Tag Archives: FLSA

November 23, 2016

DOL’s Overtime Salary Threshold Increase Is On Hold – Now What?

6a013486823d73970c01b8d1dc5d4a970cBy Mark Wiletsky

Many human resource professionals got into the office today not knowing whether to laugh or cry. Most are happy that the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) new overtime salary requirement will not go into effect next Thursday, December 1, 2016, due to a federal judge’s grant of a nationwide preliminary injunction which prevents the DOL from implementing and enforcing the new rule. (See our post yesterday reporting on the injunction.) Yet, many organizations have already spent countless hours preparing for the new rule to go into effect next week and are wondering what to do now. Let’s review where things stand and your best options going forward.

Nationwide Injunction Delays Final Overtime Rule 

In September, twenty-one states sued the DOL in federal court in Texas seeking to stop the DOL’s final rule that more than doubles the salary threshold for the so-called white collar exemptions and calls for automatic increases every three years. Business groups and industry associations also filed suit in the same Texas court seeking a similar outcome. The state-plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. Shortly thereafter, the business-plaintiffs filed an expedited motion for summary judgment. The two cases were consolidated under Judge Amos L. Mazzant, III.

On November 16, 2016, Judge Mazzant heard oral argument on the state-plaintiffs’ emergency preliminary injunction motion. He issued his ruling yesterday, granting the preliminary injunction on a nationwide basis.

To prevail on their preliminary injunction motion, the states needed to show, among other things, that they would have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their case. The court ruled that the states met that burden, finding that the plain meaning of the executive, administrative, and professional exemptions in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) focused only on the duties of such positions, without a minimum salary level. The court stated that although the FLSA delegated authority to the DOL to establish the types of duties that might qualify an employee for these exemptions, it did not authorize the Department to disqualify employees who meet the duties requirements but do not meet the salary level established in the DOL’s final rule. The court concluded that the DOL exceeded its delegated authority and ignored Congress’s intent by raising the minimum salary level so that it “supplants the duties test.”

Anticipating The Next Legal Move

The preliminary injunction is only the first step in this legal challenge to the DOL’s final overtime rule, but it provides a huge blow to the Obama administration’s efforts to raise wages for U.S. workers. The DOL could appeal the court’s ruling to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, but according to a DOL statement, the agency is still “considering all of [its] legal options.” Whether an appeal would be successful is unknown. Absent an appeal, the Texas lawsuits continue, with a permanent resolution still to be decided. Read more >>

June 21, 2016

Supreme Court Avoids Deciding Whether Car Dealership Service Advisors Are Exempt From Overtime Pay

Mumaugh_BBy Brian Mumaugh

The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) 2011 rule that stated that “service advisors” at car dealerships are not exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), but declined to take the final step by declaring them exempt under the FLSA. Instead, the Court sent the case back to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to analyze whether service advisors are exempt under the applicable FLSA provision without regard to the DOL’s 2011 regulation.  Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S.  ___ (2016).

Duties of Service Advisors

At issue are the “service advisors” in a car dealership’s service department. These advisors typically greet the car owners who enter the service area, evaluate the service and repair needs of the vehicle owner, recommend services and repairs that should be done on the vehicle, and write up estimates for the cost of repairs and services before the vehicle is taken to the mechanics for service.

While service advisors do not sell cars, and they do not repair or service cars, they are essential in the sale of services to be performed on cars in the Service Department. Consequently, the issue is whether they fall within the FLSA exemption for salesmen, partsmen, or mechanics. The case before the Court involved numerous service advisors who sued their employer alleging, among other things, that the dealership failed to pay them overtime wages.

DOL Had Flip-Flopped On Exempt Status

In 1970, the DOL took the view that service advisors did not fall within the salesman/mechanic exemption and should receive overtime pay. Numerous courts deciding cases challenging the DOL’s earlier interpretation, however, rejected the DOL’s view and found service advisors exempt. After the contradictory rulings, the DOL changed its position, acquiescing to the view that service advisors were exempt from overtime pay. In a 1978 opinion letter, as confirmed in a 1987 amendment to its Field Operations Handbook, the DOL clarified that service advisors should be treated as exempt.

After more than 30 years operating under that interpretation, the DOL flip-flopped again in 2011. After going through a notice-and-comment period, the DOL adopted a final rule that reverted to its original position that service advisors were not exempt and were entitled to overtime. It stated that it interpreted the statutory term “salesman” to mean only an employee who sells automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, not one who sells services for automobiles and trucks, as service advisors do.

Dealerships were understandably unhappy with the final rule and continued to challenge the DOL’s position in court. As cases went up on appeal, the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals ruled that the DOL’s interpretation was incorrect. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, ruling instead to uphold the agency’s interpretation. Those contradictory decisions led the Supreme Court to take on the issue in the Encino Motorcars case. Read more >>

March 22, 2016

Class-Action Lawsuit Permitted To Rely On Sample Data To Determine Wages Owed

Husband_JBy John Husband

In the absence of actual time records, time spent by employees donning and doffing protective gear may be established by representative evidence in order to establish the employer’s liability for unpaid overtime pay in a class action lawsuit, ruled the U.S. Supreme Court today. The Court rejected the company’s argument that each employees’ wage claim varied too much to be resolved on a classwide basis. Instead, the Court upheld the class certification, sending the case back to the district court to determine how to distribute to class members the $2.9 million dollar jury award. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. ___ (2016).

Pay For Donning and Doffing Protective Gear

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), it is well established that employers must pay employees for time spent performing preliminary or postliminary activities that are “integral and indispensable” to their regular work. In the Tyson Foods case, over 3,300 pork processing employees sued, alleging that the company failed to pay them for time spent putting on and taking off required protective gear at the start and end of their work shifts and at meal periods. The employees argued that such time was “integral and indispensable” to their work and that when added to their weekly work hours, pushed them beyond 40 hours per week resulting in unpaid overtime.

Because Tyson Foods did not keep any time records for donning and doffing time, the employees presented representative evidence of the time spend on those activities, including employee testimony, video recordings of the donning and doffing process at the plant, and a study by an industrial relations expert, Dr. Kenneth Mericle. Dr. Mericle analyzed 744 videotaped observations to determine how long various donning and doffing activities took, concluding that employees in the kill department took an estimated 21.25 minutes per day while workers in the cut and retrim departments took an estimated 18 minutes per day. Using that data, another expert added that time to each employees’ recorded work time to determine how many hours each employee worked per week.

Tyson Foods argued that because the workers did not all wear the same protective gear, each individual plaintiff spent different amounts of time donning and doffing the gear. Therefore, Tyson Foods maintained that whether and to what extent it owed overtime pay to each individual employee was a question that could not be resolved on a class-action basis. Importantly, Tyson Foods did not attack the credibility of the employees’ expert or attempt to discredit the statistical evidence through its own expert, but instead opposed class certification on the basis that the individual variances of the time spent by each employee made the lawsuit too speculative for classwide recovery. 

Employee-Specific Pay Inquiries Do Not Destroy Class Action

The Court determined that the employees’ use of Dr. Mericle’s representative study was permissible to establish hours worked in order to fill the evidentiary gap created by the employer’s failure to keep time records of the donning and doffing activities. The Court refused to define a broad-reaching rule about when statistical evidence may be used to establish classwide liability, stating instead that it would depend on the purpose for which the evidence was being introduced and the elements of the underlying action. It ruled it appropriate to rely on  sample evidence when each class member could have relied on that sample to establish liability if he or she had brought an individual lawsuit. In the wage and hour context, if the sample data could permit a reasonable jury to find the number of hours worked in each employees’ individual action, the “sample is a permissible means of establishing the employees’ hours worked in a class action.”

The Court, in its 6-to-2 decision, refused to rule on the issue of how the jury’s $2.9 million award would need to be dispersed among the class members and how to prevent uninjured class members (i.e., those whose donning and doffing time did not result in overtime) from recovering any part of the award. In fact, Chief Justice Roberts, writing a separate concurring opinion, expressed his concern that the district court would not be able to devise an allocation method that would award damages only to those class members who suffered an actual injury. But, because the majority found that the allocation methodology issue was not before the Court, the case gets sent back to the trial court for that determination.

Litigation Tactics To Oppose Class Certification

The Court noted numerous litigation strategies by Tyson Foods that may have proved fatal to its case. First, Tyson Foods failed to move for a hearing to challenge the admissibility of the employees’ expert study by Dr. Mericle. A so-called Daubert hearing would have offered Tyson the chance to keep the representative sample out of the trial which may have eliminated the employees’ evidence of time spent donning and doffing protective gear.

Second, the Court noted that Tyson Foods did not attempt to discredit Dr. Mericle’s sample evidence through an expert of its own. By focusing its trial strategy only on attacking the class certification issue, the jury was left without any rebuttal to the employees’ experts.

Finally, Tyson Foods rejected splitting the jury trial into two phases, a liability phase and a damages phase. Instead, it insisted on a single proceeding in which damages would be calculated in the aggregate and by the jury. The jury came back with a $2.9 million award, which was half of what the employees’ sought, but still a significant award against Tyson Foods.

Blow To Businesses Defending Class Actions

Although the Court refrained from approving the use of representative data in all class-action cases, the Court’s decision makes it more difficult for employers to object to sample data when defending a class or collective action. Noting that representative data is not an appropriate means to overcome the absence of a common employer policy that applies to all class members, per its 2011 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes decision, the Court allowed representative data to fill the evidentiary gap regarding hours worked where each employee worked in the same facility, did similar work, and was paid under the same policy.

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March 17, 2016

New Overtime Regulations May Be Finalized Sooner Than Expected

Biggs_JBy Jude Biggs

The U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) agenda specifies that its final overtime regulations are due to be published in July, but recent developments suggest they may be released a few months earlier.  With the salary threshold for the white collar exemptions going up from the current $23,660 to over $50,000 per year, employers need to prepare now for the changes.

DOL’s Overtime Rule Sent To OMB

On March 15, 2016, the DOL sent its proposed final overtime regulations to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) which is the final step before the rule can be published. The OMB review process typically takes one to two months, but speculation suggests that the review of this rule may be sped up to allow for publication as early as April or May.

The political environment in Washington, D.C. and fact that this is an election year may be to blame for the expedited process. The Congressional Review Act (Act) provides Congress with 60 legislative days to review any final rule issued by a federal agency. If Congress disapproves of the regulation, which current Republicans in Congress are sure to do with the overtime rule, it may pass a resolution to nullify the rule. The President can veto that resolution, but then Congress has the opportunity to override the veto by a two-thirds vote.

Because of an unusual provision in the Act, any new rule that is not submitted to Congress within 60 session days of the adjournment of the Senate or House, may be subject to a renewed review by the new Congress in the next Congressional session (with potential veto by a newly elected President). Or, if Congress’s 60-day-review period extends after the presidential inauguration, the new President may let a resolution of disapproval stand, killing the rule. The Obama Administration will not want to take the chance that a new Congress and/or President gets to review the overtime rule in 2017 so it is expected that the White House will do everything possible to get the new overtime rule to Congress prior to the cutoff date.

Salary Threshold For Exemptions Will More Than Double

The DOL’s proposed rule raises the salary threshold for the white collar exemptions from the current $455 to an expected $970 per week, more than doubling the annual salary level to more than $50,000. The salary threshold for the highly compensated employee exemption will increase from the current $100,000 to more than $122,000 per year. The DOL estimates that almost five million U.S. workers who are currently exempt will be entitled to minimum wage and overtime compensation under the new salary level requirements. In addition, the final rule will include an automatic annual adjustment provision that will require that the salary thresholds be adjusted each year to keep up with inflation.

Next Steps

With a compressed timeline for the new rule to become effective, employers need to take steps now to decide how to handle employees who no longer qualify as exempt under the new rules. Some companies may choose to increase exempt employee salaries to meet the new threshold in order to retain the exemption. Others may choose instead to change the status of some workers’ status to non-exempt and pay them overtime. Either way, employers need to get a plan in place to prevent headaches and potential wage claims when the final rule goes into effect.

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November 4, 2015

2016 Colorado Minimum Wage Going Up To $8.31 Per Hour

Hobbs-Wright_EBy Emily Hobbs-Wright 

Minimum wage workers in Colorado will see a one percent increase in their hourly wage in 2016. The Colorado Division of Labor has proposed to increase the minimum wage from the current $8.23 per hour to $8.31 per hour beginning January 1, 2016. The minimum wage for tipped employees will increase from $5.21 to $5.29 per hour. 

The Colorado Constitution mandates that the state minimum wage rates be automatically adjusted for inflation each year. The new wage rates for 2016 reflect that the consumer price index (CPI) for the Denver-Boulder-Greeley urban area for the first half of 2015 went up overall by one percent from the first half of 2014. The Bureau of Labor Statistics noted that higher costs for housing, up 5.5%, were largely responsible for the overall increase. Food prices rose 1.5 percent and other items were up 3.2%. Despite a 21.7% decrease in energy costs, the overall CPI for urban consumers was up one percent. 

Proposed Minimum Wage Order Number 32 will be up for comment at a public hearing on November 9, 2015, after which the Division of Labor will issue its final rule. Information about the hearing and submitting written comments is available on the Division’s website

As a reminder, Colorado’s state minimum wage rates apply if either of the following two situations applies to an employee: 

1. The employee is covered by the minimum wage provisions of Colorado Minimum Wage Order Number 32; or 

2. The employee is covered by the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 

If in doubt about the application of Colorado’s wage laws, be sure to consult with your employment counsel.

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August 24, 2015

Home Care Workers Entitled to Minimum Wage and Overtime

BWiletsky_My Mark Wiletsky 

Agencies that provide companionship or live-in care services for the elderly, ill or disabled will now have to pay their home care workers minimum wage and overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Reversing a lower court decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) new regulations that removed those employees from the “domestic service” exemption. The Court also struck down the challenge to the DOL’s revised definition of companionship services that now places a duty restriction on workers who may be considered exempt. 

Extension of FLSA Protections Is Reasonable 

For years, individuals who provide companionship or live-in care services were exempt from the minimum wage and overtime rules under the FLSA, even if those individuals were employed by a third party.  In 2013, however, the DOL reversed its prior interpretation of the domestic service exemption, adopting new regulations stating that third-party employers of companionship-services and live-in employees could no longer use the exemption to avoid paying minimum wage and overtime pay to their home care workers. The new regulations also narrowed the definition of companionship services: a worker providing exempt services can spend no more than 20 percent of his or her total hours worked on the provision of care, including meal preparation, driving, light housework, managing finances, assistance with the physical taking of medications, and arranging medical care. 

Before the new rules went into effect, trade associations representing third-party agencies that employ home care workers challenged the DOL’s new regulations in court and the district judge declared them invalid. The lower court ruled that the DOL’s decision to exclude a class of employees from the exemption because they were employed by a third-party agency contravened the plain terms of the FLSA. The court also threw out the DOL’s revised definition of companionship services, with its 20 percent limit on care-related tasks, as contrary to both the text and intent of the statutory exemption. 

On August 21, 2015, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia disagreed and upheld the new regulations. The appellate court found that the FLSA exemption did not specifically address the third-party employment question and therefore, the DOL had the authority to create rules and regulations to fill in the gap. 

The court also determined that the DOL’s new interpretation was “entirely reasonable.” The DOL explained that its change in policy was due to the change in the market for home health care. In the 1970’s, professional care for the elderly and disabled was primarily provided in hospitals and nursing homes so that services in the home were largely that of an “elder sitter” or companion. More recently, however, individuals needing a significant amount of care were now receiving that care in their own homes, provided by professionals employed by third-party agencies rather than by workers hired directly by care recipients or their families. These changes, as well as Congress’s intent to bring more workers within the FLSA’s protections, convinced the court that the DOL’s changed interpretation was reasonable. 

Potential Adverse Effects of FLSA Coverage Unfounded 

The third-party agencies challenging the DOL’s regulations argued that requiring minimum wage and overtime pay for home care workers would raise the cost of their services, making home care less affordable and creating a “perverse incentive for re-institutionalization of the elderly and disabled.” The DOL countered by pointing to fifteen states where minimum wage and overtime protections already extend to most third-party-employed home care workers and noted that there was no reliable data that these pay protections led either to increased institutionalization or a decline in the continuity of care. The DOL also cited the industry’s own survey that indicated that home care agencies operating in those fifteen states had a similar percentage of consumers receiving 24-hour care as those agencies in non-overtime states. 

The DOL further argued that the new rules would improve the quality of home care services, thus benefitting consumers, because the revised regulations would result in better qualified employees and lower turnover. It would also reflect the reality that home care workers employed by third-party agencies are professional caregivers, many of whom have training or certifications, who work for agencies that profit from their employees’ services. The appellate court found the DOL’s position reasonable, upholding its regulations. 

No Standing to Challenge Narrowed Definition of Companionship Services 

By ruling that the third-party agencies could not use the domestic services exemption, the court removed the ability of those agencies to use the companionship services definition to exempt home care workers from minimum wage and overtime protections. As a result, the trade associations’ members challenging the new, narrowed definition of companionship services would not be directly harmed by the revised definition. Because they would not suffer any injury from the narrowed definition, the challengers lacked standing to oppose the revision, denying the court of jurisdiction to resolve that issue. Consequently, the court ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the DOL. 

Practical Effect for Home Care Employers 

Pending any appeals, the DOL’s new regulations removing the ability of third-party home care agencies to exempt their home care workers from FLSA minimum wage and overtime pay will go into effect. Employers of home care workers should take steps now to ensure that they comply with the FLSA minimum wage requirement for all hours worked as well as paying an overtime premium for all hours worked over 40 per week. In addition to updating your pay practices, be sure to revise any affected policies and statements in your employee handbook, operational manual, timekeeping procedures, job advertisements and recruiting materials.

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July 20, 2015

Unpaid Internships Permitted Under New Test

Williams_BBy Brad Williams 

A federal circuit court has adopted a new test permitting employers to use unpaid interns where the “tangible and intangible benefits provided to the intern are greater than the intern’s contribution to the employer’s operation.”  In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 2015 WL 4033018 (2nd Cir. July 2, 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected a stringent and outdated six-part test promoted by the Department of Labor (DOL) for determining whether “interns” are actually “employees” within the meaning of federal wage and hour law.  Glatt will have a significant impact on intern-initiated litigation, including by making class or collective actions more difficult to prosecute in jurisdictions that adopt the test. 

Background to Glatt 

Internships have become a hot-button topic in recent years.  In 2010, the DOL issued “Fact Sheet #71” to educate private sector, for-profit employers about unpaid interns and to dissuade their use.  Derived from a 1947 U.S. Supreme Court case that addressed the use of “trainees” hoping to become railroad brakemen, the Fact Sheet listed six criteria that the DOL believed must be satisfied for interns to be excluded from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) minimum wage and overtime requirements.  Most notably, these criteria included requirements that employers derive “no immediate advantage” from interns’ activities and that interns not “displace” regular employees (e.g., by preventing their hiring, or by absorbing overtime hours).  The DOL took the position that all six criteria must be satisfied for the “trainee” / “intern” exception to apply.  However, because most employers receive at least some benefit from unpaid interns, the DOL’s rule would effectively preclude all private sector, for-profit businesses from using unpaid interns, except in unusual cases involving bona fide educational programs and job shadowing. 

Based largely on the DOL’s position, interns initiated a wave of class and collective actions across the country alleging that they had been wrongly classified as “interns” rather than “employees.”  Despite ambiguity in the controlling case law, employers settled many of these lawsuits at great expense and out of fear that satisfying the DOL’s six-factor test would prove impossible.  For instance, Condé Nast settled a class action involving 7,500 interns for $5.8 million in 2014, and Saturday Night Live settled a similar lawsuit involving thousands of interns for $6.4 million that same year.  Other employers elected to discontinue their internship programs altogether to avoid the threat of litigation. 

Case Law Response to DOL’s Six-Factor Test 

Despite employers’ capitulation in the face of class and collective action threats, the actual test for distinguishing between “interns” and “employees” under the FLSA has always been ambiguous.  Although the DOL has long promoted its six-part test, it has vacillated in opinion letters and other administrative guidance regarding whether all six criteria must be satisfied.  For their part, courts have afforded the DOL’s test some deference, but have rarely held that all six criteria must be met.  Instead, they have considered the “totality of the circumstances” or the “economic realities” of interns’ and employers’ relationships in determining whether interns (or similar workers) are actually “employees.”  Many of these cases are based upon U.S. Supreme Court cases like Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947), and Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).  Other courts – most notably the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch.. Inc., 642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011) – have eschewed the DOL’s six-part test altogether, favoring a “primary beneficiary” test which looks at which party receives the primary benefit of an internship.  In Solis, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the “primary beneficiary” test was supported by Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947), the very same 1947 U.S. Supreme Court case on which the DOL purported to base its six-factor test. 

District Court Decisions in Glatt and Hearst 

The Glatt case was originally filed in 2011 in New York by former interns of Fox Searchlight Pictures who had worked on the film Black Swan.  A similar lawsuit was filed in 2012 in New York by former interns of Hearst Corp. who had worked on magazines including Harper’s Bazaar and Marie Claire.  Both cases were high-profile and amongst the first wave of intern-initiated lawsuits to work their way through the courts.  Both were closely watched by employers concerned about the legality of internships. 

In 2013, the district court in Glatt held that two of plaintiffs were “employees” rather than “interns”/ “trainees” under the FLSA and state law.  The court applied a version of the DOL’s six-factor test but did not expressly hold that all six factors must be satisfied.  The court also granted class and conditional collective action certifications to a third plaintiff. 

Also in 2013, the district court in Hearst held that the magazine interns were not “employees” under the FLSA and state law based on a “totality of the circumstances” test.  The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.  Because Glatt and Hearst addressed the same issues, but reached different results, they were eventually consolidated for argument on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Second Circuit’s Adoption of “Primary Beneficiary” Test in Glatt 

On July 2, 2015, the Second Circuit issued its long-awaited decision in Glatt.  That same day, it issued a summary order in the companion case, Hearst.  In Glatt, the court rejected both the DOL’s six-factor test, and the plaintiffs’ insistence that they were automatically “employees” of Fox Searchlight Pictures because the company had received an “immediate advantage” from their work.  The court found the DOL’s six-factor test unpersuasive, and afforded it virtually no deference because it was based upon the DOL’s reading of Walling, which the Second Circuit concluded it was equally competent to construe (along with other U.S. Supreme Court cases). 

Accepting Fox Searchlight Pictures’ argument, the Second Circuit adopted a “primary beneficiary” test, holding that “the proper question is whether the intern or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the relationship.”  Although not fully articulated in the court’s decision, this test is supported by both a defensible reading of Walling, and later U.S. Supreme Court cases mandating consideration of the “totality of the circumstances” and the “economic realities” of the parties’ relationships.  To help lower courts apply the new test, the Second Circuit listed seven non-exclusive factors to consider in determining whether an intern or an employer is the “primary beneficiary” of an internship: 

  • The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly understand that there is no expectation of compensation.  Any promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests that the intern is an employee—and vice versa. 
  • The extent to which the internship provides training that would be similar to that which would be given in an educational environment, including the clinical and other hands-on training provided by educational institutions. 
  • The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s formal education program by integrated coursework or the receipt of academic credit. 
  • The extent to which the internship accommodates the intern’s academic commitments by corresponding to the academic calendar. 
  • The extent to which the internship’s duration is limited to the period in which the internship provides the intern with beneficial learning. 
  • The extent to which the intern’s work complements, rather than displaces, the work of paid employees while providing significant educational benefits to the intern.
  • The extent to which the intern and the employer understand that the internship is conducted without entitlement to a paid job at the conclusion of the internship. 

Because the district court in Glatt had not expressly considered these factors, the Second Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings.  Given its holding in Glatt, the Second Circuit also vacated the district court’s decision in Hearst and remanded for further proceedings. 

Glatts Impact in the Second Circuit and Beyond 

Glatt’s “primary beneficiary” test is more favorable to employers than the DOL’s six-factor test.  The fact that employers receive some benefit from interns’ work no longer means that internships are automatically illegal.  In addition, the individualized assessment required to determine whether an intern – as opposed to an employer – benefits more from an internship under the test means that class and collective actions might now prove impossible to certify.  In fact, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s class and conditional collective action certifications in Glatt, and affirmed the district court’s denial of class certification in Hearst.  This strongly suggests that class and collective actions may no longer be appropriate vehicles for resolving intern classification disputes in jurisdictions that apply the new test.  To the extent that Glatt or Hearst proceed in the courts below, the defendants will likely face liability only as to individual interns, not entire classes.

Glatt’s new test is currently only the law in the Second Circuit, which covers Connecticut, New York, and Vermont.  However, the test for distinguishing between “interns” and “employees” remains in flux in many jurisdictions, and other federal circuit courts may adopt similar tests as more intern-initiated lawsuits work their way through the courts. For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit – which covers Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming – currently applies a “totality of the circumstances” test based on Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993).  However, like Glatt, Reich recognized that the DOL’s six-factor test was unpersuasive, and the case contains language consonant with Glatt’s “primary beneficiary” test. 
The Tenth Circuit may eventually adopt a more favorable standard if and when it revisits intern classification.  Regardless of how the case law develops, however, Glatt plainly illustrates the weakness in the DOL’s six-factor test, and shows that employers may profitably resist intern class or collective actions, even when it requires making new law.

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March 23, 2015

FMLA and FLSA Lawsuits Are Increasing

Wiletsky_MBy Mark Wiletsky 

The U.S. federal courts saw a whopping 26.3 percent increase in the number of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) lawsuits filed last year over the prior fiscal year, according to statistics recently released by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Wage and hour lawsuits alleging a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) were up a significant 8.8 percent. These filings are the highest they’ve been in the past 20 years of annual statistics reported by the courts. 

The increasing numbers of lawsuits brought under those two employment laws may reflect how difficult it is to understand and administer wage and hour and leave laws. The increase also may be due to the heightened awareness by workers of their rights and benefits under these laws. Regardless of the cause of the increase, the numbers suggest that it is worthwhile for employers to focus their compliance efforts in these two areas. 

Self-Audit Your Pay and Leave Practices 

Before you find yourself defending a lawsuit, take the time to review your payroll and FMLA policies and practices, including these often tricky issues: 

  • Classifying workers as exempt versus non-exempt from minimum wage and overtime pay requirements
  • Calculating each non-exempt employee’s regular rate of pay and overtime rate
  • Rounding time at the beginning and end of shifts
  • Automatic deductions for meal periods
  • Treating workers as independent contractors rather than employees
  • Tracking time worked remotely or “off-the-clock”
  • Providing FMLA notices within required time period
  • Calculating FMLA leave for workers with irregular schedules
  • Administering intermittent FMLA leave
  • Not penalizing employees who have taken FMLA leave 

If your self-audit reveals any irregularities, take steps to revise your policies and practices to bring them into compliance with the applicable laws. Don’t forget state and local laws that may impose additional requirements related to pay and leave administration. If in doubt, don’t hesitate to consult with your legal counsel so that you don’t become one of next year’s statistics.

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March 9, 2015

DOL May Issue Interpretations of FLSA Exemptions Without Notice-and-Comment Process

Mark Wiletsky of Holland & Hart

By Mark Wiletsky 

Today the Supreme Court sided with the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), holding that a federal agency’s interpretive rules are exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. ___ (2015). The Court’s decision means that the DOL (and other federal agencies) may issue initial and amended interpretive rules without advance notice and without considering input from interested parties. 

DOL “Flip-Flopped” on Interpretive FLSA Rule 

In this case, the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) challenged the DOL’s most recent interpretation on whether loan officers fell within the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) administrative exemption following a series of “flip-flops” in the DOL’s interpretation. In 1999 and 2001, the DOL issued opinion letters stating that mortgage-loan officers do not qualify for the administrative exemption to overtime pay requirements. After new regulations regarding the exemption were issued in 2004, the MBA requested a new interpretation under the revised regulations. In 2006, the DOL issued an opinion letter in which it changed its position, deciding that mortgage-loan officers do qualify for the administrative exemption. In 2010, however, the DOL changed its interpretation again when it withdrew the 2006 opinion letter and issued an Administrator’s Interpretation without notice or comment stating that loan officers once again do not fall within the administrative exemption. 

The MBA sued the DOL, claiming that the DOL needed to use the notice-and-comment process established by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when it planned to issue a new interpretation of a regulation that differs significantly from its prior interpretation. 

Distinction Between Legislative Rules and Interpretive Rules 

In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the text of the APA specifically excludes interpretive rules from the notice-and-comment process, so the DOL was free to change its interpretation on loan officers qualifying for the administrative exemption without providing advance notice or seeking public comment first. The Court pointed to the difference between “legislative rules” that have the force and effect of law, which must go through the notice-and-comment period, and “interpretive rules” that do not have the force and effect of law and, therefore, are not subject to the notice-and-comment obligation. 

Finding that the clear text of the APA exempted interpretive rules from the notice-and-comment process, the Court overruled prior precedent in a line of cases that has come to be known as the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine. Under that doctrine, if an agency had given its regulation a definitive interpretation, the agency needed to use the APA’s notice-and-comment process before issuing a significantly revised interpretation. The Court’s ruling today specifies that no notice or comment process is needed for interpretive rules, whether it is an initial interpretation or a subsequently revised one. 

Implications of Court’s Decision 

Today’s ruling means that the DOL’s interpretation excluding mortgage-loan officers from the administrative exemption stands. More broadly, it means that federal agencies, such as the DOL, are permitted to issue and amend interpretations of their regulations that will take effect immediately without any advance notice to the regulated parties. Accordingly, employers should stay on top of new developments so as not to miss any new regulatory interpretations that may impact their employment practices.  

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February 23, 2015

Exempt Employee Salary Deductions for a Reduced Schedule

Brad CaveBy Brad Cave

Classifying an employee as exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) comes with a trade-off.  Most employers know that exempt employees are not entitled to overtime.  But, in exchange for that benefit, the FLSA limits employers’ ability to reduce the exempt employee’s salary, even when they are not coming to work.  However, exempt employees are not immune from needing time off of work to recover from a medical condition, to settle an aging parent into an assisting living arrangement or to handle a long-term behavioral issue with a child. If an employee seeks some time off each week to take care of such matters, you may agree to allow the employee to work a reduced work schedule for a period of time. But when payday rolls around, must you pay the employee his or her full weekly salary or can you deduct pay to reflect the reduced work schedule? Missing this answer can have significant ramifications for the employee’s exempt status.

FLSA Salary Basis

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, exempt employees’ pay must meet the salary basis test, which means that the employee must receive a predetermined amount of salary for each workweek, without reductions because of variations in the quality or quantity of work during the week. Thus, deductions from salary for reduced working hours is generally not permitted under the salary basis test. Deducting pay for the missed time could result in the loss of the employee’s exempt status. However, two exceptions may apply to your employee.

FMLA Leave Can Result in Pay Deduction

If the employee’s reduced schedule constitutes unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the FLSA regulations permit employers to “pay a proportionate part of the full salary for time actually worked” without risk to the exempt status. This means that if your employee is missing work for an FMLA-qualifying reason, you may deduct pay from their weekly salary to reflect the unpaid FMLA leave time.

PTO, Sick Leave or Other Paid Leaves

If the employee has accrued PTO, sick leave or another type of company-provided paid leave, you can require that the employee use such paid leave to cover the partial day absences, as long as the employee continues to receive the full amount of their weekly salary. And, once the employee uses up all of their accrued paid leave, you can make salary deductions for full-day, but not partial-day, absences.

Saved Wages Vs. Loss of Exempt Status

Deductions from an exempt employee’s salary should be made only after careful consideration of the potential consequences. After all, the salary you save now for missed time may seem trivial if you lose the exempt status of this and all similarly-situated employees and owe them overtime for the past two years.