Category Archives: Legal

August 29, 2013

DOJ Will Not Challenge State Marijuana Legalization Laws – New Federal Enforcement Policy Unlikely to Affect Colorado Employers

By Emily Hobbs-Wright 

Cannabis-leaf-mdOn August 29, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it will not challenge the state ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington that legalize the possession and use of small amounts of marijuana under state law.  The DOJ makes clear, however, that marijuana remains an illegal drug under the federal Controlled Substances Act.  This clarification means Colorado employers may still enforce their drug-free workplace policies and take appropriate action when an employee or applicant tests positive for marijuana. 

DOJ Expects States to Enforce Strict Regulatory Schemes 

In its August 29, 2013 Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement, the DOJ identifies eight enforcement priorities for federal law enforcement and prosecutors, such as preventing distribution of marijuana to minors, preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal to other states, and preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other public health consequences of marijuana use.  The DOJ states that it expects that states and local governments to not only establish, but also enforce robust controls in their marijuana regulatory schemes to meet its federal objectives.  The guidance instructs federal prosecutors to review marijuana cases on an individual basis, weighing all available information and evidence but to no longer “consider the size or commercial nature of a marijuana operation alone as a proxy for assessing whether marijuana trafficking implicates the Department’s enforcement priorities . . .”  The DOJ further stated that if states fail to develop or enforce a strict regulatory scheme and the stated harms result, federal prosecutors will step in to enforce federal marijuana priorities and may challenge the regulatory schemes in those states. 

Courts in Colorado Uphold Employer Terminations for Employee Marijuana Use 

In April 2013, the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that terminating an employee who tested positive for marijuana following his off-duty, off-premises use of medical marijuana did not violate Colorado’s lawful activities statute.  Coats v. Dish Network LLC, 2013 COA 62.  Brandon Coats, a quadriplegic who obtained a license to use medical marijuana under Colorado’s Amendment 20, was fired for violating his employer’s drug policy after testing positive for marijuana. Coats asserted that he never used marijuana on his employer’s premises, was never under the influence of marijuana at work and never used marijuana outside the limits of his medical marijuana license.  He sued his employer, Dish Network, alleging that his termination violated Colorado’s lawful off-duty activities statute, CRS § 24-34-402.5(1), which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for engaging in “any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours.”

The Coats court looked to the plain meaning of the term “lawful” in the statute and decided that “for an activity to be ‘lawful’ in Colorado, it must be permitted by, and not contrary to, both state and federal law.”  Because marijuana was, and remains, illegal under federal law, the court held that marijuana use is not a “lawful activity” under the Colorado lawful activities statute and therefore, the employer did not violate the statute when it terminated him for testing positive for marijuana.

Earlier this week, the federal district court in Colorado ruled that enforcement of a drug-free workplace policy is a lawful basis for an employer’s decision to terminate an employee who tests positive for marijuana, whether from medical or any other use.  Curry v. MillerCoors, Inc., No. 12-cv-2471 (Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, D.Colo. Aug. 21, 2013). In granting the employer’s motion to dismiss, the federal court rejected all of the former employee’s claims related to his medical use of marijuana that resulted in a positive drug test and his termination under the employer’s drug policy.  Significantly, the court dismissed his disability discrimination claim under Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute as a matter of law, finding that it was lawful for the employer to discharge the employee under its drug-free workplace policy despite the employee’s allegation that he was terminated because of using medical marijuana to treat disabling medical conditions.  Judge John L. Kane wrote “anti-discrimination law does not extend so far as to shield a disabled employee from the implementation of his employer’s standard policies against employee misconduct.”  In dismissing the employee’s claim for violation of Colorado’s lawful activities statute, Judge Kane relied on the Coats decision and similarly ruled that because marijuana use is illegal under federal law, the employee’s medical marijuana use was not a “lawful activity” under the statute. 

DOJ’s Announcement Should Not Change Workplace Decisions 

The DOJ’s announcement of relaxed marijuana enforcement in states that have legalized marijuana does not alter employers’ ability to enforce their drug-free workplace policies.  On the contrary, because the DOJ reinforced that marijuana remains an illegal drug under federal law, the analysis used by courts in Colorado to uphold termination decisions based on positive drug tests should continue to apply.  Employers should create or revise their drug policies to state that use of any drug that is illegal under state or federal law will violate the policy.  Employers then should enforce their policies in a consistent and uniform manner, regardless of the legalization of marijuana use in Colorado.


Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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August 20, 2013

NLRB Judge Strikes Down Employer’s Dress Code Following “Slave” Shirt Discipline

By Brian Mumaugh 

What is wrong with an employer’s dress code that prohibits clothing that displays vulgar or obscene phrases, remarks or images which may be racially, sexually or otherwise offensive as well as clothing that displays words or images that are derogatory to the Company?  It is overly broad and interferes with employees’ Section 7 rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) to engage in union and/or protected concerted activity, according to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).  The ALJ’s review of the dress code came after the employer disciplined an employee who wore a T-shirt with the word “slave” on it next to a picture of a ball and chain and the employee’s time clock number. Dismissing the employer’s argument that the shirt would be racially offensive to visitors who toured its facility, the ALJ found that the employer violated the Act by sending the employee home without pay to change his “slave shirt.” 

The History of the “Slave Shirt” 

Mark Gluch was a long time employee of automotive parts manufacturer Alma Products Company and a vigorous supporter of the union representing his bargaining unit.  The 2012 incident that gave rise to this case occurred when Gluch wore the “slave shirt” to work during a period of contentious negotiations for a new union contract.  The origin of the shirt, however, dated back to 1993 when company employees developed and paid for the “slave shirts” to send the company a message during an earlier round of difficult contract negotiations.  The shirts resurfaced in 1996 when the bargaining unit employees wore them while picketing during a strike.  Immediately following the strike, as many as 30% of the unit employees wore the “slave shirts” to work on any given Friday.  No discipline or policy infraction was noted or enforced at that time. 

Company Seeks to Avoid Racially Offensive Shirt 

When a new president and CEO, Alan Gatlin, took over for Alma Products in 2005, he noticed employees wearing the “slave shirt.” Finding the shirts to be racially offensive, he felt embarrassed that customers and visitors to the facility would see employees wearing the shirt and be offended.  He testified that in his view, the shirts did not reflect well on the Company with customers as they tried to get new business.  Gatlin asked the human resources manager to draft a dress code policy which was implemented in early 2006.  The dress code policy did not specifically reference the “slave shirt” but included general prohibitions against clothing that displayed “vulgar/obscene phrases, remarks or images which may be racially, sexually or otherwise offensive and clothing displaying words or images derogatory to the Company . . .”  The policy also stated “[i]f you are uncertain whether an article of clothing is appropriate under this policy, follow the old adage of better safe than sorry and refrain from wearing it at work.”

 

After implementing the dress code in 2006, it appears that employees seldom wore the “slave shirt” to work.  However, during difficult union contract negotiations in April 2012, Gluch and other employees began wearing pro-union shirts and pins and Gluch wore the “slave shirt” to work.  Gluch’s supervisor gave Gluch the option of removing the shirt or turning it inside out so that the writing would not be visible.  When Gluch refused to do so, he was sent home without pay for wearing the shirt. 

ALJ Rejects Company’s Concerns About Racial Discrimination 

The union filed an unfair labor practice charge claiming, among other things, that the policy and the Company’s enforcement of the policy, violated the Act.  The Company argued that the shirt’s “slave” reference was offensive to African-Americans due to the history of slavery in the United States.  Noting that an important buyer from Chrysler was African-American as was a new production supervisor at the facility, the Company asserted that it was entitled to discipline Gluch for wearing the racially offensive shirt.  The ALJ rejected this argument, stating that the NLRB has repeatedly found employees to be protected even when they displayed messages that likened their working conditions to those of a slave.  The ALJ noted that the dictionary definition of “slave” does not reference race, but instead focuses on the condition of servitude or being subject to a person or influence.  In addition, given the shirt’s history that it had been worn to work over the past two decades as support for the union, the ALJ determined that it would not be seen as carrying a racial message.  Moreover, the Company had a policy prohibiting racial discrimination since the 1990s, yet had failed to take any action to prohibit wearing the “slave shirt” as racially offensive prior to Gluch’s wearing of the shirt in 2012.  

Key to the ALJ’s analysis of the dress code policy was its general prohibition of words or images that are derogatory to the Company.  The ALJ found that the policy interfered with employees’ Section 7 activity, such as protected statements to coworkers, supervisors or third parties who deal with the Company, because it would prohibit employees from objecting to their working conditions and seeking the support of others in improving them.  The dress code policy was found to be unlawfully overbroad because it prohibits all communications derogatory to the company regardless of whether the words are racially or sexually discriminatory or are protected as concerted activities under the National Labor Relations Act.  In addition, by directing employees to be “safe” not “sorry,” the ALJ stated that the policy directs employees to construe the prohibition on derogatory comments such that it prohibits Section 7 activity. 

Dress Code Policies That Do Not Restrict Section 7 Activity 

With the NLRB (and its ALJs) striking down a variety of employer policies relating to both union and non-union employees, it is difficult to draw a bright line to determine which policies pass scrutiny and which do not.  That said, employers can learn lessons from this recent decision that may help keep their dress code policy away from NLRB review.  First, use specific examples of acceptable versus unacceptable attire rather than general statements that require interpretation.  Second, if your workplace warrants different dress standards for different segments of employees (e.g., public-facing employees vs. behind the scenes employees), make those standards clear and justified by business necessity.  Third, if you include a statement that prohibits derogatory words or images on clothing, include a statement that communications protected by Section 7 are permissible under the dress code.  Finally, enforce your policy in a uniform and consistent manner, so that all dress code violations are treated similarly regardless of the employee or supervisor involved.


Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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June 21, 2013

Arbitration Agreement Waiving Class Claims Upheld – What it Means for Employers

By Jeffrey T. Johnson 

Supreme court bldgArbitration is a matter of contract between the parties and courts are not permitted to invalidate an agreed-upon provision that prohibits claims from being arbitrated on a class action basis, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in its June 20, 2013 opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.  Employers can benefit from this ruling by crafting arbitration agreements that limit an employee’s right to pursue employment claims on behalf of a class of employees.   

Cost to Pursue Individual Arbitration Not a Factor 

At issue in the American Express case was an arbitration agreement between American Express and merchants who accept its charge cards that required the parties to arbitrate all disputes.  The agreement further stated that “there shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.”  

When numerous merchants filed a class action lawsuit against American Express alleging violations of federal antitrust laws due to American Express’ alleged high card fees, American Express moved to dismiss the lawsuit and instead force each merchant to arbitrate its claim individually, as required by the arbitration agreement.  The District Court agreed with American Express and dismissed the class action lawsuit.  The merchants appealed the dismissal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the cost to prove the antitrust claims by each individual merchant would far exceed the amount they could recover as an individual plaintiff.  The merchants submitted a declaration from an economist who estimated that the cost of expert analysis on the antitrust claims would be “at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million.”  The maximum amount of damages that each individual plaintiff could expect to recover was $38,549 as treble damages.  The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal, ruling that because the cost for each merchant to arbitrate their claim individually was prohibitive, the class-action waiver in the arbitration agreement was unenforceable and arbitration could not proceed.  American Express sought review by the Supreme Court. 

In a 5-3 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not allow courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class actions on the ground that the plaintiffs’ cost to arbitrate a federal statutory claim individually exceeds the potential recovery.  Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the merchants’ argument that cost vs. recovery should factor into the enforceability of an arbitration agreement.  He wrote that “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”  The Court drew a distinction between contract provisions that prohibit an individual from asserting their statutory rights at all (e.g., a waiver of certain claims) and prohibiting class claims.  Relying on earlier precedent, the Court reiterated that it may invalidate arbitration agreements that operate as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies, but will not invalidate an agreement because it is not worth the expense involved in a party proving a statutory remedy.  The Court also refused to create preliminary hurdles before a plaintiff could be held to contractually-agreed arbitration, such as requiring a court to evaluate the cost to prove claims as well as the damages that could be recovered if the plaintiff is successful.  Justice Scalia wrote that “such a judicially created superstructure” would “undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in general and bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure.” 

Dissent:  Majority’s Response to Merchants Was “Too Darn Bad” 

Justice Elena Kagen, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Steven Breyer (Justice Sotomayor did not take part in the decision), wrote a stinging dissent in which she characterized the case as small business owners who were forced to accept a form contract by a monopolizing credit card company that violated antitrust laws.  The dissent states that if the arbitration clause is enforceable, American Express has insulated itself from antitrust liability because it used its monopoly power to insist on a contract that “effectively deprives its victims of all legal recourse.”  Justice Kagen wrote: the “nutshell version of today’s opinion, admirably flaunted rather than camouflaged:  Too darn bad.”  The three dissenting justices believe that the FAA was never meant to produce the outcome arrived at by the majority, and that the majority decision blocks the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulates wrongdoers from liability.  The dissent instead would rely on the “effective vindication” rule, namely that an arbitration clause will not be enforced if it prevents the effective vindication of federal statutory rights, however it achieves that result, to invalidate the bar on class arbitration in the American Express agreement. 

Employment Arbitration Agreements 

Recent Supreme Court decisions upholding arbitration agreements, such as the American Express opinion, may bolster efforts to use arbitration agreements in the employment context.  Although there are pros and cons to utilizing arbitration agreements with employees, a significant advantage is the ability to prohibit class actions by requiring employees to arbitrate their employment disputes on an individual basis.  In addition, arbitration can be less costly than litigating in court, and more confidential as most arbitration filings are not public records.  Perhaps most significantly, arbitration allows employment cases to be heard by arbitrators, not juries, thereby reducing the risk of runaway verdicts.  Employers should consult with employment counsel to determine if arbitration agreements are warranted with their workforce and if so, what provisions will best protect the company’s interests.


Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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