Category Archives: Nevada

October 5, 2016

DOL Finalizes Paid Sick Leave Rule For Federal Contractors

To implement President Obama’s September 2015 Executive Order, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) recently issued its final rule requiring certain federal contractors to provide up to seven days of paid sick leave per year to employees who work on covered contracts. Here are the essential requirements for contractors under this new rule.

Which Contractors and Employees Are Covered?

The final rule applies to new contracts with the federal government resulting from a solicitation that was issued, or contract that was awarded, on or after January 1, 2017. It includes contracts that are covered by the Davis-Bacon Act, the Service Contract Act, concessions contracts, and service contracts in connection with federal property or lands.

Not all employees of a federal contractor must be provided with this mandated paid sick time. Instead, employees must be allowed to accrue and use paid sick leave only while working on or in connection with a covered contract. Employees who perform work duties that are necessary to the performance of a covered contract but who are not directly engaged in performing the specific work called for by the contract, and who spend less than 20 percent of their work time in a particular workweek performing work in connection with such contracts, are exempt from the rule’s accrual requirements.

What Amount of Paid Sick Time Must Be Provided?

Contractors must allow employees to accrue one hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours worked on or in connection with a covered contract, up to a maximum of 56 hours per year. In order to calculate that accrual, contractors may use an estimate of time their employees work in connected with (rather than on) a covered contract as long as the estimate is reasonable and based on verifiable information. As for employees for whom contractors are not required by law to keep records of hours worked, such as exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, it may be assumed that such employees work 40 hours each week.

If a contractor prefers not to calculate accrual amounts, the contractor may elect to provide an employee with at least 56 hours of paid sick leave at the beginning of each accrual year.

What If A Contractor Already Provides Paid Sick Time Off?

A contractor’s existing paid time off (PTO) policy may fulfill the paid sick leave requirement as long as it provides employees with at least the same rights and benefits required under the final rule. In other words, if the contractor’s existing policy provides at least 56 hours of PTO that can be used for any purpose, the contractor does not have to provide separate paid sick leave, even if an employee chooses to use all of his or her PTO for vacation. However, if the contractor’s policy does not meet all of the requirements under the final rule, such as not permitting an employee to use paid time off for reasons related to domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking, then the existing PTO policy would not comply. In such cases, the contractor would have to either amend its PTO policy to make it compliant, or separately provide paid sick leave for the additional purposes under the final rule.

How Does An Employee Use This Paid Sick Leave?

An employee may use paid sick leave in increments as little as one hour for absences resulting from any of the following:

the employee’s medical condition, illness or injury (physical or mental)
for the employee to obtain diagnosis, care, or preventive care from a health care provider for the above conditions
caring for the employee’s child, parent, spouse, domestic partner, or another individual in a close relationship with the employee (by blood or affinity) who has a medical condition, illness or injury (physical or mental) or the need to obtain diagnosis, care, or preventive care for the same
domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking, that results in a medical condition, illness or injury (physical or mental), or causes the need to obtain additional counseling, seek relocation or assistance from a victim services organization, take legal action, or assist an individual in engaging in any of these activities.

An employee may request to use paid sick leave by a written or verbal request, at least seven calendar days in advance when the need for the leave is foreseeable. When not foreseeable, the request must be made as soon as is practicable. Contractors may limit the amount of paid sick leave that an employee uses only based on how much paid sick time the employee has available. Any denial of a request to use paid sick leave must be provided by the contractor to the employee in writing with an explanation of the denial. Operational need is not an acceptable reason to deny paid sick leave requests.

May Contractors Require Medical Certifications?

Contractors may require a medical certification only if the employee is absent for three or more consecutive full workdays. Contractors must inform employees that a medical certification will be required before he or she returns to work.

What About The Overlap With The FMLA?

Contractors must still comply fully with the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as well as state and local paid sick time laws. If an employee is eligible for time off under the FMLA, the contractor must meet FMLA requirements for notices and certifications, regardless of whether the employee is eligible to use accrued paid sick leave. The contractor may, however, run the paid sick leave concurrently with unpaid FMLA leave.

Must Unused Paid Sick Time Be Carried Over or Paid Out?

Contractors must carry over unused, accrued paid sick leave from one year to the next, but may limit the maximum amount of accrual at any point in time to 56 hours. Contractors are not required to pay employees for accrued, unused paid sick leave at the time of job separation, but keep in mind that state or local laws may mandate a different result if the organization uses PTO instead of sick time. However, if an employee has been rehired by the same contractor within 12 months after a job separation, the contractor must reinstate the employee’s accrued, unused paid sick leave, unless such amount was paid out upon separation.

Preparing For January 2017

Employers who expect to seek or renew federal contracts on or after January 1, 2017 should review their existing sick leave and/or PTO policies to determine what changes may be required in order to comply with the new rule. The DOL provides many additional resources to explain the final rule, including a Fact Sheet, Overview of the Final Rule, and Frequently Asked Questions. Given the potential impact on contractors’ policies and how they are administered, we recommend taking steps now to determine how best to comply.

September 22, 2016

Minimum Wage For Federal Contractors Going Up In 2017

By Mark Wiletsky

On January 1, 2017, the new minimum wage for employees working on covered federal contracts will be $10.20 per hour, up five cents from the current hourly minimum of $10.15. An even bigger increase will go into effect for tipped employees working on or in connection with covered contracts as the tipped-employee minimum cash wage goes up from $5.85 to $6.80 per hour.

Inflation-Based Increases

According to President Obama’s 2014 Executive Order establishing a minimum wage for employees working on federal contracts, and the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) corresponding regulations, the annual minimum wage for non-tipped employees increases based on the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, rounded to the nearest five cents. The annual percentage increase in the CPI-W over the past year was 0.287% which would raise the minimum wage rate to $10.18. Because the hourly rate must be rounded to the nearest multiple of five cents, the new rate beginning January 1, 2017 will be $10.20.

For tipped employees, the Executive Order requires that the minimum cash wage increase by $0.95 (or a lesser amount, if necessary) until it reaches 70% of the contractor minimum wage for non-tipped employees. For 2017, the hourly cash wage for tipped employees will go up by $0.95 cents to $6.80 per hour. Employers must remember that at all times, the amount of tips received by the employee must equal at least the difference between the cash wage paid and the Executive Order minimum wage. If the employee does not receive sufficient tips, the contractor must increase the cash wage paid so that the cash wage in combination with the tips received equals the Executive Order minimum wage.

Required Minimum Wage Notice

Covered federal contractors are required to inform all workers performing on or in connection with a covered contract of the applicable minimum wage rate under the Executive Order. The required notice may be met by posting the free poster on Federal Minimum Wage for Contractors provided on the Wage and Hour Division’s website. As with all employment law posters, this notice should be displayed in a conspicuous place at the worksite.

September 20, 2016

Overtime Rule Lawsuit Seeks To Stop December 1st Changes

By Mark Wiletsky

Twenty-one states have sued the federal Department of Labor (DOL) seeking to prevent the new overtime exemption salary boost from going into effect on December 1, 2016. In a lawsuit filed in the Eastern District of Texas, the states argue that the DOL exceeded its authority when it issued its final rule increasing the salary level for exempt employees to $47,476 per year, with automatic updates to the salary threshold every three years.

Legal Challenge To The Overtime Rule

In the states’ complaint against the DOL, the states argue that the new rule is unlawful. One of their primary arguments is that enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the new overtime rule against the states infringes upon state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The complaint cites the increased payroll costs to the states that would result from having to comply with the new exempt salary levels.

The states argue numerous other reasons why the new overtime rule should be stopped, including that the DOL exceeded the authority granted to it by Congress when it focused on the salary level as the litmus test for exempt status rather than on the duties of white collar workers. The states argue that exempt status should apply to any “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional” employee, even if their salary falls below the new threshold.

The states also take issue with the automatic increases in the new rule through which the DOL will index the salary thresholds every three years. The states assert that the DOL should have to go through the normal notice and comment period in order to make future changes to the salary levels. Read more >>

August 23, 2016

Employer Violates NLRA By Barring Employees From Bringing Class or Collective Actions, Says Ninth Circuit

By Brian Mumaugh

Bad news for employers in the ongoing saga of whether an employer violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by requiring that employees pursue any legal dispute against the company on an individual basis, rather than in a class or collective action with other employees. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that the NLRA precludes employees from waiving their right to have disputes heard collectively and an employer that requires employees to waive that right as a condition of employment commits an unfair labor practice. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. 13-16599 (9^th Cir. August 22, 2016).

Broad Ruling Extends To Any “Separate Proceedings” Requirement

Accounting firm Ernst & Young required its employees to sign agreements mandating that all legal claims against the firm be pursued exclusively through arbitration and only as individuals in “separate proceedings.” When employee Stephen Morris brought a class and collective action in federal court alleging that the firm misclassified employees denying them overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Ernst & Young sought to compel arbitration on an individual basis pursuant to its arbitration agreement. The district court agreed, dismissing the federal court case and ordering arbitration.

Morris appealed, arguing, among other things, that the “separate proceedings” clause violated the NLRA. Morris relied on determinations by the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) in the D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil cases in which the Board ruled that concerted action waivers violate the NLRA. The Ninth Circuit agreed. It ruled that when an employer requires employees to sign an agreement precluding them from bringing a concerted legal claim regarding wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment, the employer violates the NLRA.

The Court focused on the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA’s statutory right of employees “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection” to include a right to join together to pursue workplace grievances, including through litigation. It characterized this as a labor law case, not an arbitration case. It stated that the problem with the contract was not that it required arbitration, but that it excluded all concerted employee legal claims. The Court explained that the same problem would exist “if the contract required disputes to be resolved through casting lots, coin toss, duel, trial by ordeal, or any other dispute resolution mechanism, if the contract (1) limited resolution to that mechanism and (2) required separate individual proceedings.” Read more >>

July 13, 2016

EEOC Revises Its Proposal To Collect Pay Data Through EEO-1 Report

By Cecilia Romero

6a013486823d73970c01b8d204e441970c-320wi On July 13, 2016, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) announced that it has revised its proposal to collect pay data from employers through the Employer Information Report (EEO-1). In response to over 300 comments received during an initial public comment period earlier this year, the EEOC is now proposing to push back the due date for the first EEO-1 report with pay data from September 30, 2017 to March 31, 2018. That new deadline would allow employers to use existing W-2 pay information calculated for the previous calendar year. The public now has a new 30-day comment period in which to submit comments on the revised proposal.

Purpose of EEOC’s Pay Data Rule

The EEOC’s proposed rule would require larger employers to report the number of employees by race, gender, and ethnicity that are paid within each of 12 designated pay bands. This is the latest in numerous attempts by the EEOC and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) to collect pay information to identify pay disparities across industries and occupational categories. These federal agencies plan to use the pay data “to assess complaints of discrimination, focus agency investigations, and identify existing pay disparities that may warrant further examination.”

Employers Covered By The Proposed Pay Data Rule

The reporting of pay data on the revised EEO-1 would apply to employers with 100 or more employees, including federal contractors. Federal contractors with 50-99 employees would still be required to file an EEO-1 report providing employee sex, race, and ethnicity by job category, as is currently required, but would not be required to report pay data. Employers not meeting either of those thresholds would not be covered by the new pay data rule.

Pay Bands For Proposed EEO-1 Reporting

Under the EEOC’s pay data proposal, employers would collect W-2 income and hours-worked data within twelve distinct pay bands for each job category. Under its revised proposed rule, employers then would report the number of employees whose W-2 earnings for the prior twelve-month period fell within each pay band.

The proposed pay bands are based on those used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Occupation Employment Statistics survey:

(1) $19,239 and under;

(2) $19,240 – $24,439;

(3) $24,440 – $30,679;

(4) $30,680 – $38,999;

(5) $39,000 – $49,919;

(6) $49,920 – $62,919;

(7) $62,920 – $80,079;

(8) $80,080 – $101,919;

(9) $101,920 – $128,959;

(10) $128,960 – $163,799;

(11) $163,800 – $207,999; and

(12) $208,000 and over.

July 6, 2016

Union Remains Active In Health Care Industry Despite Withdrawing Initiative To Cap California Health Care Executive Salaries

By Steve Gutierrez

The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) – United Healthcare Workers West (UHW) has twice tried to get an initiative on the California ballot to cap the salaries of executives at nonprofit hospitals. The union recently withdrew its latest ballot initiative, ensuring that it will not appear on this November’s ballot.

SEIU Sought To Cap Private Executive Salaries

Called the “Charitable Hospital Executive Compensation Act of 2016,” SEIU’s initiative sought to limit the annual compensation packages paid to chief executive officers, executives, managers, and administrators of nonprofit hospitals and affiliated medical entities in California. The cap would be set at the annual salary of the U.S. President, currently $450,000. All executive compensation would be included in the cap, including salary, bonuses, stock options, paid time off, housing payments, loan forgiveness, and reimbursement for transportation, parking, entertainment or similar benefits. It would not include the cost of health or disability insurance or contributions to health reimbursement accounts.

The measure called for penalties for hospitals and covered physicians groups who violated the salary cap. Such penalties would include fines, revocation of tax-exempt status, and having an additional person sit on the nonprofit’s board of directors to represent the state Attorney General.

Protect Taxpayers or Organizing Tactic?

Filed in October of 2015, SEIU’s latest initiative stated that its purpose was to ensure that assets held for charitable purposes were not used to enrich executives, managers, and administrators of nonprofit hospitals. SEIU also stated that the total compensation packages for hospital executives should be reasonable and not excessive “in light of the substantial public benefit that the State tax exemption for nonprofit organizations conveys.” In essence, the union touted that taxpayers should not have to subsidize the multi-million dollar paychecks of administrators at tax-exempt healthcare entities.

In the past, the SEIU filed other California initiatives, including one to limit hospital prices and another to put more rules around charity care that could be provided by nonprofit hospitals. In exchange for the SEIU withdrawing those initiatives, the California Hospital Association (CHA) agreed to a contract with the SEIU in 2014 called the Code of Conduct which was intended to put obligations and restrictions on the conduct of each party. The Code expired by its terms on December 31, 2015, but not before the CHA filed a complaint against the SEIU alleging that its initiative to cap executive salaries violated the Code.

As revealed in the arbitration order, in which the arbitrator found that the SEIU did in fact violate the Code, the goals of the SEIU in pushing its healthcare industry initiatives were to increase its membership by reaching agreements with hospitals that provide them access to healthcare workers, and by working together with the hospitals to get Medi-Cal fully funded, which would support more jobs for union members. The initiatives therefore appear to be intended to pressure the hospitals into helping the SEIU organize workers and expand its membership.

Even though this specific salary cap initiative has been withdrawn, we can expect that the SEIU-UHW will continue its pressure tactics in organizing workers in the healthcare industry.

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June 21, 2016

Supreme Court Avoids Deciding Whether Car Dealership Service Advisors Are Exempt From Overtime Pay

By Brian Mumaugh

The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) 2011 rule that stated that “service advisors” at car dealerships are not exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), but declined to take the final step by declaring them exempt under the FLSA. Instead, the Court sent the case back to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to analyze whether service advisors are exempt under the applicable FLSA provision without regard to the DOL’s 2011 regulation. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. ___ (2016).

Duties of Service Advisors

At issue are the “service advisors” in a car dealership’s service department. These advisors typically greet the car owners who enter the service area, evaluate the service and repair needs of the vehicle owner, recommend services and repairs that should be done on the vehicle, and write up estimates for the cost of repairs and services before the vehicle is taken to the mechanics for service.

While service advisors do not sell cars, and they do not repair or service cars, they are essential in the sale of services to be performed on cars in the Service Department. Consequently, the issue is whether they fall within the FLSA exemption for salesmen, partsmen, or mechanics. The case before the Court involved numerous service advisors who sued their employer alleging, among other things, that the dealership failed to pay them overtime wages.

DOL Had Flip-Flopped On Exempt Status

In 1970, the DOL took the view that service advisors did not fall within the salesman/mechanic exemption and should receive overtime pay. Numerous courts deciding cases challenging the DOL’s earlier interpretation, however, rejected the DOL’s view and found service advisors exempt. After the contradictory rulings, the DOL changed its position, acquiescing to the view that service advisors were exempt from overtime pay. In a 1978 opinion letter, as confirmed in a 1987 amendment to its Field Operations Handbook, the DOL clarified that service advisors should be treated as exempt.

After more than 30 years operating under that interpretation, the DOL flip-flopped again in 2011. After going through a notice-and-comment period, the DOL adopted a final rule that reverted to its original position that service advisors were not exempt and were entitled to overtime. It stated that it interpreted the statutory term “salesman” to mean only an employee who sells automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, not one who sells services for automobiles and trucks, as service advisors do.

Dealerships were understandably unhappy with the final rule and continued to challenge the DOL’s position in court. As cases went up on appeal, the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals ruled that the DOL’s interpretation was incorrect. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, ruling instead to uphold the agency’s interpretation. Those contradictory decisions led the Supreme Court to take on the issue in the Encino Motorcars case. Read more >>

June 15, 2016

OFCCP’s New Sex Discrimination Rule Expands Employee Protections Based on Pregnancy, Caregiver Status, and Gender Identity

By Jude Biggs

This week, the OFCCP updated its sex discrimination guidelines on topics such as accommodations for pregnant workers, gender identity bias, pay discrimination, and family caregiving discrimination. Intended to align the OFCCP’s regulations with the current interpretation of Title VII’s prohibitions against sex discrimination, the new rule will require federal contractors to examine their employment practices, even those that are facially neutral, to make sure that they do not negatively affect their employees. The new rule takes effect on August 15, 2016.

Overview of New Sex Discrimination Rule

The existing OFCCP sex discrimination guidelines date back to the 1970s. The new rule is designed to meet the realities of today’s workplaces and workforces. Today, many more women work outside the home, and many have the financial responsibility for themselves and their families. Many women have children while employed and plan to continue work after giving birth to their children. Women sometimes are also the chief caregivers in their families. The updated regulations are meant to offer women and men fair access to jobs and fair treatment while employed.

The new rule defines sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of sex, pregnancy (which includes childbirth or related medical conditions), gender identity, transgender status and sex stereotyping. The rule specifies that contractors must provide accommodations for pregnancy and related conditions on the same terms as are provided to other employees who are similarly able or unable to perform their job duties. For example, contractors must provide extra bathroom breaks and light-duty assignments to an employee who needs such an accommodation due to pregnancy where the contractor provides similar accommodations to other workers with disabilities or occupational injuries.

The new rule also incorporates President Obama’s July 2014 Executive Order that prohibits federal contractors from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. In addition, contractors that provide health care benefits must make that coverage available for transition-related services and must not otherwise discriminate in health benefits on the basis of gender identity or transgender status.

The rule prohibits pay discrimination based on sex. It recognizes the determination of “similarly situated” employees is case-specific and depends on a number of factors, such as tasks performed, skills, effort, levels of responsibility, working conditions, job difficulty, minimum qualifications, and other objective factors. Notably, the OFCCP rule says that employees can be “similarly situated” where they are comparable on some of the factors, but not all of them.

Unlawful compensation discrimination can result not only from unequal pay for equal work, but also from other employer decisions. Contractors may not grant or deny opportunities for overtime work, training, apprenticeships, better pay, or higher-paying positions or opportunities that may lead to higher-paying positions because of a worker’s sex. Employees may recover lost wages for discriminatory pay any time a contractor pays compensation that violates the rule, even if the decision to discriminate was made long before that payment. Read more >>

May 23, 2016

Limitations Period For Constructive-Discharge Claim Starts When Employee Gives Notice of Resignation

The Supreme Court made clear today that the filing period for a constructive-discharge claim begins to run when the employee gives notice of his or her resignation. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court favored the five-circuit majority who recognized such timeline and rejected the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning that the clock begins to run on the date of the “last discriminatory act.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. ___, (2016). Although the case involved a federal employee, the Court noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) treats federal and private sector employee limitations periods the same so this ruling should affect constructive-discharge claims against private employers as well.

Discriminatory Act That Triggers Limitations Clock

In the case before the Court, Marvin Green, a postmaster in Colorado, claimed he was denied a promotion because of his race. A year after that matter was settled, Green filed an informal EEO charge with the Postal Service alleging that he was subjected to retaliation for his prior EEO activity due to his supervisor threatening, demeaning, and harassing him. After the Postal Service’s EEO Office completed its investigation of his allegations, he was informed he could file a formal charge, but he failed to do to.

A few months later, Green was investigated for multiple infractions, including improper handling of employee grievances, delaying the mail, and sexual harassment of a female employee. Green was placed on unpaid leave during the investigation. Federal agents quickly concluded that Green had not intentionally delayed mail, but neither Green nor his union representative was told. Instead, the Postal Service began negotiating with Green’s union representative to settle all the issues against Green, resulting in Green signing a settlement agreement in December 2009 that included giving up his postmaster position. On February 9, 2010, Green submitted his resignation which was to be effective March 31.

During that time, Green filed multiple charges with the Postal Service’s EEO Office. By regulation, federal employees must contact an equal employment opportunity officer in their agency within 45 days of “the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory” before bringing suit under Title VII. Green’s allegations included that he had been constructively discharged by being forced to retire.

Green eventually sued the Postal Service in federal court in Denver. The district court dismissed Green’s constructive discharge claim, ruling that he had not contacted an EEO counselor about his constructive-discharge claim within 45 days of the date he signed the settlement agreement in December. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Green argued that the 45-day limitations period did not begin to run until he announced his resignation, even though that was months after the last alleged discriminatory act against him. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with Green, ruling that the clock began to run on the date of the “last discriminatory act” giving rise to the constructive discharge, as two other circuits have held.

Limitations Period Begins When Employee Gives Notice of Resignation

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Green asserted that the statute of limitations began when he actually resigned due to constructive discharge, the act that gave rise to his cause of action, which was consistent with the rulings of numerous other Courts of Appeals. Interestingly, the Court agreed with the position taken by the Postal Service, which was different from the Tenth Circuit’s decision, ruling that the limitations period for a constructive-discharge claim begins to run when the employee gives notice of his resignation.

In an opinion written by Justice Sotomayor, the Court explained that “the ‘matter alleged to be discriminatory’ in a constructive-discharge claim necessarily includes the employee’s resignation.” The Court noted that to the “standard rule” governing statutes of limitations, the “limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” It means that period begins when the plaintiff “can file suit and obtain relief.” In effect, a constructive-discharge claim is like a wrongful-discharge claim which accrues only after the employee is fired. With nothing in Title VII or its regulations to the contrary, the Court therefore found that the limitations period should not begin to run until after the discharge itself.

So precisely when does an employee resign for purposes of triggering the limitations period for a constructive-discharge claim? The Court ruled that the limitations period begins on the day the employee tells his employer of his resignation, not the employee’s actual last day of work.

The Court did not decide the factual question of when Green actually gave notice of his resignation to the Postal Service, sending the matter back to the Tenth Circuit to determine that fact.

Significance of Decision for Employers

The practical effect of the Court’s ruling is to extend the period in which an employee may allege a constructive discharge beyond the limitations period for the underlying discriminatory acts that gave rise to the resignation. Hypothetically, employees who resign may be able to bootstrap any alleged discriminatory act during the course of their employment to their decision to abandon employment. In his dissent, Justice Thomas further opined that a discrimination victim may extend the limitations period indefinitely simply by waiting to resign. Yet the Court believed such concerns to be overblown, doubting that a victim of employment discrimination would continue to work under intolerable conditions only to extend the limitations period for a constructive-discharge claim. Nonetheless, even if the applicable Title VII limitation period (typically 180 or 300 days for private employers) for the underlying discrimination has passed, an employee may still have a timely claim for constructive discharge under the Court’s rule.

Time will tell if Justice Thomas’s concerns were more realistic that his colleagues believed.

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May 20, 2016

Employers Who Prevail In A Title VII Case May Seek Attorneys’ Fees Even Without A Ruling On The Merits

By Dora Lane

In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Title VII defendant is not required to obtain a favorable judgment on the merits of the underlying discrimination case to be eligible to recover its attorneys’ fees. The decision means that employers who are able to dispose of Title VII claims for non-merits reasons, such as a dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure of the EEOC to conciliate, or something similar, may ask a court to award the attorneys’ fees incurred in contesting the claims (assuming, of course, it satisfies the remaining requirements for an attorneys’ fees award). Refusing to decide whether the EEOC must pay the $4 million attorney fee award at issue, the Court sent the case back to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to consider an alternative theory proposed by the EEOC. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U.S. ___ (2016).

Trucking Company Gets Sexual Harassment Claims Dismissed

In the case before the Court, a new female driver at a large trucking company, CRST Van Expedited, Inc., filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC alleging that she was sexually harassed by two male trainers during her 28-day over-the-road training trip. After a lengthy investigation and unsuccessful conciliation, the EEOC filed suit alleging sexual harassment on behalf of the driver and other allegedly similarly situated female employees. During discovery, the EEOC identified over 250 other women who had supposedly been harassed.

Years of legal battles ensued, during which the district court ultimately dismissed all of the EEOC’s claims for various reasons, including expiration of the statute of limitations, lack of severity or pervasiveness of the alleged harassment, employees’ failure to complain timely, CRST’s prompt and effective response to harassment complaints, and discovery sanctions for the EEOC refusing to produce certain women for depositions. Upon dismissing the lawsuit, the court ruled that CRST was a prevailing party and invited them to apply for attorneys’ fees. CRST did, and the court awarded CRST over $4 million in fees.

The EEOC appealed (twice) and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, among other things, reversed the award of attorneys’ fees. Bound by previous decisions in its circuit, the Court of Appeals held that before a defendant could be deemed to have prevailed for purposes of recovering attorneys’ fees, the defendant had to obtain a favorable judicial determination on the merits of the case. The Eighth Circuit then determined that CRST had not prevailed on the claims brought on behalf of 67 women because their claims were dismissed due to the EEOC’s failure to investigate and conciliate, which was not a ruling on the merits. As a result, the Eighth Circuit ruled that CRST was not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees on those claims. CRST appealed to the Unites States Supreme Court.

Defendant As “Prevailing Party”

Title VII provides that a court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. Accordingly, before deciding whether to award attorneys’ fees in any given case, a court must determine whether the party seeking fees has, in fact, prevailed. That determination is relatively clear when a plaintiff proves his or her discrimination case and a favorable judgment or court order is entered in the plaintiff’s favor. But there has been no clear definition on how courts should determine whether a defendant has prevailed, especially when the complaint is dismissed for procedural deficiencies or on jurisdictional grounds.

In rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s requirement that “prevailing party” status depends on a ruling on the merits, the Court stated that “[c]ommon sense undermines the notion that a defendant cannot ‘prevail’ unless the relevant disposition is on the merits.” Instead, the Court held that a defendant fulfills its primary objective whenever it can rebuff the plaintiff’s case, irrespective of the precise reason for the court’s decision. Looking to the congressional intent for Title VII’s fee-shifting provision, the Court ruled that a defendant may “prevail” even when the court’s final judgment in not on the merits.

Fees Expended in Frivolous, Unreasonable, or Groundless Litigation

The Court noted that under Title VII’s fee-shifting provision, prevailing defendants may seek attorneys’ fees whenever the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. The Court recognized that defendants spend significant attorney time and expenses contesting frivolous and unreasonable claims that result in their favor, whether on the merits or not, and that a request for an award of fees in such cases is appropriate.

Good News For Employers

The Court’s decision is good news for employers defending Title VII claims because it makes clear that a defendant may ask for attorneys’ fees when it gets a favorable judicial result for reasons not on the merits, where the defendant can show that the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. That clarification may help deter the EEOC and individual plaintiffs from filing or continuing to litigate groundless claims.

That said, we may not have seen the final word on application of the Title VII fee-shifting provision as the Court sent the CRST case back to the Eighth Circuit to consider a new argument put forth by the EEOC, namely that a defendant must obtain a preclusive judgment in order to be the “prevailing party.” We’ll keep tabs on this case and let you know of any further developments.

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