepancy in the employer’s reasons can weaken your objection to the UI claim and be used in other legal proceedings to challenge the legitimacy of your reasons for the termination.

June 10, 2013

Fired for Dating a Client, Employee Fails to Prove Violation of Colorado’s Lawful Activities Statute

By Mark Wiletsky

Dating a client is probably never a good idea. In some professions, it is a violation of ethical responsibilities. In other cases, it may be bad for business when the relationship goes sour. In the case of a family advocate for a social services organization, it created the appearance of a conflict of interest. That conflict of interest saved a small Colorado employer from being liable for a violation of Colorado’s Lawful Activities statute when it terminated the family advocate for dating a client. Ruiz v. Hope for Children, Inc., 2013 COA 91.

Romantic Relationship as Lawful Activity Conducted Outside of Work

Charlotte Ruiz worked as the only family advocate at a small non-profit social services organization in Pueblo called Hope for Children. Seledonio Rodriguez became a client of Hope for Children when he attended a court-ordered fathering class there. Ruiz didn’t meet Rodriguez until he completed his first class and needed assistance to sign up for a second class. Shortly after completing his second class, Rodriguez ran into Ruiz at the Colorado State Fair and sometime thereafter, they began dating. When Hope for Children’s executive director learned about the romantic relationship, she told Ruiz she could not continue to work for the organization if she wanted to continue to date Rodriguez. Ruiz refused to give up the relationship, so she was fired.

Ruiz sued Hope for Children alleging that she was terminated in violation of Colorado’s Lawful Activities Statute, which prohibits terminating an employee for engaging in a lawful activity outside of work. After a two-day bench trial, the judge concluded that Ruiz was indeed terminated for engaging in a lawful activity outside of work. However, the judge also found that the relationship raised a conflict of interest, or at least, the appearance of a conflict of interest which kept the termination from violating the statute.

Conflict of Interest Defense to Lawful Activities Statute

Colorado’s Lawful Activities statute provides defenses that allow an employer to restrict employees’ off-duty, off-premises lawful activities, namely when the restriction: (1) relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or group of employees; or (2) is necessary to avoid a conflict of interests with any responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of such a conflict of interest. Before this opinion, no Colorado appellate opinions interpreted these statutory defenses. In the Ruiz case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the conflict of interest defense was not limited to financial conflicts or an actual interference with the employee’s ability to perform a job-related duty. Instead, the Court stated that the determination of a conflict of interest, or appearance of one, must be made in light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case looking at both the context and industry involved.

In Ruiz’s case, the Court agreed that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions that Ruiz’s romantic relationship with a client created an appearance of a conflict of interest with her job duties. The relevant facts in this case included that: (a) Ruiz might be called to testify in court about Rodriguez’s completion of his court-ordered fathering class; (b) Hope for Children does not “close” its files and frequently worked with families over the course of many years, meaning Rodriguez would always be considered a client; (c) most of the organization’s budget was from a state agency grant and referrals from the agency would be negatively affected by permitting employees to date clients; (d) a romantic relationship between an employee and a client would negatively impact the credibility of the social services organization, as testified to by a former director of another social services agency and board member; and (e) the organization’s funding might be revoked if it allowed its employees to date clients. Based on the appearance of a conflict of interest created by Ruiz’s relationship with Rodriguez, the Court agreed that Hope for Children’s termination of Ruiz fell within the statutory defense language contained within the Lawful Activities statute and therefore, did not violate the statute.

What do we learn from this case? First, be cautious before terminating an employee for otherwise lawful, off-duty activities, at least in Colorado and other states that protect such conduct. Second, a romantic relationship can be a lawful, off-duty activity under the Lawful Activities statute. Therefore, if you terminate an employee for a romantic relationship, be sure you are on solid footing to establish a defense to a wrongful termination claim.

May 29, 2013

October 1 Deadline for Employers to Provide Notice of Health Care Exchange

By Elizabeth Nedrow

Employers recently were given the green light on a notice requirement related to health care reform.

The central feature of much of health care reform is the exchange system. No later than October 1, 2013, employers must provide each employee a written notice:

Informing the employee of the existence of the exchange including a description of services provided by the exchange, and the manner in which the employee may contact the exchange to request assistance;
Explaining that the employee may be eligible for a premium tax credit if the employee purchases a qualified health plan through the exchange; and
Including a statement informing the employee that if the employee purchases a qualified health plan through the exchange rather than choosing employer-offered health coverage (if any), the employee may be foregoing the employer's contribution (if any) to the employer-offered health coverage, as well as a statement that such employer contributions are often excludable from income for federal income tax purposes.

Read our entire alert on this notice requirement here.

May 14, 2013

D.C. Circuit Court Tears Down NLRB Poster Rule

By Brad Williams

The writing’s still not on the wall. On May 7, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) controversial poster rule requiring 6 million private employers to post a government-issued notice advising employees of their union-related rights. The rule remains in limbo pending a related appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and potential appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Poster Rule and Business Group Backlash

The controversial rule was issued in August 2011 under the NLRB’s purported statutory authority to enact rules “necessary” to carrying out the National Labor Relation Act’s provisions. The Board had long been empowered under Section 6 of the Act to engage in administrative rulemaking, but had generally eschewed this power to enforce union-related rights through case-by-case adjudication. In justifying its unusual poster rule, the NLRB claimed that many employees were unaware of their union-related rights. It cited the small percentage of unionized employees in the private workforce, and claimed that immigrants and high school students were particularly unlikely to be aware of their workplace rights.

The NLRB poster rule required all private employers covered by the Act—6 million businesses—to post an 11-by-17 inch government-issued notice in “conspicuous places,” and on intranet or internet sites used to communicate with employees. The poster advised employees of their rights to organize and join unions, to collectively bargain, and to strike and picket. Failure to post was an unfair labor practice, and could separately be used as evidence of an employer’s unlawful motive in other Board cases. The statute of limitations on unfair labor practice charges would also be tolled in cases where employers failed to post.

Business groups excoriated the rule as unbalanced. The poster did not advise employees of their additional rights to decertify unions, to refuse to pay dues in right-to-work states, or to object to dues payments in excess of those needed for representational purposes. The rule also arguably implicated employers’ free speech rights, and exceeded the NLRB’s Section 6 authority because the Act does not expressly mandate that the Board educate employees about workplace rights. Some groups claimed that the Obama administration was also improperly attempting to bypass the legislative process through substantive rulemaking.

District Court Challenges and the D.C. Circuit Court’s Injunction

The rule was originally slated to become effective in November 2011, but implementation was twice delayed due to litigation in the U.S. District Courts for the Districts of Columbia and South Carolina. In the former case, a district court judge upheld the rule as a valid exercise of the Board’s Section 6 power, but invalidated two of its enforcement mechanisms. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2012). In the latter case, a judge held that the Board had exceeded its Section 6 authority because the Act nowhere required employers to post notices of employee rights. Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778 (D.S.C. 2012).

Both district court opinions were appealed. Just two weeks before it was finally scheduled to become effective—on April 30, 2012— the D.C. Circuit Court enjoined the rule’s enforcement pending resolution of the District of Columbia appeal. The NLRB directed its regional offices to not implement the rule pending resolution of the issues before the D.C. Circuit Court.

D.C. Circuit Court’s Opinion

On May 7, 2013, Judges A. Raymond Randolph, Karen Henderson, and Janice Rogers Brown of the D.C. Circuit Court—all Republican appointees—rejected the rule after finding each of its enforcement mechanisms incompatible with the Act.

Writing for the court, Judge Randolph first noted that the Act’s free speech provision—Section 8(c)—precluded the NLRB from finding employer speech containing no threat of reprisal or promise of benefit to be an unfair labor practice, or evidence of such a practice. But he found that the poster rule did precisely that. It provided that failure to post was both an unfair labor practice, and could be used as evidence of other unfair labor practices. Drawing on First Amendment jurisprudence, he rejected any claim that the government-issued poster merely reflected the Board’s, and not an employer’s, speech. First Amendment principles protect both the “dissemination” and the “creation” of messages. They also protect the right not to speak, so the “right to disseminate another’s speech necessarily includes the right to decide not to disseminate it.” Judge Randolph thus found two of the rule’s enforcement mechanisms invalid.

He next held that the rule’s purported tolling of the statute of limitations in cases where employers failed to post the notice was incompatible with Congressional intent. The Board failed to prove that in enacting the 6-month statute of limitations on unfair labor practice charges, Congress contemplated potential tolling where employers failed to post, or where employees were unaware of their union-related rights. Judge Randolph thus held that the rule’s remaining enforcement mechanism was also invalid.

Because each of its enforcement mechanisms conflicted with the Act, Judge Randolph rejected the rule’s notice posting requirement after noting that the NLRB had expressly rejected the option of issuing a rule that depended solely on voluntary compliance.

In a concurring opinion, Judges Henderson and Brown agreed with Judge Randolph’s reasoning, but would have taken his decision one step further. They argued that, regardless of whether the enforcement mechanisms were valid, the NLRB lacked Section 6 authority to issue the poster rule. They urged that the Act invested with Board with only reactive power—such as responding to unfair labor practice charges, or responding to election petitions filed by parties—but not any proactive authority to guard against potential statutory violations. “The NLRA,” they concluded, “simply does not authorize the Board to impose on an employer a freestanding obligation to educate its employees on the fine points of labor relations law.” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 12-5068 (D.C. Cir. May 7, 2013).

Fourth Circuit Appeal and Potential U.S. Supreme Court Review

While the D.C. Circuit Court firmly rejected the poster rule, the related challenge from South Carolina remains pending before the Fourth Circuit. That court heard oral arguments in the case in March 2013, and the parties have already submitted their differing interpretations of the D.C. Circuit court’s opinion in supplemental filings. The Board has not yet updated its website to address the effect, if any, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion may have on its own enforcement position.

Regardless of how the Fourth Circuit eventually rules, the NLRB’s poster rule seems likely to end up before the U.S. Supreme Court. The writing’s still not on the wall, but the Supreme Court is one step closer to posting its own thoughts on the matter.

May 7, 2013

Small Colorado Employers Face Higher Damages for Discrimination Claims

By Mark Wiletsky and Steve Gutierrez

Small businesses beware: your employees now have more incentive to sue you. As of January 1, 2015, employees can recover compensatory and punitive damages for employment discrimination claims against businesses that employ between one to fourteen people under Colorado’s Job Protection and Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 2013, signed into law by Governor John Hickenlooper on Monday, May 6, 2013. But don’t despair. By taking some proactive steps now, businesses can minimize their exposure to potential claims.

Increased Exposure for Small Employers

Colorado’s new anti-discrimination law changes the landscape for small employers by allowing compensatory and punitive damages against Colorado’s small businesses (with 1-14 employees), along with attorneys’ fees and costs to the employee if he or she prevails, back pay, front pay, interest, and other potential relief. Thankfully, the new Colorado law contains some safeguards against outrageous damage awards that would likely put small employers out of business. For businesses with 1-4 employees, compensatory and punitive damages are capped at $10,000. For businesses with 5-15 employees, such damages are capped at $25,000. Businesses with greater than 15 employees are subject to the existing damages caps found in the federal anti-discrimination laws.

The availability of these damages to employees of businesses with fewer than 15 employees will likely result in more discrimination cases filed in Colorado against small businesses, significantly raising the potential exposure for small business owners. That is especially true given that such claims may be filed in state court, which is often viewed by attorneys representing employees as a more favorable forum for such claims.

Age Discrimination No Longer Cut Off at Age 70

The Job Protection and Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 2013 also eliminates the age 70 cutoff for age discrimination claims brought under Colorado law. This brings the state law into line with the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act which does not have an upper age limit. Consequently, employees age 40 and older are protected from employment discrimination under both state and federal law.

Good Faith Efforts May Avoid Punitive Damages

Under the new Colorado law, employers will not be subject to punitive damages if they can demonstrate good-faith efforts to prevent discriminatory and unfair employment practices in the workplace. In addition, no punitive damages are available in a lawsuit involving a claim of failure to make a reasonable accommodation for a disability if the employer can demonstrate good-faith efforts to identify and make a reasonable accommodation that would provide the disabled employee with an equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on the employer’s operation. Small businesses should begin those good-faith efforts now so that policies and procedures to prevent and respond to discrimination are in place when the law goes into effect.

Steps Small Businesses Should Take to Minimize Risk

Unfortunately for small businesses, the mere threat of a lawsuit, however meritless, may stretch tight resources to the breaking point. That is why it is so important to take proactive measures now, which will help minimize the risk of such lawsuits. Among other things, small businesses should:

1) Adopt and distribute policies that prohibit discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in the workplace. Require new and existing employees to acknowledge their receipt of these policies, preferably on an annual basis.

2) Train supervisors, managers and employees. Everyone in the workplace should be trained on your anti-discrimination policies and procedures with specialized training provided to supervisors and managers who must recognize harassment and discrimination and know what to do when they observe it or receive a complaint. In small workplaces, dealing with complaints of discrimination or retaliation can be difficult. Still, if you address it promptly and appropriately, you will be in a better position to avoid or defend against a claim.

3) Document performance issues. We often see meritless lawsuits filed because legitimate performance concerns were not shared with the employee or appropriately documented. If an employee has performance issues, be sure to get it in writing. Focus on the problem, give concrete examples, and warn the employee that a failure to achieve immediate and sustained improvement may result in termination.

4) Arbitration agreements. Consider whether it would be appropriate to have employees sign an arbitration agreement. Such agreements take discrimination claims out of the civil court system, and generally allow for a more streamlined resolution. However, arbitration is not necessarily cheaper than a court proceeding; in fact, in some cases it might cost more. Be sure to consider all the benefits and burdens of arbitration before relying on such agreements. And if you prefer arbitration, make sure your agreement complies with all applicable legal requirements.

Essentially, small employers need the same policies and procedures to deal with discrimination as larger employers do, even though many smaller employers simply do not have the same resources. Take the next 18 months before the law becomes effective to educate yourself, your supervisors and your employees on discrimination issues and take the steps that will help minimize your risk to the damages that will be available soon to aggrieved employees.

May 6, 2013

Colorado Restricts Employers’ Use of Credit Reports

By Mark Wiletsky

Employers using credit reports to evaluate applicants and employees take note: Colorado recently enacted the “Employment Opportunity Act” limiting the use of credit reports in employment decisions. In passing this law, Colorado joins eight other states–California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Oregon, Vermont and Washington–in restricting employers from obtaining and/or using credit history information when evaluating applicants and employees. The new Colorado law exempts certain job positions from the prohibition on the use of credit reports, but the exceptions are very fact specific. Employers need to analyze the job responsibilities of the position at issue in order to determine if they may use credit information under this new law.

Prohibition on the Use of Consumer Credit Information for Employment Purposes

Effective July 1, 2013, section 8-2-126 of the Colorado Revised Statutes provides that an employer shall not use consumer credit information for employment purposes unless the credit information is substantially related to the employee’s current or potential job. This means that Colorado employers are prohibited from using credit information in the employment context except in those limited situations where credit or financial responsibility is substantially related to the job. The type of information prohibited under this law includes any written, oral or other communication of information that bears on a consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity or credit history. This includes a credit score, but does not include the name, address or date of birth of an employee associated with a social security number.

“Substantially Related” Analysis Looks to Job Responsibilities

When determining whether a particular position falls within the exception where credit information is “substantially related to the employee’s current or potential job,” employers may not rely on an informal, best-guess determination. Instead, employers must carefully analyze whether the job in question meets the parameters detailed in the new law.

Under Colorado’s law, “substantially related to the employee’s current or potential job” is defined to apply to positions that:

1) Constitute executive or management personnel or officers or employees who constitute professional staff to executive and management personnel, and the position involves one or more of the following:

A) Setting the direction or control of a business, division, unit or an agency of a business;

B) A fiduciary responsibility to the employer;

C) Access to customers’, employees’, or the employer’s personal or financial information (other than information ordinarily provided in a retail transaction); or

D) The authority to issue payments, collect debts or enter into contracts; OR

2) Involves contracts with defense, intelligence, national security or space agencies of the federal government.

Consider this example: you are hiring a human resource specialist who will administer employee benefits within your company. May you obtain and use a credit report on applicants for this position? Assuming this position does not involve federal defense, intelligence, national security or space agency contracts, you first must determine if this position is an executive or management position, or alternatively, if this position is considered professional staff to an executive or manager. In our example, the employee benefits specialist position may or may not be an executive or management position at your company. If not, the position may be considered professional staff to an executive or manager if the position reports to an HR Director, Vice President or other similar high level manager or officer. If we assume this position meets this threshold determination, you next must analyze if the position involves one or more of the four areas of responsibilities where credit information will be deemed substantially related. Because an employee benefits specialist is likely to have access to employees’ personal and perhaps financial information, it appears to fall within the third area of responsibility where credit information will be deemed substantially related to the job, but the answer is certainly not clear-cut.

Requesting Employee Consent to Obtain a Credit Report

In addition to the prohibition on the use of credit information for employment purposes, the new Colorado law prohibits employers or their agents from requiring an employee to consent to a request for a credit report that contains information about the employee’s credit score, credit account balances, payment history, savings or checking account balances, or savings or checking account numbers as a condition of employment unless:

1) The employer is a bank or financial institution;

2) The report is required by law; or

3) The report is substantially related to the employee’s current or potential job andthe employer has a bona fide purpose for requesting or using information in the credit report and is disclosed in writing to the employee.

The written disclosure requirement here is a new procedural step with which most employers meeting this exception will not be familiar. Employers meeting these criteria now need to provide applicants/employees with a notice of their business purpose for requesting credit information.

Employee May Be Allowed to Explain Circumstances Affecting Credit

In those cases when an employer is permitted to use credit information because it is substantially related to the job, an employer may ask the employee to explain any unusual or mitigating circumstances that affected their credit history. For example, if the credit report shows delinquent payments, the employer may inquire further allowing the employee to explain circumstances that may have caused the delinquencies, such as an act of identity theft, medical expense, a layoff, or a death, divorce or separation.

Adverse Action Disclosure Required

If the employer relies on any part of the credit information to take adverse action regarding the employee or applicant, the employer must disclose that fact and the particular information relied upon to the employee. This disclosure must be made to the employee in writing but can be made to an applicant via the same medium in which the application was made (e.g., if the application was submitted electronically, this disclosure may be sent electronically).

FCRA Obligations Still Apply

Employers who are permitted to obtain and use credit reports under the Colorado law must also comply with the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in order to obtain a credit report from a consumer reporting agency. These additional FCRA duties include:

1) Providing a clear and conspicuous written disclosure to the applicant/employee before the report is obtained, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained;

2) Getting written authorization from the applicant/employee before obtaining the report;

3) Certifying to the consumer reporting agency that the above steps have been followed, that the information being obtained will not be used in violation of any federal or state equal opportunity law or regulation, and that, if any adverse action is to be taken based on the consumer report, a copy of the report and a summary of the consumer's rights will be provided to the consumer;

4) Before taking an adverse action, providing a copy of the report and a summary of FCRA consumer rights to the applicant/employee; and

5) After an adverse action is taken, sending an adverse action notice to the employee/applicant containing certain FCRA-required statements.

Credit Check Compliance

Colorado employers need to review and update their background check policies as they relate to conducting credit checks on applicants and existing employees. In addition to FCRA obligations, employers wishing to use credit reports have additional restrictions and duties under state law.

Employers now must analyze whether each position for which they wish to obtain credit reports meets the “substantially related to the employee’s current or potential job” criteria. If the position meets that criteria and the employer wishes to obtain a credit report on an applicant or existing employee, the employer first must provide a written disclosure to the applicant/employee describing the bona fide purpose of obtaining the credit information. If the credit report reveals questionable or negative information, the employer may (but is not required to) ask the applicant/employee to explain any unusual circumstances that may have led to the unfavorable credit information. If the employer rejects the applicant/employee for the position based in any way on the credit report, the employer must provide the required FCRA adverse action notices as well as a written explanation of the particular information in the report that led to the employer’s decision.

Multi-state employers face unique challenges when obtaining and using credit reports for employment purposes as they must comply with various state laws that now restrict such use. Given the intricacies of complying with the FCRA and applicable state laws, employers are wise to consult with their counsel to review and update their credit check policies.

April 25, 2013

BUZZ KILL: Employee Legally Fired For Off-Duty Marijuana Use

By Emily Hobbs-Wright & Brad Williams

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued a precedent-setting decision today upholding an employee’s firing for off-duty marijuana use. Citing federal law, the court held that using pot during non-working hours is not “lawful activity” under the state’s lawful off-duty activity statute. The decision provides the first direct guidance on terminating workers for off-duty marijuana use since Amendment 64 legalized the drug’s use and possession last November.

The case involved a quadriplegic employee licensed to use pot under the state’s medical marijuana amendment. The company terminated his employment after he tested positive for drugs in violation of company policy. The terminated worker claimed that he used the drug within the limits of his license, had never smoked on his employer’s premises, and had never been under the drug’s influence at work.

In the lawsuit, the terminated worker claimed that the company’s actions violated Colorado’s lawful off-duty activity statute, which prohibits termination for any “lawful activity” conducted off an employer’s premises during nonworking hours. Before today, Colorado courts had never squarely addressed whether the statute prohibits termination for off-duty marijuana use, when it is permitted under Colorado law.

Invoking a dictionary definition of the term “lawful,” the Court of Appeals held that “for an activity to be ‘lawful’ in Colorado, it must be permitted by, and not contrary to, both state and federal law.” Because marijuana use remains illegal under federal law, termination for off-duty pot-smoking does not violate the statute. The court also noted that its interpretation maintained the “balance between employer and employee rights” reflected elsewhere in Colorado law.

The decision is hugely important for Colorado employers. Amendment 64, like the medical marijuana amendment before it, did not require employers to “permit or accommodate” pot use, and expressly permitted policies restricting such use. But before today, courts had never previously decided whether state or federal law defines “lawful activity” under the statute.

The decision may not be the final word. Further appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court is possible, and other legal theories based on disability and similar laws remain untested. But for now, the decision provides the best guidance yet on terminating marijuana users, suggesting that courts will protect employers’ rights to enforce drug policies notwithstanding Colorado’s legalization of marijuana. It further reinforces the importance of employers defining illegal drugs as those prohibited under both state and federal law in drug policies.

This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

April 25, 2013

Tips for Complying with Utah’s Internet Employment Privacy Act

By Elizabeth Dunning

Effective May 14, 2013, Utah employers may not request employees or applicants to disclose information related to their personal Internet accounts. The Internet Employment Privacy Act(IEPA), recently signed into law by Utah Governor Gary R. Herbert, prohibits employers from asking an employee or applicant to reveal a username or password that allows access to the individual’s personal Internet account. In addition, employers may not penalize or discriminate against an employee or applicant for failing to disclose a username or password. A similar restriction applies to higher educational institutions through passage of the Internet Postsecondary Institution Privacy Act.

With enactment of the IEPA, Utah becomes the fifth state to pass legislation that limits an employer’s access to social media accounts, joining California, Illinois, Maryland and Michigan. New Mexico passed a similar law shortly after Utah and New Jersey’s law passed the legislature and is awaiting the governor’s signature. A bill introduced in February in the U.S. House of Representatives called the Social Networking Online Protection Act (H.R. 537) is stuck in committee.

Public Online Accounts Are Fair Game under the IEPA

The IEPA does not restrict or prohibit employers from viewing or using online information about employees and applicants that the employer can obtain without the employee’s username or password. Any online information that is available to the public may be accessed and viewed by employers without violating the IEPA. Consequently, individuals who set privacy settings on their online accounts to allow “public” access effectively opt themselves out of any protections offered by this new law.

Utah Restriction Applies to Accounts Used Exclusively for Personal Communication

In prohibiting employers from requiring disclosure of online usernames and passwords, the IEPA draws a distinction between personal Internet accounts and those used for business related communications. The law only restricts employer access to personal online accounts that are used by an employee or applicant exclusively for personal communications unrelated to any business purpose of the employer. It does not, however, restrict access to accounts created, maintained, used or accessed by an employee or applicant for business related communications or for a business purpose of the employer.

In practice, the line between personal and business related accounts may be blurred as many employees use their personal online presence to network and communicate for business reasons. Consider the sales person who uses his or her LinkedIn account to communicate with potential buyers within a particular industry, or the CPA who posts tax reminders on his or her Facebook page. Are those accounts accessible under the IEPA since they are not used “exclusively” for personal communications? A plain reading of the law suggests that may be the case, thereby watering down the potential protections offered by the IEPA to applicants and employees.

Steps for Complying with the IEPA

Utah employers should review their HR forms, policies and practices to ensure that they do not ask applicants and/or employees to provide a username or password to their personal Internet accounts. Train supervisors and managers not to ask for this information as well. In fact, take the opportunity to remind supervisors and managers not to “friend” subordinates on personal online platforms, such as Facebook. In addition, reinforce that employees and applicants may not be penalized or treated adversely for failing to provide a username or password for personal online accounts.

Remember, too, that even though the IEPA does not prohibit accessing an employee’s or applicant’s public social media accounts, viewing such information creates other risks. Employers may view information regarding the individual’s religion, race, national origin, disability, age, or other protected group status that could give rise to a discrimination claim. Furthermore, online information is unreliable and ever-changing, meaning that employers should not rely on what they see online when making employment decisions. To stay out of trouble, consult with legal counsel before viewing or using social media in the employment context.

For more information about permissible actions and potential damages under the Utah Internet Employment Privacy Act, please see our Client Alert.

April 18, 2013

How a Colorado Bill Could Provide Up to 24 Weeks of FMLA Leave

By Brian Mumaugh

Could Colorado employees be entitled to take up to 24 weeks of job-protected leave every 12 months? Yes, in some circumstances, if the bill recently passed by the Colorado House of Representatives and progressing through the Senate is signed into law. Although greatly downsized from its original form, House Bill 1222 expands the group of family members for whom Colorado employees are entitled to take leave from work under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to include care for civil union partners and domestic partners. In certain circumstances, this expansion could result in an employee being entitled to 24 weeks of FMLA leave in a given year. Let’s look at what the bill provides.

Leave to Care for Civil Union and Domestic Partners

Colorado employees currently must look to the federal FMLA for job-protected leave benefits. Federal FMLA provides an eligible employee up to 12 weeks of leave during a 12-month period to care for a spouse, child or parent who has a serious health condition. The federal FMLA, however, does not permit leave for an employee to care for his or her civil union partner or domestic partner. If signed into law, House bill 1222, called the Family Care Act, would allow an eligible employee to take leave to care for the employee’s partner in a civil union or the employee’s domestic partner (if the employer recognizes the person as the employee’s domestic partner or the domestic partnership is registered with the municipality or the state, as applicable). The employer would be permitted to require the employee to provide reasonable documentation or a written statement of the family relationship, in accordance with the FMLA. The employer also would be allowed to require the same medical certification as may be required under the FMLA.

“Double Dipping” of FMLA Leave

The bill states that FMLA leave taken by an employee under this new law would run concurrently with leave taken under the FMLA and that the new law would not increase the total amount of leave to which an employee is entitled during a 12-month period. This seems to suggest that “double dipping” would not be permitted. However, federal regulations provide that the FMLA does not supersede any state law that provides greater leave rights than those provided by the FMLA. Further, the regulations state that if state law provides for a certain amount of leave, which may include leave to care for a seriously-ill “spouse equivalent,” and leave was used for that purpose, the employee is still entitled to his or her full FMLA leave entitlement, as the leave used under state law was provided for a purpose not covered by the FMLA. 29 C.F.R. § 825.701(a)(3). On the other hand, if FMLA leave is used first for a purpose that is permitted under both state and federal law and state leave has thereby been exhausted, the employer would not be required to provide any additional leave to care for the “spouse equivalent” during that 12-month period.

What does this mean? It means that the order of state vs. federal leave matters. If leave to care for a seriously-ill civil union partner under state law is requested first, the employee potentially may “double dip” if he or she subsequently requests leave provided under the federal law. This could lead to a total of 24 weeks of leave in a single 12-month period. However, if leave that qualifies under the federal FMLA occurs first and the employee takes the full 12 weeks of leave at that time, no leave is available should the employee need to care for his or her civil union partner or domestic partner under state law.

Next Legislative Steps

Having passed the Colorado House, the Family Care Act moved to the Colorado Senate where it has passed unamended on second reading. The Senate needs to pass the bill on third reading to be sent to Governor John Hickenlooper to be signed into law or vetoed. Rest assured that we will continue to monitor this bill and will pass along updates as warranted.