Tag Archives: Holland & Hart

February 2, 2016

DOL’s New Joint Employer Interpretation Seeks To Hold More Employers Accountable

The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) issued a new Administrator’s Interpretation (AI) that emphasizes the agency’s intent to apply joint employer status more broadly under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA). Even though the definition of joint employment under these acts has not changed, the DOL made it clear that it will examine dual employer relationships closely with what appears to be an intent to find joint employer status in more circumstances.

Of course, companies engaged as a “dual employer” generally seek to avoid joint employer status. Being a joint employer in the eyes of the DOL can result in liability for the acts of a client that has the primary responsibility to direct and control employees. This is not a favorable place to be. Temporary staffing agencies and PEOs do not have enough control over workers assigned to a client location to assume such liability. As a result, such companies have worked for years to maintain dual or co-employment relationships that do not constitute joint employment. It appears, however, that the DOL, through the AI, is trying to chip away at such relationships and include more dual employers within the definition of joint employer.

All companies engaged in the business of providing employees to clients or co-employing workers are affected by this AI. As explained in more detail below, it is clear that the DOL intends to scrutinize all “dual employer” relationships more closely and focus on the degree of control over workers as a guide to determine whether a joint employer relationship exists..

The DOL identified the two most likely scenarios where joint employment typically exists. One type of joint employment, referred to as vertical joint employment, is where there is an “intermediary employer”, such as a staffing agency, PEO, or other provider of workers to a client. Where such a relationship exists, the DOL will focus on the economic realities of the relationship to determine whether a worker is economically dependent on two or more employers, and if so, will be inclined to find joint employer status. The second type of joint employment under scrutiny by the DOL is where the employee has two or more separate, but related employers, each benefitting from a person’s work during the same period of time. These scenarios are explained in more detail below.

Vertical Joint Employment

In a vertical employment relationship, it is common for the “intermediary employer” to be the W-2 employer that actually pay the wages and payroll taxes, but does not direct and control the day-to-day activities of the worker. The issue for the DOL as expressed in the AI is whether, based on the economic realities of the employment relationship shared by the intermediary and the client company, joint employment exists between the employee, the intermediary employer and the client at which the employee is assigned to work.

The economic realities test is not new to the FLSA or MSPA. What is new is that in reviewing a relationship for joint employer status, the DOL announced in the AI that it will abandon its prior practice to look only to its joint employer regulations, and focus exclusively on the economic realities factors in vertical employment scenarios. This is not necessarily bad news, but it is significant.

Under the economic realities test, the degree of control exerted by a person or entity over the workers is only one of the primary factors in a joint employer analysis, and is not definitive. Other economic realities factors the DOL will consider “in the mix” include:

Does the other employer direct, control, or supervise (even indirectly) the work?
Does the other employer have the power (even indirectly) to hire or fire the employee, change employment conditions, or determine the rate and method of pay?
Is the relationship between the employee and the other employer permanent or long-standing?
Is the employee’s work integral to the other employer’s business?
Is the work performed on the other employer’s premises?
Does the employer perform functions typically performed by employers, such as handling payroll, providing workers’ compensation insurance, tools, or equipment, or in agriculture, providing housing or transportation?
Does the employee perform repetitive work or work requiring little skill?

The DOL also identified industries where it believes vertical joint employment relationships are common, and as a result, under increased scrutiny. These industries include “agriculture, construction, hotels, warehouse and logistics” as well as other industries that regularly use staffing agencies or subcontracting intermediaries.

Horizontal Joint Employment

According to the DOL, the so-called horizontal joint employment relationship exists where multiple employers who are sufficiently associated with each other both benefit from the individual’s work, such as where two separate restaurants have the same ownership and jointly schedule an employee to work at both establishments. The factors to consider when analyzing this type of joint employment include:

Who owns or operates the possible joint employers?
Do they have any agreements between the employers?
Do the two employers share control over operations?
Do the employers share or have overlapping officers, directors, executives, or managers?
Does one employer supervise the work of the other?
Do the employers share supervisory authority over the employee?
Are their operations co-mingled?
Do they share clients or customers?

The DOL stresses that it is not necessary for all, or even most, of these factors to exist in order to find joint employment status between two or more related employers.

NLRB Focus On Joint Employers

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has also been expanding its use of joint employment status to hold companies liable for violations of the National Labor Relations Act. Although the DOL stated in a recently issued Questions and Answers document that its joint employment analysis is different than that used by the NLRB, reports suggest that the office of the Solicitor of Labor reached out to the NLRB’s General Counsel on the issue of joint employment in advance of issuing the new Administrator’s Interpretation. It is clear that both agencies are focused on a broad application of the joint employer doctrine.

What Does This Mean For Employers

If joint employment is found, both entities may be held responsible for compliance with all applicable laws, including wage and hour and other employment protection laws. This includes making sure non-exempt employees are paid minimum wage for all hours worked and overtime pay for hours worked over 40 in a workweek. For employers covered by MSPA, both employers are liable for ensuring necessary disclosures of the terms and conditions of employment, and payment of wages are made, as well as maintaining required written payroll records. A joint employer could also find itself named as a co-defendant in a tort liability suit brought against the “primary actor” employer.

Joint employment also applies for determining eligibility and coverage under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). This is critical as smaller employers with less than 50 employees may think they are free of any FMLA obligations, only to find that they meet the coverage threshold if they are deemed to be a joint employer with another entity, such as a staffing agency that provides them with additional workers. Similarly, joint employer status could affect compliance under the Affordable Care Act.

In light of this new guidance and the emphasis by the federal government on broad application of joint employment, staffing agencies, PEOs, and their clients should examine their relationships, including but not limited to, the degree of control, supervision, termination rights, setting of pay rates, and provision of tools, training, and policies exerted by the client company. The higher the degree of control and reservation of rights over the workers, the higher the chance that a joint employment relationship will be found. This also means that clients may ask staffing agencies to provide additional information about their compliance with applicable laws so as to gauge their level of risk. In fact, compliant staffing companies that are violation-free may see that as a marketing point in the future.

In the end, if employers comply with applicable laws, joint employment need not come into play. It is only when compliance takes a back seat and government investigators arrive at the door, that companies need to worry about whether they are a joint employer.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

January 29, 2016

EEOC Proposes To Collect Pay Data From Employers

By Mark Wiletsky

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) plans to collect pay data from employers with more than 100 employees in order to reveal potentially discriminatory pay practices. Through a proposed revision to the Employer Information Report (EEO-1), large employers will report the number of employees by race, gender, and ethnicity that are paid within each of 12 pay bands. The revision is expected to apply to the September 30, 2017 EEO-1 reports.

By gathering this new pay data by race, gender, and ethnicity, the EEOC and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) intends to identify pay disparities across industries and occupational categories. These federal agencies plan to use the pay data “to assess complaints of discrimination, focus agency investigations, and identify existing pay disparities that may warrant further examination.” The agencies also believe the data will assist employers in promoting equal pay in their workplaces.

Employers To Be Covered By Revised EEO-1

Employers with 100 or more employees, including federal contractors, would be required to submit pay data on the revised EEO-1. Federal contractors with 50-99 employees would not be required to report pay data, but still would be required to report sex, race, and ethnicity, as is currently required.

Pay Bands For Proposed EEO-1 Reporting

Under the EEOC’s proposal, employers would use employees' total W-2 earnings for a 12-month period looking back from a pay period between July 1st and September 30th. For each of the EEO-1 job categories, the proposed EEO-1 would have 12 pay bands. Employers would tabulate and report the number of employees whose W-2 earnings for the prior 12 months fell within each pay band.

The proposed pay bands mirror the 12 pay bands used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Occupation Employment Statistics survey:

(1) $19,239 and under;

(2) $19,240 – $24,439;

(3) $24,440 – $30,679;

(4) $30,680 – $38,999;

(5) $39,000 – $49,919;

(6) $49,920 – $62,919;

(7) $62,920 – $80,079;

(8) $80,080 – $101,919;

(9) $101,920 – $128,959;

(10) $128,960 – $163,799;

(11) $163,800 – $207,999; and

(12) $208,000 and over.

The EEOC published a Question & Answer page on its website to help explain how the pay data would be reported.

Comment Period to Follow

The EEOC’s announcement of the pay data collection on the revised EEO-1 coincides with a White House commemoration of the seventh anniversary of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. The proposed changes will be officially published in the Federal Register on February 1, 2016. Interested parties and members of the public may submit comments for the 60-day period ending April 1, 2016.

We expect that a significant number of employers, business organizations, and industry associations will submit comments, opposing this additional reporting requirement. Groups also may challenge the changes in court. We will keep you posted as this proposal goes forward.

In the meantime, if your organization has concerns about its pay practices, now is a good time to review those practices and proactively address any troubling issues.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

January 20, 2016

Unaccepted Settlement Offer of Complete Relief Does Not Moot Plaintiff’s Case

By Sarah Wisor

In a 6-to-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a plaintiff who rejects a settlement offer or an offer of judgment of complete relief may continue litigating the case. Relying on principles of contract law, the Court ruled that once a settlement offer is rejected by the plaintiff, it has no continuing effect. Because the plaintiff remains empty-handed, he may continue to pursue all available remedies in court, on both an individual basis and on behalf of a class. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. ___ (2016).

Resolving Circuit Court Split on Whether Offer Moots Claim

The dilemma is this: if a defendant offers the plaintiff complete monetary and all other relief that he is entitled to recover on his claims, what is left to be decided or awarded? If there is no case or controversy, a federal court must dismiss the case as moot pursuant to Article III of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court agreed to hear this case because the Circuit Courts of Appeals did not agree on this issue. The First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals had previously ruled that an unaccepted offer does not render a plaintiff’s claim moot. However, the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits had ruled oppositely, holding that an unaccepted offer of complete relief can moot a plaintiff’s claim.

Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, pointed to Justice Kagan’s words from her dissent in an earlier case: “When a plaintiff rejects such an offer – however good the terms – [the plaintiff’s] interest in the lawsuit remains just what it was before. And so too does the court’s ability to grant her relief.” Therefore, the Court reasoned, a case is not rendered moot by an unaccepted offer to satisfy the plaintiff’s individual claim.

Chief Justice Roberts Dissents

Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito. (Justice Thomas concurred with the majority in its holding, but not its reasoning, writing a separate concurrence.) The dissenting justices stated that the “federal courts exist to resolve real disputes, not to rule on a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief already there for the taking.” The dissent would have rendered the case moot on the basis that there is no case or controversy after a defendant agrees to fully redress the injury alleged by a plaintiff.

Can Defendants Still “Pick Off” Named Plaintiffs?

Settling a named plaintiff’s individual claim prior to class certification is appealing to defendants who want to avoid the greater liability and cost of a class action. While this “picking off” strategy may have been undermined, in part, by the Supreme Court’s decision, the Court did not decide whether payment of complete relief would render the case moot.

This case arose when Jose Gomez sued a marketing firm, Campbell-Ewald, for sending him text messages without his permission. Gomez filed a nationwide class action, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), which permits consumers to recover treble damages of $1,500 per call/text message, plus litigation costs. Gomez sought the maximum statutory damages, costs, attorney’s fees, and an injunction against Campbell-Ewald barring further unsolicited messaging.

Before Gomez could file a motion for class certification, Campbell-Ewald offered to settle Gomez’s individual claim and filed an offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Campbell-Ewald offered to pay Gomez $1,503 per unsolicited message and his court costs, but not attorney’s fees, which Campbell-Ewald argued were not available under the TCPA. Campbell-Ewald also offered to stipulate to an injunction that would bar it from sending text messages in violation of the TCPA. Gomez rejected the settlement offer and allowed the Rule 68 offer of judgment to lapse. Campbell-Ewald then sought dismissal of Gomez’s case, arguing that its offer of complete relief rendered his claim moot. The Supreme Court disagreed.

However, the Court did not decide whether the result would be different if a defendant actually deposits the full amount resolving the plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, with the court then entering judgment in that amount. As Chief Justice Roberts stated in his dissent, the good news is that this case is limited to its facts, and that issue has been left for a future case.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

January 12, 2016

Anticipating Revisions To The “Persuader Rules” – What You Need To Know

By Brian Mumaugh

As early as March, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) plans to issue its final rules that will significantly narrow the type of union-avoidance activities that employers and their labor attorneys and relations consultants may engage in without having to report those activities to the government. The tightening of the so-call “persuader rules” will mean that employers who utilize labor relations consultants, including lawyers, to help with union-avoidance or collective bargaining activities will need to disclose many more of those activities, and the fees paid for them.

Evolution of the “Persuader Rules”

In the late 1950’s, because of perceived questionable conduct by both unions and employers involved in union organizing and collective bargaining campaigns, Congress enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA). The LMRDA seeks to make labor-management relations more transparent by imposing reporting and disclosure requirements on labor organizations and their officials, employers, and labor relations consultants.

Under the LMRDA, the reporting requirements for employers and their labor consultants are triggered when they undertake activities intended to directly or indirectly persuade employees to exercise (or not to exercise) the employees’ right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. Employers must file a Form LM-10 (Employer Report) that discloses all payments made to unions and union officials, persuader payments made to employees and employee committees, persuader agreements/arrangements made with labor relations consultants, including lawyers, which includes the amount and dates of payments made to such consultants, and any expenditures made to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees, or otherwise obtain information concerning employees or a labor organization. Labor relations consultants must file a Form LM-20 specifying, among other things, information about the consultant and the nature of the “persuader activities” to be performed. Under the LMRDA, the DOL must make all such forms available for public inspection.

The “Advice” Exemption

The LMRDA contains an exemption from the reporting requirements for persuader activities for services that give “advice” to the employer. Except for brief periods when the LMRDA was first enacted and again in 2001, the DOL has interpreted this “advice” exemption to apply to activities where a consultant or lawyer prepares a speech or documents for use by the employer, or revises materials initially drafted by the employer. In other words, as long as the consultant or lawyer did not directly deliver or disseminate speeches or materials to employees for the purpose of persuading them with respect to their organizational or bargaining rights, behind-the-scenes activities where the consultant/lawyer drafts materials for use by the employer would not trigger a reporting obligation. Under the proposed rules, that is about to change.

Expanded Proposed Interpretation of “Advice” Exemption

Believing its long-standing interpretation of the “advice” exemption to be overly broad, the DOL proposed a narrower interpretation that would require reporting in any case in which the agreement or arrangement with a labor consultant/lawyer in any way calls for the consultant to engage in persuader activities, regardless of whether or not advice is also given. The revised interpretation would define reportable “persuader activity” to include activities where a lawyer or consultant provides material or communications to, or engages in other actions, conduct, or communications on behalf of an employer that at least in part, has the objective of persuading employees concerning their rights to organize or bargain collectively. Exempt “advice” would be limited to recommendations, verbal or written, regarding an employer’s decision or course of conduct.

Stated examples of covered persuader activities that would require disclosure include:

drafting, revising, or providing written materials for presentation, dissemination, or distribution to employees
drafting, revising, or providing a speech, video, or multi-media presentation to be presented, shown or distributed to employees
drafting, revising, or providing website content for employees
planning or conducting individual or group employee meetings, and training supervisors or employer representatives to do the same
coordinating or directing the activities of supervisors or employer representatives
establishing or facilitating employee committees
developing personnel policies or practices
deciding which employees to target for persuader activity or disciplinary action
conducting a seminar for supervisors or employer representatives

The DOL justifies this expansion of the reporting circumstances, in part, because the role of outside consultants and law firms in managing employers’ anti-union efforts has grown substantially over the years, citing reports that somewhere between 71% and 87% of employers facing organizing drives hire third-party consultants to assist in their counter-organizing efforts. The DOL also states that underreporting of persuader activities is a problem as “employees are not receiving the information that Congress intended they receive.” Regardless of its reasoning, the DOL’s proposed change of its 50-year old interpretation will result in significant burdens on both employers and their consultants.

March 2016 Is New Target Date for Final Rule

Almost five years has passed since the DOL published its proposed rule changing the “persuader rules.” After numerous delays in publishing its final rules, the DOL’s regulatory agenda indicates that it expects to issue the final “persuader rules” this March. We will let you know when the final rules are published, or if the timeline changes. In the meantime, you might want to take advantage of the next few months before the new rules kick in to obtain union-avoidance materials and training from your consultants now. At a minimum, talk to your labor relations consultant/labor lawyer about the upcoming changes so that you are aware of how they may impact your labor strategies in the future.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

January 4, 2016

Pregnancy-Related Accommodation Bill To Be Introduced in Colorado Legislature

Following the national trend, a bill to be introduced during Colorado’s next legislative session intends to expand protection for pregnancy-related leave. Specifically, the draft bill would require employers to provide reasonable accommodations to applicants and employees for conditions related to pregnancy and childbirth. If passed, the bill would mean that employers must engage in an interactive process to assess potential reasonable accommodations, provide notice of employee rights, and refrain from retaliating against employees and applicants that request or use a pregnancy-related accommodation.

With the 2016 Colorado legislative session set to convene on January 13th, here are the highlights of the draft bill.

Reasonable Accommodation Requirement

Under the draft bill, an employer would commit an unfair employment practice if it refuses to make a reasonable accommodation for a job applicant or an employee for conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer’s business. Employers would need to engage in a good-faith interactive process with the employee to determine possible, effective reasonable accommodations.

Most employers should be familiar with the interactive process as it should be used when assessing accommodations for qualified individuals with a disability. Possible reasonable accommodations listed in the draft bill include more frequent or longer break periods, temporary transfer to a less strenuous or hazardous position, job restructuring, light duty, time off to recover from childbirth, acquisition or modification of equipment, seating, assistance with manual labor, modified schedules, and break-time and private non-bathroom space for expressing breast milk. Employers would not be required hire new employees, or discharge, transfer, or promote another employee in order to make a reasonable accommodation.

The bill would further prohibit employers from requiring an applicant or employee to accept a reasonable accommodation that the individual chooses not to accept. The bill also would prevent employers from requiring an employee to take leave if there are other reasonable accommodations that may be made. These provisions seem to suggest that the employee has veto power over offered accommodations. This differs significantly from disability law as under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), an employer meets its reasonable accommodation duty if it provides an accommodation that allows the employee to perform the essential functions of his or her job, even if that accommodation is not the one preferred by the employee.

Undue Hardship Analysis

An “undue hardship” is defined in the bill as an action requiring significant difficulty or expense proven by the employer. Factoring into that determination would be:

the nature and cost of the accommodation
the overall financial resources of the employer
the overall size of the employer’s business with respect to the number of employees and the number, type, and location of the available facilities, and
the accommodation’s effect on expenses and resources or its impact on the operations of the employer.

If the employer provides a similar accommodation to other classes of employees, it will be presumed that the accommodation does not impose an undue hardship. Employers would have to rebut that presumption if they fail to offer the same or similar accommodation for pregnancy-related conditions.

Retaliation Prohibited

Employers would be prohibited from taking adverse action against an employee who requests or uses a reasonable accommodation for a pregnancy-related condition. An adverse action is defined in the bill as a retaliatory action, such as the failure to reinstate the employee to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other applicable service credits.

Notice and Posting Requirement

If this bill were to become law, employers would be required to provide employees with written notice of their rights under this provision. New employees would have to be provided the written notice at the start of their employment. Additionally, employers would have ten days to provide the notice to individual employees who inform their employer of their pregnancy. There is also a provision to notify existing employees within a specified time after the effective date of the new law. Finally, employers would be required to post the written notice in a conspicuous place at their business in an area accessible to employees.

Likelihood of Bill Passage

Remember that at present, this bill is only a draft and after it is introduced in the House, it will be assigned to a committee. There are many opportunities for legislators to amend, add, or delete provisions in the bill throughout the legislative process.

That said, some form of the bill stands a reasonable chance of passage within the Democratically controlled Colorado House. It has less chance of success in the Republican-controlled Senate. We will watch to see if other legislators add their names as co-sponsors, or if an alternative (perhaps less onerous) bill is introduced in the Senate. We will track this bill and keep you informed of any important developments.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

April 14, 2015

EEOC Fails to Show Telecommuting Would Be A Reasonable Accommodation

By Mark Wiletsky

The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) “does not endow all disabled persons with a job—or job schedule—of their choosing,” according to the majority of judges on the full Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In an 8 to 5 decision, the Sixth Circuit Court ruled en banc that Ford Motor Company did not violate the ADA when it denied an employee’s request to telecommute up to four days per week in order to accommodate her irritable bowel syndrome. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 12-2484 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015).

“Good, Old-Fashioned Interpersonal Skills” Made In-Person Attendance Essential

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) argued that a resale buyer for Ford, Jane Harris, who had irritable bowel syndrome that made it difficult for her to be far from a restroom, should be allowed to work from home up to four days per week. The agency cited Ford’s telecommuting policy that allowed other workers, including some resale buyers, to telecommute as evidence that Harris’ telecommuting request was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

The Court disagreed. It ruled that regular and predictable on-site attendance was an essential function of the resale-buyer position at Ford. Resale buyers needed to purchase raw steel from steel suppliers and then resell it to parts manufacturers to make parts used in Ford vehicles. Although some interactions could be done by email and telephone, the Court found that many required “good, old-fashioned interpersonal skills,” and resale buyers needed to be able to meet face to face with suppliers, parts manufacturers and Ford employees during core business hours.

Importantly, the Court reiterated the general rule is that regular attendance at work is essential to most jobs, especially interactive ones. It pointed to past court opinions as well as to EEOC regulations that support the premise that regular and predictable on-site attendance is an essential job function. The Court even relied on that “sometimes-forgotten guide” – common sense, stating that non-lawyers (as well as judges in other appellate circuits) recognize that regular in-person attendance is an essential function, and a prerequisite to other essential functions, of most jobs.

Other Buyers Telecommuted on a Predictable, Limited Basis

But what about the fact that Ford had a telecommuting policy that allowed other employees, including resale buyers like Harris, to work from home? Wouldn’t that make telecommuting a reasonable accommodation for Harris?

The Court said no, because she proposed to telecommute four days per week on a schedule of her choosing. The other resale buyers who telecommuted did so only one established day per week and they agreed in advance that they would come into work that day, if needed. They were also able to perform well and maintain productivity. Harris, on the other hand, wanted to be able to pick and choose which days she would telecommute, up to four days per week, without agreeing to come in those days, if necessary. The Court found that none of these other employees’ more predictable and more limited telecommuting schedules removed regular on-site attendance from the resale buyer’s job.

As a result, the Court ruled that Harris’ proposed telecommuting accommodation unreasonable.

In addition, Ford had allowed Harris to telecommute on an as-needed basis on three separate occasions and her performance suffered. Other attempts to improve Harris’ attendance also failed. The Court found that Harris could not perform the essential functions of her job and was unable to establish regular and consistent work hours. Therefore, it ruled that she was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA.

Technology Did Not Carry the Day

The EEOC argued that advances in technology make on-site attendance less essential. The Court disagreed in this case, stating that there was no evidence presented that specific technology made personal interactions unnecessary for resale buyers.

No Blind Deference to Employer’s Judgment

The Court made a point of stating that its opinion did not open the door for courts to blindly accept as essential whatever an employer says is essential for a particular job. It emphasized that an employer’s words, policies and practices were all important in deciding whether a particular task or requirement is an essential job function.

In Ford’s case, the evidence supported Ford’s judgment that regular and predictable in-person attendance was essential for resale buyers. The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ford.

No Retaliation For Termination

The Court also ruled that Ford did not retaliate against Harris when it fired her for poor performance just four months after she had filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Key was Ford’s good documentation of Harris’ performance and interpersonal issues. She had been ranked in the bottom 10% of her peer group before she filed her charge. Documentation showed that she failed to update spreadsheets, complete her paperwork, schedule training sessions, price items correctly and finish her work on time. Despite the closeness in time of the firing to her charge filing, the Court ruled that the EEOC failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the real reason that Ford terminated Harris was unlawful retaliation instead of poor performance.

Dissent: Either Physical Presence is Not Essential or Telecommuting is A Reasonable Accommodation

Five judges on the Sixth Circuit dissented, believing that the EEOC had presented enough evidence to send the EEOC’s claims to a jury. Specifically, the dissent stated that the evidence was sufficient to show that there remained genuine disputes over whether Harris was a qualified individual, either because in-person attendance was not an essential function of her job, or because telecommuting would be a reasonable accommodation for her. It pointed to Ford’s telecommuting policy which allowed for “one to four days” of telework each week. It noted that Harris proposed that she be able to work from home up to four days each week, as was arguably allowed under the policy, not that she be permitted to telecommute four days each and every week.

The dissent also asserted that Harris’ past attendance issues that were a result of her disability should not be used against her in deciding whether a telecommuting arrangement during core business hours would be a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Moreover, the dissent found that Ford should have engaged in a more interactive process to clarify Harris’ telecommuting accommodation request. Finally, the dissent believed that there was a genuine dispute over whether Ford retaliated against Harris for filing her discrimination charge.

Lessons for Employers Facing ADA Telecommuting Accommodation Requests

The majority’s decision finding that regular and predictable in-person attendance is an essential function of most jobs, especially interactive ones, is favorable for employers. But it does not mean that telecommuting can never be a reasonable accommodation. In fact, the dissent in this case demonstrates that telecommuting requests for disabled employees is likely to continue to be an issue with which employers will grapple in coming years.

If face-to-face interactions and in-person attendance at meetings or other work-related functions is essential for certain jobs at your workplace, be certain to include those tasks in your job descriptions. If you generally allow telecommuting, be sure to have a written policy and apply it consistently. If presented with a request to telecommute in order to accommodate a disability, engage in an interactive process to discuss whether telecommuting would be appropriate for that particular position and employee, whether it would constitute an undue hardship for your organization and if alternative accommodations would allow the employee to perform his or her essential functions. And by all means, make sure you have concrete documentation of an employee’s poor performance or policy infractions before taking adverse action against anyone who has filed a discrimination charge.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

October 21, 2014

EEOC’s Failure to Engage in Conciliation Dooms Its Separation Agreement Lawsuit Against CVS Pharmacy

By Mark Wiletsky

Chalk up a loss for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in its lawsuit against CVS Pharmacy’s separation agreements. As we reported earlier, the EEOC sued CVS alleging that CVS’s separation agreements deterred employees from filing charges and communicating with the EEOC about discrimination and retaliation. Dismissing the case, a federal judge recently ruled that the EEOC failed to engage in the required procedural steps, including conciliation, before filing its lawsuit.

EEOC Dismissed Employee’s Charge, Then Went After Employer

This lawsuit is an example of the aggressive, proactive nature of the EEOC in extending the protections of Title VII to new and novel claims. The case arose after CVS terminated Tonia Ramos, a pharmacy manager. Ms. Ramos signed CVS’s standard separation agreement, which included a release of claims and a covenant not to sue. She then proceeded to file a charge with the EEOC claiming that her discharge was based on sex and race in violation of Title VII. Almost two years later, the EEOC dismissed Ms. Ramos’s charge.

The EEOC then contacted CVS asserting that based on the separation agreement, CVS was engaging in a pattern or practice of resistance to their employees’ full enjoyment of rights under Title VII. In other words, the EEOC concluded that even though the individual employee did not have a valid discrimination claim against CVS, it would bring a pattern or practice case against CVS based on the language in its standard separation agreement used with potentially hundreds of former employees.

No Conciliation, No Lawsuit

Under Title VII enforcement procedures, the EEOC has the authority to investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of discrimination, whether filed on behalf of an allegedly harmed employee or by the EEOC itself. The procedures require that the EEOC try to resolve any alleged unlawful employment practices through informal means before filing a lawsuit. Such means include conferences, conciliation and persuasion. Although the EEOC and CVS discussed potential settlement by telephone twice before the EEOC filed suit, the EEOC failed to engage in conciliation, which proved fatal to its case. Because an attempt at reaching a conciliation agreement is a prerequisite to the EEOC filing suit and it was undisputed that the EEOC did not engage in any conciliation process, the federal court dismissed the EEOC’s case against CVS.

Judge’s Guidance is in the Footnotes

The case was dismissed on procedural grounds, but the judge took the opportunity to offer his view on the merits of the EEOC’s arguments in several footnotes in the opinion. First, the EEOC argued that the term “resistance” as used in Title VII should be interpreted broadly to extend to the language in CVS’s separation agreement even if that language did not amount to discrimination or retaliation under the Act. The judge rejected that argument, stating that the term “resistance” requires some retaliatory or discriminatory act.

Second, the judge discussed the “covenant not to sue” provision in CVS’s separation agreement. Even though the provision stated that an employee could not “initiate or file . . . a complaint or proceeding asserting any of the Released Claims,” the release of claims (in another paragraph of the separation agreement) stated that it did not limit “any rights that the Employee cannot lawfully waive.” In addition, the agreement contained two carve out provisions specifying an employee’s “right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws” and that the agreement did not prohibit the employee from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation. The judge wrote that these provisions would allow an employee to file an EEOC charge. He went on to write that even if the separation agreement explicitly banned filing charges, those provisions would be unenforceable and could not constitute “resistance” under Title VII.

One Case Down; One Still Pending

The dismissal of the CVS lawsuit is good news for employers who use separation agreements, especially in light of the judge’s comments signaling that the EEOC’s arguments were without merit. However, a similar case filed by the EEOC against College America is still proceeding through the federal court in the District of Colorado. (We wrote about the College America case here.) Like CVS, College America has asked the court to dismiss the EEOC’s case. We will let you know when the court rules on that motion. In the meantime, employers should review their separation agreements to ensure they include a provision that the agreement does not prohibit employees from filing a charge, participating in an investigation or otherwise cooperating with an appropriate federal, state or local government agency that enforces discrimination laws.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

June 13, 2014

Forced “Onionhead” Practices At Work Result in EEOC Religious Discrimination Lawsuit

By Brad Cave

“I love you, man.” Appropriate for beer commercials but perhaps not for the workplace. A New York employer who allegedly required employees to participate in prayer circles, thank God for their job and say “I love you” to managers and co-workers faces a religious discrimination lawsuit filed recently by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC seeks compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of three employees who were fired, allegedly for opposing the required “Onionhead” practices, and a class of similarly harmed individuals. EEOC v. United Health Programs of America, No. 14-cv-3673 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 11, 2014).

Company Required “Harnessing Happiness” or “Onionhead” Practices

According to the EEOC complaint, three former employees of United Health Programs of America filed charges alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII because the company required employees to engage in practices under a belief system called “Harnessing Happiness” or “Onionhead.” According to the Harnessing Happiness website, Onionhead is an “incredibly pure, wise and adorable character” who “wants everyone to know how they feel and then know what to do with those feelings.” The three women claim that the company required them to participate in various Onionhead-related activities on a daily and weekly basis, including praying, reading spiritual texts, burning candles, keeping lights at work very dim, thanking God for their employment and saying “I love you” to colleagues and managers. They assert that every day, employees were asked to select Onionhead-related cards to keep next to their computers and to wear Onionhead-related pins. In addition, one of the company’s upper managers and the aunt of the company owner, “Denali,” was the leader of the Onionhead practices and allegedly would require employees to attend one-on-one sessions with her in order to read and discuss books about “divine plans,” “moral codes” and “enlightenment.”

Fired – Allegedly for Opposing Onionhead Practices

Each of the three Charging Parties, Elizabeth Ontaneda, Francine Pennisi and Faith Pabon, were allegedly fired for objecting to the Onionhead practices. Pennisi, an Account Manager and IT Project Manager, spoke up at a managers’ meeting in July 2010, stating that she was Catholic and did not want to participate in the Onionhead activities. Ontaneda, a Senior Accounting Manager for Customer Service, also spoke up at the meeting, saying she felt the same way. A few weeks later, both women were relocated to work in an open area on the customer service floor, rather than in their offices, and their duties were changed to require answering phones. Denali placed a large statue of Buddha in Pennisi’s empty office. Denali also spoke of “demons” in connection with Ontaneda’s and Pennisi’s resistance to Onionhead practices. The day after losing their offices, the women called in sick and were terminated by the company owner by phone and voicemail.

Pabon, a Customer Care Consultant, attended a spa weekend in Connecticut with Denali and about 20 other customer service employees. Pabon alleges that Denali stated that the purpose of the trip was spiritual enlightenment and that they were to be together at all times, holding hands, praying and chanting. Pabon refused to participate in some of the group activities and on Monday following the spa weekend, Denali fired Pabon for “insubordination.”

Hostile Work Environment, Failure to Accommodate and Retaliation

The EEOC asserts numerous religious discrimination claims against the company, including creating a hostile work environment based on religion, failure to accommodate the employees’ own religious beliefs or lack thereof, terminating employees based on religion and retaliating against employees for opposing the required Onionhead practices in the workplace. The EEOC also alleges that some employees were constructively discharged when they felt compelled to leave the company to avoid participating in the required Onionhead activities.

Reports suggest that the company denies any merit to the lawsuit and that they expect it to be dismissed. We don’t yet know the basis of their defense and must remember that at present, the allegations are unproven. It will be an interesting case to follow. We will keep you posted as it proceeds through the court

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

June 2, 2014

Disabled Employee Not Entitled to Additional Leave as Reasonable Accommodation

By Jude Biggs

After Kansas State University denied her request to extend a leave of absence for longer than six months, assistant professor Grace Hwang, who suffers from cancer, filed suit against the University alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the University had not violated the Rehabilitation Act because Ms. Hwang could not show that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job. In addition, the Tenth Circuit held that requiring the University to extend the six-month’s leave was not a reasonable accommodation. Hwang v. Kansas State Univ., No. 13-2070 (10th Cir. May 29, 2014).

Policy Provided Six-Month’s Paid Leave of Absence

Ms. Hwang was set to teach classes at Kansas State University under a one-year contract that covered all three academic terms — fall, spring and summer. Before the fall term, Ms. Hwang was diagnosed with cancer. She asked for a leave of absence to seek medical treatment. The University granted her a paid six-month leave under its regular policy which capped the length of a leave at six months.

As the six-month leave was coming to an end, Ms. Hwang’s doctor advised her to seek more time off of work. She asked the University to extend her leave through the end of the spring semester, intending to return before the summer term. The University refused to extend her leave but instead arranged for Ms. Hwang to receive long-term disability benefits, effectively ending her employment with the University.

Ms. Hwang sued the University in federal court alleging that the University’s denial of her request for extended leave constituted disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination by entities that receive federal funds, such as Kansas State. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The federal district court dismissed her lawsuit on a motion to dismiss (before any discovery was done), and Ms. Hwang appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which covers the states of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Kansas, Oklahoma and New Mexico.

Extended Leave Not A Reasonable Accommodation Under Rehabilitation Act

The University did not dispute that Ms. Hwang was a capable teacher and that her cancer rendered her disabled as defined by the Rehabilitation Act. The central issue in the appeal was whether the University was required to ignore the six-month time limit in its leave policy to extend Ms. Hwang’s leave of absence beyond six months. The Court said no. Because Ms. Hwang wasn’t able to work for an extended period of time, she was not capable of performing the essential functions of her job. In addition, requiring the University to keep her job open for that extended period of time did not qualify as a reasonable accommodation. The Court wrote: “[a]fter all, reasonable accommodations – typically things like adding ramps or allowing more flexible working hours – are all about enabling employees to work, not to not work.”

The Court noted that a “brief absence from work” for medical care may be required as a reasonable accommodation, as it likely allows the employee to continue to perform the essential functions of the job. Determining how long employers must provide for leave as a reasonable accommodation depends on factors such as the duties essential to the job in question, the nature and length of the leave sought and the impact of the leave on co-workers. That said, the Court stated that it would be difficult to find a six-month leave of absence in which the employee performs no work (e.g., no part-time hours or work from home) reasonable in any job in the national economy today. Ms. Hwang’s terrible problem, in the Court’s view, was one other forms of social security aim to address. In addition, the Court noted that the aim of the Rehabilitation Act is to prevent employers from denying reasonable accommodations that would allow disabled employees to work, not to turn employers into a “safety net” for those who cannot work.

“Inflexible” Six-Month Leave Policy Not Inherently Discriminatory

Ms. Hwang asserted that the University’s “inflexible” sick leave policy that capped the maximum length of sick leave at six months violated the Act. She cited the EEOC’s guidance manual which states that if a disabled employee needs additional unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation, the employer must modify its “no-fault” leave policy to provide the additional leave, unless the employer can show that there is another effective accommodation that would allow the individual to perform the essential functions of her job, or that granting additional leave would cause the employer an undue hardship. The Court, however, pointed to another section of the EEOC’s guidance manual to counter Ms. Hwang’s argument, as the EEOC manual states “ . . . six months is beyond a reasonable amount of time.” In fact, the Court stated that an “inflexible” leave policy can actually help protect the rights of disabled employees rather than discriminate against them because such a policy does not permit individual requests for leave to be singled out for discriminatory treatment.

Not all leave policies will past muster, however. The Court stated that policies that provide an unreasonably short sick leave period may not provide enough accommodation for a disabled employee who would be capable of performing his or her job with just a bit more time off. Alternatively, policies that are applied inconsistently, such as where some employees are allowed more time off and others are held to a strict time limit, could be discriminatory. In this case, however, the Court found that Ms. Hwang did not allege any facts to support a claim that she was treated differently than other similarly situated employees.

Retaliation Claim Fails As Well

Ms. Hwang also asserted that she was unlawfully retaliated against for reporting disability discrimination. In particular, she based her claims on two theories : (1) the University failed to explain her COBRA health benefits before or immediately after her termination; and (2) she wasn’t hired for two other positions at the University that she applied for after losing her teaching job. The Court easily dispensed with both theories.

First, COBRA allows thirty days for an employer to provide separating employees with a COBRA notice. Consequently, the University was not required to provide Ms. Hwang with notice of her COBRA benefits before or immediately after her termination of employment. Second, although Ms. Hwang alleged that she was not hired for two other University positions for which she applied, she failed to allege any facts suggesting that the University’s decision not to hire her was because she had engaged in legally protected opposition to discrimination. She not only failed to provide facts showing that she was qualified for the two jobs, but she also failed to offer facts suggesting that the University officials who decided not to hire her knew about her disability and her complaint about disability discrimination. Without such allegations, the Court ruled that Ms. Hwang’s retaliation claim failed.

ADA Application

Although this case alleged a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, courts typically analyze such claims similarly to those alleging a violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Consequently, this case may prove helpful to employers defending ADA claims where the employer denies an employee’s request for an extended leave of absence. Employers should heed the Court’s warning about leave policies that may be discriminatory if they provide an unreasonably short leave or are inconsistently applied. However, lengthy leaves of six months or more, or leaves of an unlimited duration in which the disabled employee provides no work, will likely not be considered a reasonable accommodation.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

May 13, 2014

Independent Contractor Status — Colorado Supreme Court Sets Forth Applicable Test

By Bradford J. Williams

Yesterday we posted an article describing the unsettled test for independent contractor status under Colorado’s unemployment insurance benefits laws after the Colorado Court of Appeals issued a new decision last week. Now, that test has been settled as the Colorado Supreme Court issued its decision in the Softrock and Western Logistics cases.

The Colorado Supreme Court ruled yesterday that determining whether a worker is “customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business” in order to be deemed an “independent contractor” under Colorado’s unemployment insurance benefits laws requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the worker and the putative employer. In two companion cases, the Court rejected a stringent, single-factor test for determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor for purposes of unemployment insurance tax liability and benefits. Reversing decades of case law, the Court ruled that no single factor is dispositive of an employer-employee relationship. Instead, courts and agencies may consider nine factors enumerated in a statute pertaining to independent contractor agreements, as well as “any other information relevant to the nature of the work and the relationship between the employer and the individual.” ICAO v. Softrock Geological Servs., 2014 CO 30; Western Logistics, Inc. v. ICAO, 2014 CO 31.

Putative Employer Must Prove Independent Contractor Status

Under the Colorado Employment Security Act (CESA), employers must pay unemployment taxes on wages paid to employees, but not on compensation paid to independent contractors. Similarly, employees are entitled to collect unemployment insurance benefits under the CESA whereas independent contractors are not. Putative employers bear the burden of proving that workers are independent contractors, not employees, for purposes of the CESA.

In order to establish that a worker is an independent contractor, a putative employer must prove that the individual (i) is free from control and direction in the performance of his or her service, and (ii) is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business related to the service performed. C.R.S. § 8-70-115(1)(b). The CESA does not define what must be shown to satisfy the second part of this test.

2012 Court of Appeals Decisions on the Single-Factor Test

For years, the Colorado Division of Employment and Training and most courts have applied a single-factor test, rejecting claims that workers are independent contractors, and thus ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits, where they do not provide similar services to others while working for the putative employer. It has not mattered, for instance, whether the workers were directed or controlled by the putative employer, whether they maintained separate business entities, whether they set their own hours, whether they were trained by the putative employer, whether they were paid an hourly or fixed rate, whether they provided their own equipment, whether they had their own offices, or whether they advertised their own businesses. If they did not provide similar services to others while working for the putative employer, they were almost always deemed to be employees for purposes of receiving unemployment insurance benefits.

In 2012, one division of the Colorado Court of Appeals reaffirmed this decades-old case law effectively mandating a single-factor test. Western Logistics, Inc. v. ICAO, 2012 COA 186. Another division of the Court of Appeals, however, rejected the stringent, single-factor test, holding for the first time that agencies and courts must instead apply a multi-factor test to determine whether an individual “is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, or business related to the service performed.” Softrock Geological Servs. v. ICAO, 2012 COA 97. In Softrock, the Court of Appealsstated that the factors to be considered in the “customarily engaged” inquiry are the nine factors set forth in statutory section 8-70-115(1)(c), which defines evidence that must be included in an independent contractor agreement to create a presumption that a worker is an independent contractor rather than an employee. In March 2013, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeals in both the Western Logistics and Softrock cases in order to finally determine the appropriate test for deciding whether a worker is customarily engaged in an independent business for purposes of the CESA.

Single-Factor Test No Longer Dispositive

In its decision yesterday, the Supreme Court concluded that the appropriate test for courts and agencies to apply is a totality of the circumstances test that looks at all the relevant factors bearing upon the relationship between a worker and his or her putative employer. The Court rejected the stringent, single-factor test used in Western Logistics and numerous other cases, finding that relying on a single factor – i.e., whether a worker provides similar services to others at the same time he or she works for the putative employer – is unfair to putative employers because it leaves the independent contractor determination up to the unpredictable decisions of workers. For instance, it ignores the putative employer’s own intent regarding the working relationship, and also ignores whether workers even desire to find other work in the same field.

In its decision, the Court broadly adopted the Court of Appeal’s approach in Softrock, concluding that the statutory factors should be considered in determining whether a worker is engaged in an independent business under the CESA. However, the Supreme Court went even further, holding that other factors may also be relevant to this determination. The Court rejected “a rigid check-box type inspection,” and opted instead for a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the working relationship between a worker and his or her putative employer where no single factor is dispositive of the worker’s status.

Interestingly, just last week, yet another division of the Colorado Court of Appeals anticipated the Supreme Court’s ruling in these two cases, concluding that virtually any relevant circumstances may be considered in weighing independent contractor status. The decision rejected both the Western Logistics single-factor test and the Softrock multi-factor test that limited the determination to just those factors specifically delineated in statute. See Visible Voices, Inc. v. ICAO, 2014 COA 63.

Many Factors May Determine Independent Contractor Status

The Supreme Court’s new totality of the circumstances test is very helpful to putative employers because it allows them to prove independent contractor status based on the entire working relationship between the worker and the putative employer. A putative employer seeking to prove that a worker is an independent contractor engaged in an independent business or trade may now produce evidence bearing upon the nine factors set forth in statute, showing that the putative employer did not:

Require the worker to work exclusively for the putative employer; except that the worker may choose to work exclusively for that business for a finite period of time specified in the independent contractor agreement;
Establish a quality standard for the worker; except that the putative employer can provide plans and specifications regarding the work but cannot oversee the actual work or instruct the worker as to how the work will be performed;
Pay a salary or hourly rate but rather a fixed or contract rate;
Terminate the worker during the contract period unless the worker violates the terms of the contract or fails to produce a result that meets the specifications of the contract;
Provide more than minimal training for the worker;
Provide tools or benefits to the worker; except that materials and equipment may be supplied;
Dictate the time of performance; except that a completion schedule and a range of mutually agreeable work hours may be established;
Pay the worker personally but rather makes checks payable to the trade or business name of the worker; and
Combine the putative employer’s business operations in any way with the worker’s business, but instead maintains such operations as separate and distinct.

The putative employer may also invoke other evidence not set forth in the statute, but nonetheless relevant to whether the worker maintains an independent trade or business. As suggested in recent cases, these factors include, but are not limited to, whether the worker:

Maintains an independent business card, listing, address, or telephone;
Has a financial investment in the project or risks suffering a loss;
Uses his or her own equipment on the project;
Sets the price for performing the project;
Employs others to complete the project; or
Carries liability insurance.

Although we have yet to see how the courts and agencies will apply this new totality of the circumstances test, putative employer should try to satisfy as many of these factors as possible in order to establish that workers are independent contractors, not employees. Putative employers should also continue to use independent contractor agreements that satisfy all the statutory factors needed to create a presumption that workers are independent contractors. However, there is now no limit to the types of evidence putative employers may invoke to establish independent contractor status, and putative employers are no longer bound by the outdated rule that workers must always offer their services to others at the same time the work for the putative employer in order to be considered independent contractors.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.