August 24, 2016

NLRB Reverses Position on Grad Student Assistants, Allowing Them To Unionize

By Steven Gutierrez

Overruling its 2004 Brown University decision, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) decided that graduate student assistants at private colleges and universities can be considered statutory employees under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), permitting them to organize and form a union. Columbia University, 364 NLRB 90 (August 23, 2016). The Board concluded that student assistants who perform paid work at the direction of their university have a common-law employment relationship with the university and therefore, are entitled to the protections of the NLRA.

Why Brown University Was Wrong

The 2004 Board that decided this issue in Brown University ruled that graduate assistants could not be statutory employees under the NLRA because they are primarily students and have a primarily educational relationship with the university, not an economic one. The current Board rejected that view, finding that because student assistants perform work, at the direction of the university, for which they are compensated, they are statutory employees and the fact that there may be another relationship not covered by the NLRA, namely an educational relationship, did not foreclose their coverage as employees.

The current Board also disagreed with the Brown University Board’s “fundamental belief that the imposition of collective bargaining on graduate students would improperly intrude into the educational process and would be inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the [NLRA].” Instead, this Board believes that allowing grad assistants to be covered employees meets the “unequivocal policy” of the NLRA to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining, and will make sure that an entire category of workers are not deprived of the protections of the law.

Multiple Flip-Flops On Graduate Assistants

In overruling Brown University, the Board’s position returns to the position held in the 2000 New York University (NYU) ruling, which itself was overruled in Brown University. Prior to the NYU ruling, however, the Board had long held that various student assistants could not be included in petitioned-for bargaining units.

This new flip-flop on the issue of coverage for graduate student assistants is not surprising given the leanings and make-up of the majority of the current Board, which has favored the extension of coverage and its jurisdiction, when possible. Board member Philip Miscimarra dissented in this case, writing that he agreed with the Brown University reasoning that graduate student assistants have a predominately academic, rather than economic, relationship with their school. He would not have overruled Brown University, or permitted the petitioned-for bargaining unit to proceed. Read more >>

August 23, 2016

Employer Violates NLRA By Barring Employees From Bringing Class or Collective Actions, Says Ninth Circuit

By Brian Mumaugh

Bad news for employers in the ongoing saga of whether an employer violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by requiring that employees pursue any legal dispute against the company on an individual basis, rather than in a class or collective action with other employees. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that the NLRA precludes employees from waiving their right to have disputes heard collectively and an employer that requires employees to waive that right as a condition of employment commits an unfair labor practice. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. 13-16599 (9^th Cir. August 22, 2016).

Broad Ruling Extends To Any “Separate Proceedings” Requirement

Accounting firm Ernst & Young required its employees to sign agreements mandating that all legal claims against the firm be pursued exclusively through arbitration and only as individuals in “separate proceedings.” When employee Stephen Morris brought a class and collective action in federal court alleging that the firm misclassified employees denying them overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Ernst & Young sought to compel arbitration on an individual basis pursuant to its arbitration agreement. The district court agreed, dismissing the federal court case and ordering arbitration.

Morris appealed, arguing, among other things, that the “separate proceedings” clause violated the NLRA. Morris relied on determinations by the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) in the D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil cases in which the Board ruled that concerted action waivers violate the NLRA. The Ninth Circuit agreed. It ruled that when an employer requires employees to sign an agreement precluding them from bringing a concerted legal claim regarding wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment, the employer violates the NLRA.

The Court focused on the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA’s statutory right of employees “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection” to include a right to join together to pursue workplace grievances, including through litigation. It characterized this as a labor law case, not an arbitration case. It stated that the problem with the contract was not that it required arbitration, but that it excluded all concerted employee legal claims. The Court explained that the same problem would exist “if the contract required disputes to be resolved through casting lots, coin toss, duel, trial by ordeal, or any other dispute resolution mechanism, if the contract (1) limited resolution to that mechanism and (2) required separate individual proceedings.” Read more >>

July 21, 2016

Wyoming’s New Workplace Safety Division: What Employers Need to Know

By Trey Overdyke

In early May, the Wyoming Department of Workforce Services (DWS) announced the launch of a new unit of safety advisers offering free health and safety consultations to Wyoming employers upon request. Does the launch mean Wyoming employers will soon have an additional layer of occupational safety and health staff to worry about? In this article, I will try to read the tea leaves and offer my perspective.

Focus on Injury Prevention, Workers’ Comp Trends

The DWS’s standards and compliance staff, in consultation with Governor Matt Mead, recently created the Workers’ Compensation Safety and Risk Unit (WCSRU). According to DWS Director John Cox, the new unit represents a “reorganization” that is designed to provide more employers safety consultations and offer the potential for lower workers’ compensation premiums.

The WCSRU is composed of nine recommissioned Wyoming Occupational Safety and Health Administration (WOSHA) consultation staff members. The WCSRU will focus on conducting workplace health and safety surveys without the risk of fines or penalties. The unit is also expected to offer detailed analysis of workers’ comp data to assist in identifying injury trends and developing best practices for preventing workplace injuries and illnesses.

Wyoming Has Highest Worker Death Rate in Nation

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Wyoming had 37 workplace fatalities in 2014, the latest year for which statistics are available. With 13.1 fatalities per 100,000 workers, Wyoming has the highest worker death rate in the country. The national average for 2014 was 3.3 deaths per 100,000 workers. In Wyoming, transportation incidents accounted for the largest number of workplace deaths. Workplace violence, other injuries caused by persons or animals, and falls, slips, and trips caused deaths as well.

Because of the high fatality numbers, in 2015, legislators introduced bills designed to strengthen workplace safety regulations in Wyoming. Two of the bills would have increased penalties for violations of safety rules, including raising the maximum fine for a violation that causes a worker’s death to $250,000. Another bill would have allowed Wyoming to implement workplace safety rules that are stricter than similar federal safety rules, a practice that is currently barred. None of the bills passed.

WCSRU’s Role

As you know, WOSHA is responsible for enforcing occupational safety and health standards in Wyoming. WOSHA plans to adopt all federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards. WOSHA is permitted to adopt its own standards only if there are no corresponding OSHA standards. Wyoming has unique health and safety standards covering oil and gas well drilling, servicing, and special servicing as well as a standard for anchoring drilling rigs. WOSHA imposes the same record-keeping and reporting standards required by OSHA.

So the question is, how will the WCSRU interact with and affect the work of WOSHA staff? The new unit is expected to overlap with WOSHA in some ways. Both organizations’ staff will conduct health and safety surveys for employers to identify and remedy safety hazards in the workplace. However, according to the DWS’s news release, the WCSRU will bypass “time-consuming federal requirements, which add an extra layer of reporting and operational constraints . . . and limit the services [the] DWS is able to provide.”

Bottom Line

Several Wyoming agencies will be paying close attention to the WCSRU for the next few years. We expect to hear a number of success stories from Wyoming employers in many industries. However, read the fine print before initiating a consultation. If an employer and the WCSRU disagree on a hazard abatement, there does not appear to be a clear procedure to resolve the dispute. Further, if there is a dispute, you cannot eliminate the possibility that the WCSRU will refer the issue to WOSHA for enforcement.

We will share our experiences with the WCSRU as the unit works its way across Wyoming.

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July 13, 2016

EEOC Revises Its Proposal To Collect Pay Data Through EEO-1 Report

By Cecilia Romero

6a013486823d73970c01b8d204e441970c-320wi On July 13, 2016, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) announced that it has revised its proposal to collect pay data from employers through the Employer Information Report (EEO-1). In response to over 300 comments received during an initial public comment period earlier this year, the EEOC is now proposing to push back the due date for the first EEO-1 report with pay data from September 30, 2017 to March 31, 2018. That new deadline would allow employers to use existing W-2 pay information calculated for the previous calendar year. The public now has a new 30-day comment period in which to submit comments on the revised proposal.

Purpose of EEOC’s Pay Data Rule

The EEOC’s proposed rule would require larger employers to report the number of employees by race, gender, and ethnicity that are paid within each of 12 designated pay bands. This is the latest in numerous attempts by the EEOC and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) to collect pay information to identify pay disparities across industries and occupational categories. These federal agencies plan to use the pay data “to assess complaints of discrimination, focus agency investigations, and identify existing pay disparities that may warrant further examination.”

Employers Covered By The Proposed Pay Data Rule

The reporting of pay data on the revised EEO-1 would apply to employers with 100 or more employees, including federal contractors. Federal contractors with 50-99 employees would still be required to file an EEO-1 report providing employee sex, race, and ethnicity by job category, as is currently required, but would not be required to report pay data. Employers not meeting either of those thresholds would not be covered by the new pay data rule.

Pay Bands For Proposed EEO-1 Reporting

Under the EEOC’s pay data proposal, employers would collect W-2 income and hours-worked data within twelve distinct pay bands for each job category. Under its revised proposed rule, employers then would report the number of employees whose W-2 earnings for the prior twelve-month period fell within each pay band.

The proposed pay bands are based on those used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Occupation Employment Statistics survey:

(1) $19,239 and under;

(2) $19,240 – $24,439;

(3) $24,440 – $30,679;

(4) $30,680 – $38,999;

(5) $39,000 – $49,919;

(6) $49,920 – $62,919;

(7) $62,920 – $80,079;

(8) $80,080 – $101,919;

(9) $101,920 – $128,959;

(10) $128,960 – $163,799;

(11) $163,800 – $207,999; and

(12) $208,000 and over.

July 6, 2016

Union Remains Active In Health Care Industry Despite Withdrawing Initiative To Cap California Health Care Executive Salaries

By Steve Gutierrez

The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) – United Healthcare Workers West (UHW) has twice tried to get an initiative on the California ballot to cap the salaries of executives at nonprofit hospitals. The union recently withdrew its latest ballot initiative, ensuring that it will not appear on this November’s ballot.

SEIU Sought To Cap Private Executive Salaries

Called the “Charitable Hospital Executive Compensation Act of 2016,” SEIU’s initiative sought to limit the annual compensation packages paid to chief executive officers, executives, managers, and administrators of nonprofit hospitals and affiliated medical entities in California. The cap would be set at the annual salary of the U.S. President, currently $450,000. All executive compensation would be included in the cap, including salary, bonuses, stock options, paid time off, housing payments, loan forgiveness, and reimbursement for transportation, parking, entertainment or similar benefits. It would not include the cost of health or disability insurance or contributions to health reimbursement accounts.

The measure called for penalties for hospitals and covered physicians groups who violated the salary cap. Such penalties would include fines, revocation of tax-exempt status, and having an additional person sit on the nonprofit’s board of directors to represent the state Attorney General.

Protect Taxpayers or Organizing Tactic?

Filed in October of 2015, SEIU’s latest initiative stated that its purpose was to ensure that assets held for charitable purposes were not used to enrich executives, managers, and administrators of nonprofit hospitals. SEIU also stated that the total compensation packages for hospital executives should be reasonable and not excessive “in light of the substantial public benefit that the State tax exemption for nonprofit organizations conveys.” In essence, the union touted that taxpayers should not have to subsidize the multi-million dollar paychecks of administrators at tax-exempt healthcare entities.

In the past, the SEIU filed other California initiatives, including one to limit hospital prices and another to put more rules around charity care that could be provided by nonprofit hospitals. In exchange for the SEIU withdrawing those initiatives, the California Hospital Association (CHA) agreed to a contract with the SEIU in 2014 called the Code of Conduct which was intended to put obligations and restrictions on the conduct of each party. The Code expired by its terms on December 31, 2015, but not before the CHA filed a complaint against the SEIU alleging that its initiative to cap executive salaries violated the Code.

As revealed in the arbitration order, in which the arbitrator found that the SEIU did in fact violate the Code, the goals of the SEIU in pushing its healthcare industry initiatives were to increase its membership by reaching agreements with hospitals that provide them access to healthcare workers, and by working together with the hospitals to get Medi-Cal fully funded, which would support more jobs for union members. The initiatives therefore appear to be intended to pressure the hospitals into helping the SEIU organize workers and expand its membership.

Even though this specific salary cap initiative has been withdrawn, we can expect that the SEIU-UHW will continue its pressure tactics in organizing workers in the healthcare industry.

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June 21, 2016

Supreme Court Avoids Deciding Whether Car Dealership Service Advisors Are Exempt From Overtime Pay

By Brian Mumaugh

The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) 2011 rule that stated that “service advisors” at car dealerships are not exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), but declined to take the final step by declaring them exempt under the FLSA. Instead, the Court sent the case back to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to analyze whether service advisors are exempt under the applicable FLSA provision without regard to the DOL’s 2011 regulation. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. ___ (2016).

Duties of Service Advisors

At issue are the “service advisors” in a car dealership’s service department. These advisors typically greet the car owners who enter the service area, evaluate the service and repair needs of the vehicle owner, recommend services and repairs that should be done on the vehicle, and write up estimates for the cost of repairs and services before the vehicle is taken to the mechanics for service.

While service advisors do not sell cars, and they do not repair or service cars, they are essential in the sale of services to be performed on cars in the Service Department. Consequently, the issue is whether they fall within the FLSA exemption for salesmen, partsmen, or mechanics. The case before the Court involved numerous service advisors who sued their employer alleging, among other things, that the dealership failed to pay them overtime wages.

DOL Had Flip-Flopped On Exempt Status

In 1970, the DOL took the view that service advisors did not fall within the salesman/mechanic exemption and should receive overtime pay. Numerous courts deciding cases challenging the DOL’s earlier interpretation, however, rejected the DOL’s view and found service advisors exempt. After the contradictory rulings, the DOL changed its position, acquiescing to the view that service advisors were exempt from overtime pay. In a 1978 opinion letter, as confirmed in a 1987 amendment to its Field Operations Handbook, the DOL clarified that service advisors should be treated as exempt.

After more than 30 years operating under that interpretation, the DOL flip-flopped again in 2011. After going through a notice-and-comment period, the DOL adopted a final rule that reverted to its original position that service advisors were not exempt and were entitled to overtime. It stated that it interpreted the statutory term “salesman” to mean only an employee who sells automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, not one who sells services for automobiles and trucks, as service advisors do.

Dealerships were understandably unhappy with the final rule and continued to challenge the DOL’s position in court. As cases went up on appeal, the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals ruled that the DOL’s interpretation was incorrect. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, ruling instead to uphold the agency’s interpretation. Those contradictory decisions led the Supreme Court to take on the issue in the Encino Motorcars case. Read more >>

June 15, 2016

OFCCP’s New Sex Discrimination Rule Expands Employee Protections Based on Pregnancy, Caregiver Status, and Gender Identity

By Jude Biggs

This week, the OFCCP updated its sex discrimination guidelines on topics such as accommodations for pregnant workers, gender identity bias, pay discrimination, and family caregiving discrimination. Intended to align the OFCCP’s regulations with the current interpretation of Title VII’s prohibitions against sex discrimination, the new rule will require federal contractors to examine their employment practices, even those that are facially neutral, to make sure that they do not negatively affect their employees. The new rule takes effect on August 15, 2016.

Overview of New Sex Discrimination Rule

The existing OFCCP sex discrimination guidelines date back to the 1970s. The new rule is designed to meet the realities of today’s workplaces and workforces. Today, many more women work outside the home, and many have the financial responsibility for themselves and their families. Many women have children while employed and plan to continue work after giving birth to their children. Women sometimes are also the chief caregivers in their families. The updated regulations are meant to offer women and men fair access to jobs and fair treatment while employed.

The new rule defines sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of sex, pregnancy (which includes childbirth or related medical conditions), gender identity, transgender status and sex stereotyping. The rule specifies that contractors must provide accommodations for pregnancy and related conditions on the same terms as are provided to other employees who are similarly able or unable to perform their job duties. For example, contractors must provide extra bathroom breaks and light-duty assignments to an employee who needs such an accommodation due to pregnancy where the contractor provides similar accommodations to other workers with disabilities or occupational injuries.

The new rule also incorporates President Obama’s July 2014 Executive Order that prohibits federal contractors from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. In addition, contractors that provide health care benefits must make that coverage available for transition-related services and must not otherwise discriminate in health benefits on the basis of gender identity or transgender status.

The rule prohibits pay discrimination based on sex. It recognizes the determination of “similarly situated” employees is case-specific and depends on a number of factors, such as tasks performed, skills, effort, levels of responsibility, working conditions, job difficulty, minimum qualifications, and other objective factors. Notably, the OFCCP rule says that employees can be “similarly situated” where they are comparable on some of the factors, but not all of them.

Unlawful compensation discrimination can result not only from unequal pay for equal work, but also from other employer decisions. Contractors may not grant or deny opportunities for overtime work, training, apprenticeships, better pay, or higher-paying positions or opportunities that may lead to higher-paying positions because of a worker’s sex. Employees may recover lost wages for discriminatory pay any time a contractor pays compensation that violates the rule, even if the decision to discriminate was made long before that payment. Read more >>

June 6, 2016

Colorado’s New Pregnancy Accommodation Law

Effective August 10, 2016, Colorado employers will commit an unfair employment practice if they fail to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee, or an applicant for employment, for health conditions related to pregnancy or physical recovery from childbirth, absent an undue hardship. Last week, Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper signed into law House Bill 16-1438 which requires Colorado employers to engage in an interactive process to assess potential reasonable accommodations for applicants and employees for conditions related to pregnancy and childbirth. The new law, section 24-34-402.3 of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, also prohibits employers from denying employment opportunities based on the need to make a pregnancy-related reasonable accommodation and from retaliating against employees and applicants that request or use a pregnancy-related accommodation.

Posting and Notification Requirements

The new law imposes posting and notification requirements on Colorado employers. By December 8, 2016 (120 days from the effective date), employers must provide current employees with written notice of their rights under this provision. Thereafter, employers also must provide written notice of the right to be free from discriminatory or unfair employment practices under this law to every new hire at the start of their employment. Employers in Colorado also must post a written notice of rights in a conspicuous place at their business in an area accessible to employees.

For more information on this new law, read our full post about its requirements here.

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June 2, 2016

Colorado Bill Will Give Employees Right to Review Their Personnel Files

By Brad Williams

Most employees in Colorado currently have no legal right to review or copy their personnel files. But that is about to change. A bill awaiting signature by Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper will require private employers to allow employees to inspect and copy their personnel files at least annually upon request. If enacted, House Bill 16-1432 will also grant former employees the right to inspect their personnel files one time after termination of employment. Once signed, the bill will become effective on January 1, 2017.

Employers Must Allow Access to Pre-Existing Personnel Files

Under the bill, employers are not required to create or keep personnel files for current or former employees. They are also not required to retain any particular documents that are – or were – in an employee’s personnel file for any particular period of time. However, if a personnel file exists when an employee asks to inspect it, the employer must allow access.

The inspection should take place at the employer’s office and at a time convenient for both parties. Employers may have a manager of personnel data, or another employee of their choosing, present during the inspection. If an employee asks to copy some or all of his or her file, the employer may require payment of reasonable copying costs. Because the bill is silent regarding whether employees may bring others (such as their lawyers) to inspections, employers should likely limit inspections to only the requesting employees.

What Constitutes a “Personnel File”?

The bill defines a “personnel file” as an employee’s personnel records which are used to determine his or her qualifications for employment, promotion, additional compensation, employment termination, or other disciplinary action. This encompasses both records kept in an actual file, and those employers may collect through reasonable efforts. Put differently, employers cannot avoid the bill’s mandates by simply scattering employee records amongst multiple file cabinets.

The bill provides numerous exceptions to the documents that must be made available for inspection. The following are not included in the definition of “personnel files” and need not be made available:

documents required to be placed or maintained in a separate file from the regular personnel file by federal or state law;
records pertaining to confidential reports from previous employers;
an active criminal or disciplinary investigation, or an active investigation by a regulatory agency; and
information which identifies another person who made a confidential accusation against the requesting employee.

May 23, 2016

Limitations Period For Constructive-Discharge Claim Starts When Employee Gives Notice of Resignation

The Supreme Court made clear today that the filing period for a constructive-discharge claim begins to run when the employee gives notice of his or her resignation. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court favored the five-circuit majority who recognized such timeline and rejected the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning that the clock begins to run on the date of the “last discriminatory act.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. ___, (2016). Although the case involved a federal employee, the Court noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) treats federal and private sector employee limitations periods the same so this ruling should affect constructive-discharge claims against private employers as well.

Discriminatory Act That Triggers Limitations Clock

In the case before the Court, Marvin Green, a postmaster in Colorado, claimed he was denied a promotion because of his race. A year after that matter was settled, Green filed an informal EEO charge with the Postal Service alleging that he was subjected to retaliation for his prior EEO activity due to his supervisor threatening, demeaning, and harassing him. After the Postal Service’s EEO Office completed its investigation of his allegations, he was informed he could file a formal charge, but he failed to do to.

A few months later, Green was investigated for multiple infractions, including improper handling of employee grievances, delaying the mail, and sexual harassment of a female employee. Green was placed on unpaid leave during the investigation. Federal agents quickly concluded that Green had not intentionally delayed mail, but neither Green nor his union representative was told. Instead, the Postal Service began negotiating with Green’s union representative to settle all the issues against Green, resulting in Green signing a settlement agreement in December 2009 that included giving up his postmaster position. On February 9, 2010, Green submitted his resignation which was to be effective March 31.

During that time, Green filed multiple charges with the Postal Service’s EEO Office. By regulation, federal employees must contact an equal employment opportunity officer in their agency within 45 days of “the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory” before bringing suit under Title VII. Green’s allegations included that he had been constructively discharged by being forced to retire.

Green eventually sued the Postal Service in federal court in Denver. The district court dismissed Green’s constructive discharge claim, ruling that he had not contacted an EEO counselor about his constructive-discharge claim within 45 days of the date he signed the settlement agreement in December. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Green argued that the 45-day limitations period did not begin to run until he announced his resignation, even though that was months after the last alleged discriminatory act against him. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with Green, ruling that the clock began to run on the date of the “last discriminatory act” giving rise to the constructive discharge, as two other circuits have held.

Limitations Period Begins When Employee Gives Notice of Resignation

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Green asserted that the statute of limitations began when he actually resigned due to constructive discharge, the act that gave rise to his cause of action, which was consistent with the rulings of numerous other Courts of Appeals. Interestingly, the Court agreed with the position taken by the Postal Service, which was different from the Tenth Circuit’s decision, ruling that the limitations period for a constructive-discharge claim begins to run when the employee gives notice of his resignation.

In an opinion written by Justice Sotomayor, the Court explained that “the ‘matter alleged to be discriminatory’ in a constructive-discharge claim necessarily includes the employee’s resignation.” The Court noted that to the “standard rule” governing statutes of limitations, the “limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” It means that period begins when the plaintiff “can file suit and obtain relief.” In effect, a constructive-discharge claim is like a wrongful-discharge claim which accrues only after the employee is fired. With nothing in Title VII or its regulations to the contrary, the Court therefore found that the limitations period should not begin to run until after the discharge itself.

So precisely when does an employee resign for purposes of triggering the limitations period for a constructive-discharge claim? The Court ruled that the limitations period begins on the day the employee tells his employer of his resignation, not the employee’s actual last day of work.

The Court did not decide the factual question of when Green actually gave notice of his resignation to the Postal Service, sending the matter back to the Tenth Circuit to determine that fact.

Significance of Decision for Employers

The practical effect of the Court’s ruling is to extend the period in which an employee may allege a constructive discharge beyond the limitations period for the underlying discriminatory acts that gave rise to the resignation. Hypothetically, employees who resign may be able to bootstrap any alleged discriminatory act during the course of their employment to their decision to abandon employment. In his dissent, Justice Thomas further opined that a discrimination victim may extend the limitations period indefinitely simply by waiting to resign. Yet the Court believed such concerns to be overblown, doubting that a victim of employment discrimination would continue to work under intolerable conditions only to extend the limitations period for a constructive-discharge claim. Nonetheless, even if the applicable Title VII limitation period (typically 180 or 300 days for private employers) for the underlying discrimination has passed, an employee may still have a timely claim for constructive discharge under the Court’s rule.

Time will tell if Justice Thomas’s concerns were more realistic that his colleagues believed.

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